POLITICAL STUDIES

PANEL IV
ELITE-MASS RELATIONS

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Kaplan: Project 4:1, U.S. Goals and Values, deals with providing a somewhat clearer and more coherent formulation of American goals and values, on the grounds that to specify our aims or interests in terms of preservation of peace is scarcely an adequate basis for making clear what the content of our program might be.

Lasswell: I do not see much virtue in the project as it is now set up, but I think that there is lurking somewhere a project which might be worth taking into account. I am struck by the fact that in affecting the future our problem is to influence expectations about how world processes are coming out. When we deal especially with intellectual and other groups in intermediate countries, there is a great deal of consideration of what the future world historical process is likely to be. One of the difficulties which Americans have in talking to intellectuals, semi-intellectuals, and men of action in some of these intermediate countries, is the fact that they are not in a position to give a plausible basis for expecting that the "American way of life" is not going to lose out in the visible future in competition with Russian "socialist-communism" or whatever terms are used to talk about it. We might recommend keeping an eye open for the kinds of presentation of the development of the political process which could be presented experimentally to chosen groups with the idea of noticing whether or not conviction is carried at high level. One quick exemplification of what I mean is this. It is possible to present to some intellectuals the possibility that the significant developmental processes we are going through now are not simply from capitalism to socialism but from a caste-bound society through a period of sharp rivalries between socialist and non-socialist institutions -- a process which, if crisis is sustained, will lead, not to the realization of socialism or capitalism or any other form of a mobile society, but rather to the restoration of a caste-bound society. Formulations of this kind, elaborated and backed in suitable ways, might be the kinds which one might look for, indeed deliberately simulate, and then try out in dealing with the intellectuals and advisors in the intermediate areas.

Neumann: I share the skepticism with regard to the project. The cards are stacked ideologically and politically for socialists and communists, in view of the profound skepticism in Europe, and in view of the growing skepticism in the United States. Nothing much can be gained by another study. The real trouble is the analysis of the validity of the Marxian doctrine of social development applied to the United States, and the answer that begets it.

Kaplan: What we have done so far is to discriminate three different sorts of projects, one of which both Lasswell and Neumann have agreed isn't much worth pursuing. The first would be some attempt to analyze or set forth what are the valuations which are now current, and I take it you felt is not worth pursuing. There are two separate problems which are of some interest, one to analyze the trends that you could expect both here and in Russia and elsewhere, and the other a problem of effective techniques of presentation of the materials of these trends to be used in psychological warfare and in other ways.

Fox: It isn't necessary to throw out the original formulation in order to accept the desirability of doing the second sort of thing. The discussion has shifted from ends to means; it is becoming a problem of merchandising with which we are dealing. It is probably still true that there are things which social scientists can say to policy-makers which would improve the standards available in the decision-making process. While we are all perhaps agreed that we don't need to convene any more *ad hoc* committees to spin out of thin air what should be American aims and values, there might very well be considerable research on the attempt to state more precisely standards of action -- first, by making some rough approximations, then by testing them by detailed examples of particular difficult choices, with a view to saying some things which would make it less likely that in the future decisions will be made only with a view to achieving some particular end which a given decision-maker has in mind, rather than putting it against the whole spectrum of American objectives. I would be rather opposed to simply throwing out the notion that it is useful to try to state standards of action in American foreign policy.

Stouffer: I am not quite sure what is meant by formulation of trends. Do you mean a projection into the future of what the line should be, given this or that contingency? For example, suppose we go into the tailspin of an awful depression; then the problem of the apologia for capitalism, let us say, contrasted with socialism, becomes somewhat different from what would happen if we managed to maintain something like our present level of production. Is that the sort of thing you mean -- anticipating what might happen to our economic life or to our international relations, and then preparing an appropriate set of apologia, as it were, to meet each type of anticipated forecast?

Lasswell: This is one of the possibilities which is involved in anticipating short-range fluctuations in economic processes; it represents but one aspect of this thing, which may not turn out to be the crucial one. At the present time I think that an analysis of expectations which prevail in very large areas about Russia and America, about the future of capitalism and socialism, and the future power struggle of the world are rather pessimistic with regard to the United States. What I am suggesting here is whether or not there are ways of viewing the future that can lead any of these people to feel that, whether they like it or not, there is a strong possibility that American power will be conserved in the future. This involves essentially an analysis in terms of future reference statements, because this is a struggle for the control of expectations, not the control of preferences directly. Or rather, it is the control of preferences as a function of your control over expectations. I am simply stressing here the point that the most fundamental expectation which is shared around the world with regard to the world political process consists of statements about the inevitable triumph of socialism and statements about the inevitability of revolution and the inevitability of the successful inauguration of

Lasswell: these institutional changes. I have noticed, and this is no unique personal experience, that in many situations our American intellectuals and officials, to say nothing of other members of communities, are quite unqualified to meet a competent intellectual of rigorous Marxist orientation and clarify to him a plausible alternative. What is more amenable to change is the presentation of these alternatives, not to the crystallized and disciplined Marxist with his academic and personal stake in retaining his position, but the presentation to people in the intermediate areas or to people at various positions in the social-structure who are still somewhat unsettled or capable of being unsettled by the consideration of systematic alternatives. For instance, in one of the intermediate countries I met with a group of about eight technical social scientists. They were all friendly toward the United States and wanted the United States to maintain its integrity. These individuals were, with one possible exception, convinced that the days of the United States and capitalist institutions were numbered, and that the expansion of Russian power and of Russian institutions was certain. I presented to them in the course of four hours an alternative way of thinking about what the future was likely to be. I came back through about ten days later, and was interested in the fact that some of these persons apparently said to a third party that it was the first time that they had been exposed to an intellectually challenging set of alternatives. What I am interested in from that point of view is the following: what are the kinds of formulations that would produce such a response on the part of the persons occupying a determinant position in the social process?

Neumann: My objection is to the merchandising of apologias being placed in the foreground of discussion; I consider it of secondary importance at the present time. The present situation is not one in which we have to work out alternatives, because we are living in the atmosphere of complete smugness. I don't think there is any doubt about that. It is taken for granted that nothing will change fundamentally. I have not seen a single challenge to the conception that the process of peaceful change can go on and on. The only criticism to this kind of nonsense by American scholars living here is a very inferior attempt, but nevertheless an attempt, to point out that the process can't go on like that. The first problem is a problem of understanding among ourselves rather than of studying what may be a likely development, and if we agree on any statement, then seek to have alternatives and seek for means of controlling and manipulating the changes. I don't think we have anything to sell yet. What's there to sell except the concept that the democratic process can go on and on?

Fox: There are two kinds of expectations involved. Lasswell has started out by stating as a fundamental expectation that unless a conscious effort is made, one may expect that the in-between world will drift away from us. This process of altering their expectations in such a way that our own expectations will actually be improved can go on not only on the verbal front but on the economic and military fronts as well. Presumably there is a proper placing of words and goods and guns involved. There is another kind of expectation too which has to be altered. We not only have to make the in-between world and ourselves believe that our side has a chance, but we have to make the in-between world have an interest in seeing that that chance is maximized, and that involves altering or revising their expectation as to what would be the consequences of the United States being in a more influential position rather than in a less influential one. There we might ask ourselves whether it is necessarily true that we lose the ideological balance, whether there are ways

Fox: of formulating American foreign policy so that it not only looks as if this country's position could be maintained, but as if the consequences of its being maintained would be desirable. Speaking in monosyllabic terms, we can go to the in-between world and say "We will let you be what you want to be."

Neumann: This is not the problem; I would say that we can maintain our position and without the slightest doubt. That is what the problem is about, a problem of economics -- who has the power to maintain our position? There probably is a focus of ideological attraction which is something very different from simply being a big power -- a problem of creating a society in which men are happy. We are faced with a great challenge with this conception. You can maintain your power status perhaps better by being a Fascist country, by being a dictatorship, by concentrating all war powers, economic, political, social powers in one hand.

Lasswell: Let me restate this here, because this is a matter of some importance, and see whether or not we can define our differences in case there are differences, and underline our agreements in case there are agreements. I am suggesting that it is not a foregone conclusion that the United States will maintain its power indefinitely without acting as an ideologically attractive center. I deny Neumann's proposition if he intended to state it in that form.

Neumann: I didn't intend it -- I say "maybe".

Lasswell: If Neumann does not intend to be taken absolutely in his statement about the future, I would say that we are in agreement that the degree to which the United States is ideologically attractive beyond its borders has some power implications. What I am suggesting here is an exploration into the ideological alternatives which are open to us for enhancing this ideological attractiveness. I am suggesting that one of the ways open to us is to search for existing formulations, if any, which perform this function or are capable of performing this function, so that they may be perfected and utilized in different publics. I share Neumann's pessimism about the existence of perspectives about the future which are adequate for this role to a considerable extent. However, I think I can point to some instances of at least partially formulated perspectives of a type which I suggest are capable of development along the line specified. All that is proposed here is that there should be the development of these alternative perspectives, and that one of the concurrent problems is what Neumann dismissed contemptuously as the "salesmanship" problem. I am thinking of it not only in the vulgar sense of over-selling a dumbbell by over-impressing him in some fashion. I am also interested in sharing a clarification and finding in the course of an interaction between the description of other people's potentialities and our own tentative formulations, the clarifications which will in fact function as we hope. I don't think, Neumann, that we are too far apart. I am merely taking advantage of your statement to attempt to shade it in a way which would make more articulate the view which I have.

Kaplan: In formulating our problem in terms of an analysis of trends and possibly changing trends, by means other than the use of symbols, enhancing our ideological attractiveness, the assumption is very frequently made that it is perfectly clear what eventualities or what trends would in fact be attractive, and which would not. The problem is very often supposed to be a problem of trying to indicate that the trends do in fact follow this line rather than the other. It is often supposed that

Kaplan: economic values or certain patterns of economic security have a definite and a fixed value in world perspectives and in people's individual ideologies, philosphies, outlooks; and that our problem is to assure them that in fact there is every reason to expect that it will be possible for our country to continue with institutions very like its present institutions without being confronted periodically with major depressions, etc. The problem I am raising is whether or not there is any need for a more careful consideration, not of what will happen, but of the values of the different possibilities if they did happen. I would not go so far as to say that is actually the issue, because it may be very debatable whether that is a correct formulation; but it is at least a common formulation of one of the issues between the democratic idea and the Marxist-Socialist, -- that between freedom on the one hand and security on the other. It may be that we would want to explore alternative ways of analyzing or posing that kind of issue. It may be that we would want to accept the issue as formulated in that fashion, but to insist that the value of freedom has for such and such reasons not been adequately appraised in relation to the values of security. What I am suggesting is that what may be involved in this research planning area, in addition to the two problems on which we have thus far attained some measure of agreement -- in addition to the problem of an analysis of the trends in their bearing on our ideological attractiveness and the problem of salesmanship in the sense in which we now understand it -- there may also be a problem of appraisal in terms of our values, or other value standpoints, of the trends which might possibly be realized.

Marquis: I would be willing to buy this handbook for intellectuals in combating Marxian arguments and trends. If we were to embark on that, what would be the best procedure for constructing it? This is not a new idea, of course. People have recognized the need for it ever since Marx threatened our stable institutions. I should like to know whether there is some new lead, some new slant, or some new procedure which makes it seem reasonable to undertake it again. Do people feel that a committee such as is proposed would be able to do something which individuals in the past have not been able to do?

Herring: I think the philosophical implications of this problem have been very well stated; it has been discussed both as a basic philosophical question and also as a problem in manipulation. I think, however, the last question raised is the one that we should give most thought to; namely, granting its philosophical importance and its manipulative usefulness, how can we approach this in terms of a research undertaking? I wouldn't attempt answering that, but I make one comment--that if we attempted a clear and coherent formulation of American goals and values as individuals and as a nation we would come up with an enormous complex of attitudes and contraditions; it would be a triumph of clarity and coherence if one could take all of that and perfect it in that fashion. Yet it seems to me that the fact that our goals and aspirations and values do possess much that is contradictory is perhaps one of the most important aspects of the phenomenon. I can at least imagine a research undertaking that would attempt such an inventory. We face outward to the rest of the world with an ideology that has very strong roots in our history and tradition. There is much in that history and tradition that is relevant and much that is highly irrelevant, and there is a tendency on our part to talk in terms of stereotypes that have a very limited application. There is a tendency, for example, to identify capitalism and democracy; and once you have made such an identification, the attitude you take with regard to current policies is very much affected. I think that unless we can think through the effect of our traditions on our current policy, we may quite

Herring: conceivably lose out in this ideological battle; not only in terms of lack of attractiveness on the part of our ideology, but also in lack of effectiveness on the part of our actions because they are not realistically based. It seems to me that if we could dream up ways of approaching this thing as a rigorous research undertaking it would be well worth knowing the preponderance of certain goals; for example, the hold that the conception of capitalism -- it is a complex of all sorts of attitudes, words, etc. -- has on opinion might possibly be ascertained. One might ascertain the distinctions in peoples minds between loyalty to certain words such as "democracy" or "capitalism" or "free enterprise", and the way in which they would react in terms of the tariff policy or aid to a particular nation at a given time, etc. One of the first accomplishments might be some better understanding of our own internal contradictions, and once we had begun to achieve some greater degree of understanding, our skills as manipulators might be greatly enhanced and the wisdom of the policy-makers increased also.

Kaplan: The sentiment of the panel is that although we are unable now to see along just what lines research in this area would proceed, the problem is important. It might well be worth giving some serious attention to the possibilities of carrying on lines of research that would enable us to deal with it.

Andron: Apparently the call is for a Capitalist Manifesto, in effect, one that would be equally effective as another famous one. I think it is very important that such a manifesto be written in terms of European experience. The principle difficulty that we have today in explaining our goals and values to the European is that such a manifesto isn't written in terms that have meaning or relevance to European life. I would suggest that since it requires a spark of genius, and I don't think it could possibly be the work of a committee, that a canvass be made of the many distinguished European scholars in the country; that is to say scholars of European background, and that one or more of them be persuaded to attempt such a project.

Kaplan: Project 4:2, is another research planning area that has been designated as "Political Peacefare" of which presumably the conflict of ideologies is only one aspect. Again we are dealing with a research planning area and not with any specific line of research.

Neumann: The only answer to the problem as I see, we have discussed in the panel on Political Psychology. It is the analysis of past psychological warfare. I don't know of any study which seriously undertakes to analyze psychological warfare.

Lasswell: It is extraordinary that the type of autopsy which I have heard about goes no further than the rather official self-service statement. I feel that it is extremely valuable to emphasize the importance of autopsy. I know of no work I would regard as adequate to the task.

Andron: I can add to that that I know personally of two agencies where such a self-service survey has been written, where no outside scholars have come in, where the history was written by one of the personnel or a group of the personnel.

Lasswell: There should be some definite recommendation that there be a serious investigation of the past experience of various countries in psychological warfare -- just flatly like that -- and that given a preference for a field of inquiry. That

Lasswell: leaves entirely open all of the experimental or research design problems.

Kaplan: I take it by psychological warfare you would not mean to confine the investigation to an analysis of propaganda techniques and their effectiveness.

Lasswell: No, indeed.

Marquis: Would this be broad enough to include some positive methods as well as threats, negotiations, competition and infiltration; things such as economic aid and trade agreements?

Kaplan: I would certainly have supposed so, at least so far as these economic measures are considered from the standpoint of their effect on demands and expectations.

Kaplan: Project 2:a begins to deal with a more specific problem in this general field -- the role of European social democracy. My understanding is that the intent of this research proposal is to consider what bases there might be for predicting the behaviour of socialist but non-communist parties in Europe in anticipated crisis situations, particularly with reference to their ability to withstand or to succumb to pressure either from the communist or from other types of groups. The problem is obviously an important one with regard to certain general aspects of the American policy, since opposition to such groups, if there is a reasonable expectation that they would in fact maintain their independence, would actually be lessening their chances of their doing so; and if in fact there is no ground for expectation that they would maintain their independence, but on the contrary submit, would also be counter to other long-run aims.

Neumann: It is a study of the extent to which European social democracy can actually maintain its autonomy. I would say that a study should not require more than six to eight months to carry out.

Fox: I should think that we ought to be equally interested in any trans-national grouping of attitudes and loyalties in Europe, of which social democracy would be a primary example, but the new Christian parties in Europe would be another example. As a practical study it ought to be elevated to strict equality and carried through in the same way.

Lasswell: If we are thinking in terms of a continuing intelligence process to be set in motion which will give our decision makers what they need at the time they need it in the future, I should think that one would want to think equally about the importance of surveying these trans-national organizations not only in Europe. There is expansion territorially as well as functionally, and since we are here thinking in terms of the kinds of information which are of great importance for major policy decisions I should think that with equal plausibility one could insist upon the enlargement of this program.

Kaplan: Project 4:2b is "The Effect of Nationalization on Policies", addressed particularly, I suppose, to the assumption that changes in the direction of nationalization can be equated with certain definite political changes. I assume that the intent of this research proposal is to examine whether that assumption is warranted

Kaplan: or what qualifications have got to be introduced to it in specific cases.

Neumann: The project arose from a purely political consideration which, in view of the present, is the reason why we have an official policy toward nationalization. The policy is simply to permit nationalization wherever it arises through democratic processes, provided American property is not destroyed. There is a considerable amount now of indecision and lack of clarity as to what nationalization actually involves in Europe and what our policy ought to be. Mr. Neumann, as a matter of research organization do you think that it might be just as plausible to conceive of this project as one in close association with the continuing territorial surveys of the development of the political tension in any given country? 'Nationalization' is a term that covers such a variety of practices, such a variety of expectations and operations in many of these intermediate communities, that the effects which may be expected to flow from it will depend to a very considerable degree upon the special characteristics of that pattern and to the context in which they are found. I wonder, therefore, whether the formulation of the project in terms of the study of nationalization as a head on investigation is as fruitful as emphasizing the wisdom of making certain that in the territorially oriented studies you have an evaluation of the effect of nationalization. The reason that is particularly pertinent is that it has a great deal to do with the way one would apportion one's research resources.

Neumann: It may not be necessary since the Foundation of Foreign Affairs in Washington, for instance, is currently engaged in a study of nationalization. There may be a number of other such studies coming out.

Herring: I think the problem of nationalization could be stated as a good article. The processes would have to be followed in some such way as Lasswell indicated. In other words, it is very important to identify the problem adequately. It is a very good topic.

Kaplan: Project 4:2c deals with what has been called The Determinants of the "Revolutionary Situation". This is intended to be a study of the factors that can be identified as either increasing the likelihood or indicating the imminence of a revolutionary coup.

Fox: This project seems to be superficially something like the project for a belligerency index, in which we asked ourselves whether there were certain high sensitivity data which one ought to watch continuously in order that a red light go on five minutes before the explosion took place, giving us time to dive for the storm cellar. This particular proposition was given very unfriendly reception by the panel that dealt with it, and my notion is that if that is what is thought of here, perhaps the same sort of treatment could be given to this particular suggestion.

Kaplan: A belligerency index idea was brought up again in another panel; I understood that the lines of objection were directed against the supposition that it would be possible to obtain numerical data which could be more or less mechanically construed to indicate a danger situation. It was felt, on the other hand, that of course one would be interested in being able to trace lines of causal connection between belligerency and various other data which are open to direct inspection.

Kaplan: In the problem at hand, it isn't necessary to suppose that our intent is to arrive at anything like an ingenious warning system. But one might still feel that possibly our understanding of revolutionary situations as adapted to present circumstances is sufficiently unclear or unsure, or has a sufficient need of more concrete data, as to render fruitful some thought directed specifically to that problem.

Lasswell: A more general project defined to highlight those data which are indicators of impending change rather than simply those which deal with a change from one particular status to another, namely peace to war, is something that I could be in a great deal of sympathy with. Any project would be highly desirable if it would make it easy for those in charge of American policy to know that a given political situation was highly unstable and subject to drastic redefinition with a comparatively light application of external pressure.

Kaplan: That is, you are suggesting that the project be reformulated in terms of determinants of political change.

Neumann: A project in terms of political change would be so loose that you would get everything in it. The study of revolution is quite an important subject provided the description is changed, because we are faced with two types of revolution that even Marx's theory embraces, including the doctrine of the *coup d'etat* as evolved by Malaparte, for instance. These are two very different types of revolutionary change which must be strictly kept apart. On revolution, the factors are so indeterminate that you cannot possibly come to any very complete statement. This is not the case as far as the doctrine of the *coup d'etat* is concerned. This indeed would be a worthwhile enterprise.

Fox: Would you also agree that it is possible to posit a series of situations varying from a very stable political equilibrium that very likely would not be upset by anything that is likely to happen, to a very high instability in which it would seem a miracle that it wouldn't be upset; and to create indices so that accurate estimates would be continuously made in the countries around the world as degree of stability or instability?

Kaplan: Among such determinants the matter of attitudes would certainly play an important part.

Stouffer: It might be of very great interest to observe the kind of attitude material that is already being routinely collected by the various European polls, particularly if in some of these countries there is something like a crisis situation developing, to see whether or not any of the attitude material of that sort anticipated it. It might be possible even to go beyond that in anticipation, if a theory could be worked out more adequately to stimulate the asking in some of these countries of the kinds of questions which we would like to check on. A good deal of cooperation could be obtained from the French Institute of Public Opinion. In some other places where there are at least vague threats of revolution it might be possible to assemble some kind of data. You might plan something in advance so that if there were a *coup* in one of these countries, the carefully analyzed attitudes expressed by certain types of people and groups would really add something to what you probably would be able to postulate theoretically. I don't know whether it would be worth much. I am not terribly enthusiastic about it.

Berelson: Is Project 4:1, (U.S. Goals and Values), meant specifically to limit the sort of salesmanship that was considered to elite intellectuals, or is the problem also one of "selling" that sort of material to broad groups in the population?

Lasswell: Both, with the emphasis at the start on experiments designed to reach the custodians of systematically defended expectations about the future, but that would not constitute the entire study. There would be concurrence in one's attempt to explore in some situations the impact of material which is addressed to a large audience, simultaneously with what happens when you direct material to one person very intensively.

Neumann: This is first a theoretical problem of studying the inspiration of revolution. It is a problem whether the Leninist concept of revolution is valid today in countries which are either directly or indirectly already under the Soviet impact. It is a problem that Trotsky formulated -- (I don't know whether you know the English book of Mrs. Chawley's, *Arms and the Revolution*) -- whether the change in the nature of the military equipment of a country has not made revolution absolutely impossible unless the armies themselves are involved. It is a problem whether, regardless of social situations, regardless of instability, regardless of internal tension, by skillful manipulation on the top you can seize power. These are very important and probably the most fascinating problems of political science today.

Fox: This project is obviously split in two: the kinds of study which Neumann has suggested which I think we would all agree is essential to a proper rounding out of contemporary political theory, and a project to collect data which is not now being collected systematically according to some pattern.

Kaplan: Project 4:2d is titled "Changes in Foreign Policy by Political Eventualities." This suggests a more or less sytematic attempt to follow out the consequences on the basis of whatever knowledge is now available, theoretical and empirical, so as to forecast what appears to be the most probable course of changes in policy from a selected set of political eventualities which are themselves thought to be likely enough to be worth pursuing.

Lasswell: It makes sense to think of a group of specialists who will have access to a varity of information. They commit themselves to expectations about contingent future developments, and then conduct an autopsy on their own forecasts with a view to the continuous critical evaluation of forecasting within the limits of the procedures available.

Stouffer: That idea might be implemented by taking some of the past predictions made, and getting the experts to go back and analyze their own errors. In the process that might clarify a whole lot this personal prediction problem.

Lasswell: That's a very interesting idea that Stouffer has proposed. This is a suggestion that would represent a fixed and routine procedure in any continuing intelligence operation. Perhaps one of the ways to improve the bases of predicting in connection with actual policy work, is to put some people on the spot in this way and to give them a chance to operate for a few months or years with the idea of calling attention to the kinds of material which, if brought to their attention, would have increased their effectiveness. If the project has this intention it is an important technique for evaluation of the inadequacy of any given set of informa-

Lasswell: tion-gathering procedures.

Fox: Using past materials to improve the expectations of present policy makers is a useful project but probably not the project which the author of this suggestion had in mind. We might consider another interpretation of the project in order to see whether that too might not be useful. This is the problem of making advance preparation with respect to relatively uncontrollable eventualities. In this connection it is not important that one necessarily guess which is the more probable of several things, but rather that one shall have spelled out in advance what are the necessary adaptations if any one of the items in your spectrum of possibilities should happen to mature. Thus we would break down Stalin's death to Stalin's death now, and Stalin's death as result of old age twenty years from now. It would be unnecessary for us to guess whether, on the basis of a picture, he is good for five years or for twenty-five. We can distinguish sharply between that sort of thing and the second thing which was mentioned in the list, establishment of a UN police force. That is exactly the sort of thing where it is not necessary for us to guess but rather to decide. It's not a process of adapting to the relatively uncontrollable but of determining our priority of interest, and that is something we've dealt with in a series of other projects. I would re-entitle the project "Adaptation to Relatively Uncontrollable Eventualities".

Kaplan: These two problems have sometimes been formulated in methodological discussions as a difference between making forecasts and making predictions -- a difference between saying such and such events will occur and saying, if such and such conditions obtain (with no probability attached to their obtaining) then, these and these others will follow.

Marquis: I'd make a third proposal that this project might be interpreted to suggest something like the advance plans group in a military service -- to draw up definite plans with which to meet any possible emergency. Just as we have plans in case of an invasion on the west shore of Florida, so a policy department like State, could have plans for the eventuality of a revolution in Columbia. That is essentially a State Department function but one which they probably do not have staff enough to do. The main purpose would be to force a little bit more long-range foreign policy; to prevent decisions being made immediately by thinking out what you would do in various eventualities. This would perhaps be a mechanism for achieving a more integrated foreign policy, if not a better one.

Herring: I question the usefulness of setting up an eventuality department because of the difficulties there are in fore-casting as such -- that might be left with fortune-tellers and other experts in that field. The consideration of eventualities is a part of the process of thought that every policy-maker should pursue, but the emphasis is upon the fact that such an individual has a command of the data in his particular field, and upon that basis can consider alternatives and prepare himself for certain eventualities. The differences in emphasis is vital. I don't see any point in emphasising experts who would concern themselves with eventualities as such, but rather that experts with the substantive knowledge of some field should bear in mind the importance of considering eventualities.

Lasswell: Studies of political eventualities have, in addition to the points which have just been formulated, the following technical advantages: It is sometimes possible to discover in the society at a given time some persons whose focus of

Lasswell: attention is not too accurately described, but who are awfully good at calling the horses. They are exemplified by individuals who, as members of a given community, seem to be pretty good at guessing how the community is going to react to a situation. You then make a careful investigation of the focus of attention, that is to say, the bodies of rather specialized information that are brought to the notice of the forecaster, and then you use his forecast largely as a means for checking up on your knowledge-getting procedure.

Stouffer: This may be too abstract a subject to fit into the RAND program, but the study of the success of fairly complex predictions might lead to an improvement of the process by which predictions are made by responsible people. It might be possible to eventually formulate more adequately some kind of rules for defining the kinds of things that have to be taken into account. This is rather an interesting subject for some psychological research. It needs to be formulated with a lot of precision. I would guess that if you had ten good psychologists working on the problem for ten years that a little progress would be made.

Marquis: The problem of prediction is essentially the problem of the theory in the field. When your principles are established and you know how to apply them in local situations, then your predictions are good. The way to improve your predictions is to improve your principles and also their application. Therefore, any program for the improvement of prediction would have to include the improvement of theory, which is of course the whole field of political science. I should therefore not be terribly sympathetic with a project which was centered around the problem of predicting and checking predictions, but I would rather like to see that become a part of every project in which theory and its application is concerned. It might therefore, be a kind of roving project which would tie on to the tail of every other project, and which would force predictions to be made on the basis of theory. It is important not merely to record the prediction, but one must record the basis on which the prediction is made, otherwise no advance is possible.

Kaplan: This general problem of the reliability of prediction is not only relevant to RAND's interests, but of extreme importance. There are so many instances -- not only with regard to political eventualities, but on an enormous variety of matters -- about which it is necessary to have as good a judgment as one can, and for which there is no other basis at present than simply to consult what is widely recognized as expert opinion. I'm not sure that it's altogether true that the question of improvement is entirely limited to further improvements of the theory on which the prediction was based. For example, in consideration of that project some of the procedures that had been thought up were an analysis of the possible ways of combining opinions of a panel so as to obtain a more reliable prediction, etc.

Fox: Having foreseen that the Soviet delegation would take the lead in disarmament discussion and try to grab the morale initiative, the State Department is prepared very carefully for that eventuality. We have to assume with respect to that sort of thing, that it's not up to a group of social scientists speculating about the future of research in social sciences to try to help the State Department in that problem. There are some more general kinds of considerations. If one were examining various peoples' predictions (say before the first World War) as to what groups within each country in Europe were going to become stronger in the next thirty years, in terms of most of the available literature one probably would not have guessed that the Agrarian Party would have experienced a resurgence the way it did in almost every

Fox: country, and come to have political dominance. In that kind of miscalculation, the social scientists, working outside the field of specific policy, might be able to do something in the shape of considering alternative grand perspectives which might yield quite different sorts of results. The proliferation of the Christian parties all over Europe is a phenomenon which wasn't adequately foreseen and against which adequate preparation had not been made. I wouldn't want to say what are going to be some of the leading phenomena ten years from now which are not commonly foreseen.

Kaplan: The kind of self-appraisal which is ordinarily made in an operating agency is scarcely adequate to give us the maximum benefit from previous mistakes. One of the grounds for the worthwhileness of proceeding along some such lines as this project suggests, is to enhance the learning rate, or at any rate to make possible some greater improvement than would ordinarily be made in the usual course of arriving at policy.

Fox: It is a substantial possibility at the present time that the left wing of the Christian party and the right wing of the Socialist party will move closer together with consequences to both parties, and to the functioning of the democratic process. Alternatively the left wing of the socialist, and the right wing of the Christian parties may become dominant in their respective parties, with quite different consequences. It may be unnecessary for us to guess which is going to take place, but I should think that we ought to spell out, in case we don't succeed in influencing events in the direction that we wish to see them influenced, what steps would then have to be taken in case either eventuality occurs, and to adopt now a multiple contingency policy. It's not just a matter of doing some advance homework so that you can move within two minutes as soon as you know what's happened, but of adopting that policy which gives you a policy whatever happens.

Neumann: We have always been trying in the research division of the State Department to do what Fox suggested -- always to make alternatives. Of course, it's our job to make policies. The result always was that these things were discarded. If there is any research that doesn't come out with one specific proposition and solution, it does not effect the policy-maker at all.

Marquis: The same thing happened during the war in the War Department.

Neumann: In many fields, for instance the European situation, there are enough data to make intelligent forecasts and consequently intelligent suggestions for policy. In many cases it is possible but is not being done, simply because there is no staff to do it. All important research projects are carried out within twenty-four hours.

Lasswell: We are recommending that research operations which purport to outline the future deliberately subject themselves to this type of control, with the idea that they will have many of these implications which we are spelling out. The precise way in which that should be articulated with the operations either of a private research agency or a governmental research agency is one we can't solve now.

Marquis: Some of the things we are talking about would be achieved by an advance school, much as the military is served by the War College, the Staff and Command

Marquis: School, and the Industrial College, which undertakes policy problems.

Kaplan: Project 4:3 is a very broad one, "The Democratization of Dictatorships by Peacefare"; -- the study of the possibilities of instituting certain political changes, notably in Russia, by methods that fall short of the use of violence or the threat of such use.

Neumann: The whole basis of Mr. Kennan's plan rests upon the assumption of internal weaknesses in the structure of the Soviet Union which could be exploited. If that assumption is true the policy is justified; if the assumption is untrue the policy is likely to fail. There are really two problems: first, what are the weak spots in the Soviet system; and second, how can they be exploited? The first problem is the paramount problem. The structure of totalitarian morale is really the problem. During the war we had a fight with the British on how to measure morale in Nazi Germany and whether it's possible at all to measure morale. The British had quantitative studies made of newspapers, etc., in an attempt to draw a curve indicating the state of the morale in Nazi Germany. We rejected the procedure as totally inadequate, by maintaining that individual morale in a totalitarian country is a completely expendable factor, and that the total of individual attitudes does not say anything about the strength or weakness of the system.

Stouffer: The study made by Lickert's organization, based on interviews conducted in bombed areas in Europe, shows that contrary to expectation, the German people held the national leaders responsible for the bombing, and particularly were impressed by the way local leaders took advantage and got personal relative safety and comfort out of the situation.

Neumann: There are obvious tension points: The problem of nationality conflicts, the problem of bureaucracy versus masses, etc. There are any number of *possible* weak spots, but the problem is to see whether they are really weak spots.

Berelson: One suggestion about which I am skeptical is to analyze the publications directed at different groups and see over a period of time the extent to which any sort of tensions can be generalized.

Neumann: Most of our information we did not get from secret intelligence but from German publications.

Lasswell: Would one of the relevant projects be to keep track of how many demands in the name of small groups in the socialist state appear in the media of communication? You have the usual problem of interpreting any detail in terms of its context -- that includes its future which you don't see, and its past which is only generally recorded. The problem of evaluation would at least narrow down to such problems as: Here we do have a great increase in the number of demands made by the constituent groupings in the Soviet Union and then we might have a sudden dropping off of those demands. That would raise a great many obvious questions of interpretation and then you look around the rest of your context and see if you could make up your mind.

Neumann: You may come to different conclusions where psychological peacefare against the Soviet Union and psychological warfare meet, but still the results are of extraordinary importance.

Fox: Do we agree that in its present statement the project implies too simple a formulation of what is the American interest? To state it in the forms of restoring civil liberties and introducing democratic institutions perhaps underemphasizes certain very slight possibilities which do exist, while emphasizing progress toward objectives which are quite unattainable. Because of certain twists and turns in Soviet policy, people in charge of formation of Soviet policy do not always automatically agree spontaneously that a particular thing is the right thing to do. Within our own experience we have seen Mr. Litvinov taken off the shelf and put back on the shelf from time to time, and we are entitled, therefore, to say that there are plural elements which can be appealed to. Our problem therefore is to help our policy makers to adopt policies which will influence the weight of one group rather than another in the Soviet Union, so that Soviet policy will pursue a direction which we find as little distasteful to us as possible. Beyond that, the possibility of promoting a balanced distribution of power in the Soviet Union as opposed to a monolithic power structure is, I think, a more fundamental objective which we should always strive to work for.

Kaplan: You have suggested in part that in addition to the focal point, (tensions between elite on the one hand and mass on the other, in terms of consideration of morale) there is possibly an even more fundamental problem to consider of tensions within the elite, of one part of the elite to the other. Project 4:3a is the Reactions of Ruling Groups to Internal Pressures; the problem stated is similar to a study of these conflicts within the elite and procedures that have been adopted by the more powerful sections of the elite in its treatment of the other less powerful ones.

Herring: If Project RAND did nothing else but carry on a very thorough and systematic study of our experience with psychological and economic warfare, I'd be willing to dismiss many of these more imaginative projects, and say, "There is a body of data and experience that could keep many men busy for many months. The importance of this approach is that it's tangible, the stuff is there and it's not being exploited and it's not too late.

Stouffer: It's tangible in one respect and intangible in another. You do have descriptions of what they did, but you have no descriptions that are worth a damn about the effect of what they did.

Neumann: The agencies are sometimes inclined to overestimate the effect of psychological warfare and one has to reduce it afterward to a reasonable estimate. You have a large number of surveys made after the war in Germany and Japan on the effect of psychological warfare. The participants change their stories, the recipients change their stories gradually, and it will soon be impossible to get a fairly objective picture.

Herring: I question whether the approach of this project would get at the relevant factors, whether the problem really is one of eliminating totalitarianism, restoring civil liberties. The study of Russia could be approached in terms of an analysis of the problem of governments that you find in that great area viewed historically over a long period of time, as well as currently, in an effort to try to identify what the factors are that produce the kind of government that we observe. We do not observe democratic institutions operating, but those are not the terms of reference directly applicable. In Russia you have a great area with many different tribes and cultures, and the problem of getting some degree of order and culture among the

Herring: people in that great land mass has been the historical problem of the rulers of Russia. There is a tendency on our part to compare Russia with the United States where the problem is basically different. We could do it more effectively and more realistically if we could see some of these basic differences. In Russia, India, and China, for example, you would attempt to get at the basic problems that transcend any given ideology. Some of these problems are suggested in 4:3a on reactions of ruling groups to internal pressures. It might throw light on this problem and we could get away from too much concern with ideology and too much emphasis on our own vocabulary of value.

Lasswell: In 4:3 (Democratization of Dictatorships by Peacefare) plus 4:3a (Reaction of Ruling Groups to Internal Pressures), we are looking at what people who are on the outside of a dictatorship can do. Broadly speaking, some of their measures impinge rather directly on the elite, some of their measures impinge indirectly by reaching other layers of the population. This means that in any given setup, you have the possibility of stimulating pressure on the elite under some circumstances by directly stimulating the masses, if you can figure out any way to reach the Russian masses. It's plain that you do have ways of reaching the Russian elite, so if we make that broad separation of target alternatives we've got a way of considering the alternatives of action which are likely to confront policy-makers. Most of what is said here emphasizes the importance of maintaining as critical an evaluation as you can of what the changing internal pressures are in the Soviet Union. In particular, this would call for making use of whatever indices you can think of that are indicative of the state of internal pressure, and then exploring to see whatever signs there are that those changes in the internal pressure situation and the changes of the elite are in any way related to what is done to the Soviet Union from the outside -- either what is done directly to their officers in other countries, or to their satellites, to people who are their sympathizers in countries outside the Soviet Union, and then what is done to various layers inside the Soviet Union. At the present time we have very little opportunity short of war of directly reaching the masses, because we have not yet invented the communication devices, for instance, the number of radios which would make it possible to reach large audiences there. At the present time we get a good many indications which have not yet been evaluated because of sheer lack of time and research personnel. These indications reflect the responsiveness to experiences that members of the Soviet Union have outside and this is reflected to some degree in the contents of party documents, and especially in the official rules and regulations governing the degrees of decentralization in the conduct of various rebuilding, rehabilitation, industrial development, and other operations. It strikes me that one of the few tangible possibilities with respect to 4:3 and 4:3a is to emphasize the two lines of action. One is to underline the importance of maintaining a continuing detailed critical audit of the changes toward centralization and decentralization inside the Soviet Union -- a continuous evaluation of any impact on those responses which can be attributed to changes in the environment of Soviet Union. The other possibility is to look back at some of our experience in crisis situations in attempting to stimulate cleavages inside dictatorships. This last would especially involve the very critical evaluation of whatever we could find about the impact at different stages of crisis of what was done on the outside in relation to dictatorships. That's mainly war experience, but it is not only the relation between one belligerent and another, it is also the relations between allied and less actively belligerent powers. There's quite a gradation of these contracts which could be picked out for supervised study.

Herring: If we are thinking that the end objective is the democratization of Russia then it would be very important to appeal to the masses. I would argue that the history of Russian rule points to the fact that small groups have ruled the nation, and hence to get some effective influence you would not go to the masses but you would try, rather, to disrupt the elites or to support one faction against another.

Lasswell: One of the useful lines of investigation might be in the direction of systematically exploring whatever sources there are to indicate the relative strength of the several racial, nationality, and culture groupings-the extent to which they overlap adjacent territories, and the possibility of developing free governments on the outside at certain points, as techniques designed to offer favorable opportunities to dissident elites,etc., at a later stage in the war.

Kaplan: Project 4:3b deals specifically with the reactions of ruling groups to total changes in their power rather than to relative changes internally, vis-a-vis either the mass or sections of the elite or subordinate elite. It is proposed that a study be made, not only of Russia but also Britain and the United States, if possible to see whether there's any stable pattern of change in political policy as a result of changes either in the positive or negative direction in the total national power.

Fox: I object to the way the description is phrased: "How do power policies change with growth or loss of national power?" Power is not a substance which is capable of being measured by a single index, but power always has to be defined in terms of who wants what in a given situation. This is a pretty sterile sort of investigation if you want to establish an over-all index of strength or weakness or a change in strength or weakness.

Kaplan: I agree. I suspect that it's a matter of the formulation, that the intent of this research proposal was to investigate certain quite concrete and specific kinds of changes; for example, the changes in the relations between England and the various parts of the empire in the last decade or two.

Fox: There seems to be no relation whatsoever between the material that appears under research method and the material that appears under description. I should suppose that a really sophisticated statement of maximum mobilizable power would require national income analysis which only a good economist can do, rather than listing resources out of the World Almanac which political scientist have been doing for some time now.

Lasswell: Isn't what is useful in this topic covered in several other topics? It seems particularly clear that in evaluating the relative power position of the United States and Russia and different contingencies that it will be necessary to take into account the pertinent responses of the various elites. We know in general the ways to talk about the reactions of elite. What is pertinent to the problem is the context, the presentation of alternatives to action.

Kaplan: Project 4:1a is called "Leaders and the Decision Process" and is described as a study of the characteristics of effective leaderships on higher levels, modes of arriving at decisions, kinds and use of intelligence sources, personality traits, and social characteristics. The research method is described as close contact with

Kaplan: decision makers where possible, analyses, biographies, memoirs, diaries of successful or unsuccessful leaders. Here we turn to consideration of the specific persons active in making policy on high levels.

Berelson: The more general aspect of this, that is, leaders in general, business and industrial leaders and so on, is the subject of an extensive project of the Navy Human Relations Committee, so if this is referred to the other and gets its specific slant toward Russian leaders and decisions, then we would not be completely neglecting the general problem.

Fox: One more thing might be conveyed with the message that the military and naval leadership ought not to be excluded from the study of the leadership characteristics of high level government officials.

Kaplan: Project 4:4 is "Politics of Military Occupation", the systematic study of the intended effect and the actual effect, together with the methods of occupation practices in Germany and Japan, in particular from the political standpoint -- i.e., the relation of these factors to diplomatic maneuvers.

Stouffer: Is there any systematic program for some outfit to look at those 500 or 600 studies that have been done on this subject in an attempt to synthesize them or draw any general conclusions from them?

Neumann: I have proposed to the School of International Relations (?) to make a list of the various studies that are being made, and it is being thought of publishing a set of journals from the School which would be devoted to a considerable extent to surveying publications. The most important publications in the field of military occupation should and can be made accessible to the general public.

Fox: Among the major, usually unstated, alternatives in the grand strategy of American policy in the next few years is preventive war against certain powers. A major evaluation of the appropriateness of that policy would depend on what one could do with victory if one won it, and a major bit of information which one would have to have is a reasonably accurate estimate of America's capacity to administer some large areas of the world if it should achieve the total defeat of the government in that area. Therefore, there is a very considerable political point in drawing together our experiences in military occupation in order not to undertake something which we don't have the resources to carry through, or to fight through a military level something which we can't hold on to from the past military level.

Kaplan: We are all agreed that the problem indicated here is extremely important and worth pursuing, but the feeling is that enough is already being done in this area both in the preceding detailed studies and in the present plans for a general survey of the results of these studies.

Neumann: Mr. Fox wants to draw lessons we already know from the German, and Japanese and Austrian experiences for future experiments in military government.

Kaplan: Or for future non-experiments.

Neumann: Yes, and if Lasswell's suggestion of organized peace after the next war should be carried out, this would be one of the major problems of the studies. Clearly

Neumann: then, our experiences with the military government will play a considerable role. But I don't see any use in repeating the analysis of military government policy.

Kaplan: Project 4:5 is "The Logical Analysis of Political Science Concepts", the intent of which is directed toward a problem of a fundamentally different sort then the others which we had considered. The other problems are problems either of arriving at empirical data of certain kinds, or of elaborating empirical hypotheses on the basis of such data. Here the concern is with the conceptual rather than the empirical level, and the aim is not so much to increase our knowledge as to clarify the knowledge which is already available. The research method is described at least initially, as an analysis to be carried out by a logician assisted by a political scientist. As a logician I am anxious that at the very least the project be modified by reversal of roles. It is a task which must be carried out by political science though there are instrumentalities of logical analysis which might be useful. Some work of this kind has already been carried out.

Lasswell: I have the feeling that it is important to encourage systematic work in this area. Whether it is appropriate for this range of research projects that we're considering will depend very much upon just how fundamental people want to make their attack.

Kaplan: One must settle whether or not in certain areas the kind of difficulties that face us are not, at least in some considerable measure, difficulties of primarily a conceptual kind. In some cases it is quite clear that our difficulties are lack of data and we then set about procuring them. In other cases they are difficulties of elaborating theories which will incorporate those data. There may be other cases of rather considerable urgency, not necessarily practical but theoretical urgency, which also require clarification on the conceptual level. Are such concepts as those given here: 'security' 'sovereignty', 'peacefare' sufficiently clear or can they be made so in the course of concrete empirical research so they would not require any high priority specifically logical analysis?

Lasswell: RAND has an unusual collection of mathematicians and statisticians and a good many of them are keenly interested in the rigorous organization of theory. One of the problems is to think out in speculative terms the procedures through the future by which a relevant stream of knowledge could be made available for decision. I can see some virtue in having a specialized logician especially acquainted with concepts (we're talking about the psychological and sociological processes) intimately working with this specialized group for the sake of developing a theoretical structure which would be adequate to the large task. If that is what is being planned, it would afford a remarkable opportunity for the interplay of high-powered technicians concerned with developing the utmost rigor in the postulational set up, and the developing of a plausible choice of operational indices not only for continuing trend description but for the purpose of analyzing interdeterminative relations.

Fox: Are you saying that it would be nice to have a logician and a political scientist whose predisposition would be logically rigorous, examining each project, but that this particular project as it stands is not something which necessarily needs to be pushed forward?

Neumann: What would you achieve? I am in violent opposition to the trend of hoping to any accuracy by watching the condition of consciousness. I don't see what words

Neumann: have to do with the content of theory.

Stouffer: What about the attempt to speculate on certain associations between a particular interpretation of the word "security" and certain other pehenomena? Logically you would predict and expect certain associations. Isn't that what was precisely implied in this sort of thing? If this is an attempt to work out a definition of "justice", or "security", or something like that, I would disagree; but if it is an attempt here to postulate certain kinds of relations logically, and to do that operationally in some such way that it is possible to check on it, I think political science needs it.

Neumann: A good political scientist does it without saying so.

Kaplan: Your consensus is that whatever is valuable, and what is suggested to you in this concrete situation, ought to be carried out in conjunction with concrete empirical analysis of a sort that had previously been considered. Project 4:b is "The Political Implications of Population and Industrial Redistribution". Is it your sentiment that the problem is largely a problem of economics or possibly of psychology and so little a specifically political problem that there is no room for particular discussion here?

Stouffer: I'm sure it is all those problems. Labor unions of the United States wouldn't want to see some immigrants brought in here. That's a political problem, a psychological problem, and an economic problem.

Neumann: There is a special project that I think Viner will rewrite. It deals with certain domestic repercussions of foreign policy, like immigration policy, tariff policy, border policy and things like it. Then there is a special topic in the economics section on development of non-industrialized countries.

Lasswell: There are several other dimensions of this problem. One dimension is: to what extent can you accomplish certain objectives by coercively redistributing population? What is its future role in an estimate of politics in relation to Russia, for example? We know very well many facts about the extent to which population redistribution has been a political instrument inside the Soviet Union, as well as a political instrument on the part of other powers. That certainly is a dimension of the political alternatives which are open to those who are making important power decisions. Another dimension is the problem of optimum distribution of population inside of the state in order to maximize the total political objectives. What's involved is the business of whether or not you try to induce, for example, bright, able and patriotic young people who have the appropriate background to settle Alaska. Certainly a number of problems of the sort which I have just briefly referred to are appropriate when you are considering the implications for policy of the shifts of population, and you can certainly look at the effectiveness of certain compulsory shifts. My tentative view is that the effect of population shifts on the situation which confront the decision-makers in the next few years, and conversely, the evaluation of the potentialities of the redistribution for the accomplishment of power objectives will be taken care of as an incident to these more inclusive investigations we have already sketched -- investigations of the future relationships between the two major power centers. For that reason I should think we would regard this as one of the dimensions of these other problems in international politics.

Marquis: It might be suggested to the Committee that it consider some of these things together. We have had two or three projects, and many other panels have had other projects, all of which involve sources of information which would have to come through State Department or Intelligence. It would seem wise to throw all of these together -- in terms of the mechanism of research, not necessarily of the problems. I think it's wise to discuss the problems separately, but there is a common problem of the mechanism of research. Essentially they all become adjunct research staff to the Russian desk in the State Department.

Neumann: The Russian Research Staff in the State Department, in view of lack of personnel, has been compelled to abandon the fortnightly situation report of Russian policies which it has been keeping up for four years.

Berelson: I am wondering if there are any systematic efforts being made anywhere to collect biographical data on the whole wealth of new leaders who are emerging.

Neumann: During the first year of occupation the biographical section in the State Department was compiling a monthly or two-monthly description of German political leaders -- that has been abandoned because of lack of staff.

Berelson: Would there not be an appropriate way to introduce some of these problems through RAND?

Lasswell: Actually, a good many of the projects which are coming up for discussion before the Committee, as well as some of the projects that will doubtless come before the meeting as a whole, do call for biographical information of this kind, and call for its processing in terms of circulation of the elite and kindred concepts. Here's a place again where Marquis' point is especially well taken. When it is decided which researches are appropriate, the mechanism of collaboration with these various official agencies will need to be worked out. This collapse of competent interpreters of data in the civilian side of the government is one of the outstanding problems.

PANEL V

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

H. Speier (Chairman)

C.I. Barnard	P. Herring
B. Brodie	H.D. Lasswell
W.T.R. Fox	F. Neumann
H.M. Gray	D. Young

Speier: Projects 5:1 and 5:1a are rather closely related. 5:1 is "The Content of General U.S. Foreign Policy and 5:1a is "U.S. Foreign Policy Traditions". The research method of 5:1a, toward the end, "testing the intensity of public resistance to a radical reorientation of policy if needed", suggests to me that the two subjects are so closely related that you can hardly separate them. You cannot very well talk about the content of foreign policy without talking about its traditions. Project 5:1a is a very composite product. It contains a number of related matters that may be separated. I think that project 5:1a, and by implication also 5:1, raises the following three questions: 1) What is foreign policy in terms of official policy statements? 2) How is it understood by others? That is, what is the opinion about foreign policy, what is foreign policy supposed to be, or understood to be? This seems to me to be slightly different from the first question, and 3) the question of intensity of resistance to changes in foreign policy is something which can be studied only if you know two things: the intensity with which people hold opinions about foreign policy and secondly, certain guesses about the influence of future circumstances that may effect the resistance to policy change.

Barnard: I would like to add a fourth item to that; what the foreign policy is behavioristically, as distinct from what it is as determined by written statement. It has come to my attention in the last two or three years that the country's foreign policy as stated by the President or by the Secretary of State, and what the country is actually doing not known to the public, are quite different things.

Fox: That seems to me to suggest a fundamental distinction between project 5:1 and 5:1a. Tradition is the wrapper in which the action is wrapped up -- the action itself may or may not bear a close resemblance to the wrapper. It is rather obvious that intensity of resistance to change is the intensity of resistance to change in what the policy appears to be, rather than what the content is. So that is tied to the second project rather than the first one.

Barnard: I didn't mean to suggest duplicity when I said that. I mean it's like personal behavior, unconsciously quite contradictory to the belief of the person who had it. You could illustrate that in connection with atomic energy policy -- the White House was in complete contradiction to what the government was doing.

Neumann: In so far as official policy statements are concerned it is quite unneces-

Neumann: sary to restate the principles that are more or less known. In so far as the real policy is concerned, it would be tantamount to an analysis of I don't know how many phases of American foreign policy. It would be a project that would be quite tremendous in character; therefore I do not quite see the bearing of this project unless we decide to establish a scale of preference and take specific problems out of the whole problem of what is the real American foreign policy. This is a tremendous subject. Among these scale of preferences there is something that appears to me as a very urgent problem to put it in a very crude way, how to win allies and to retain their allegiance. If you read Mr. X's well-known article in *Foreign Affairs,* you will find underlying the whole article the idea that in order to win allies we have to give way to trends toward collectivism in Europe, and that in American foreign policy, resisting those trends is doomed to failure. This is one of the crucial problems, if it is considered important to have allies and win allies; which means it is essentially a problem of a dilemma in American foreign policy. The dilemma can again be crudely stated -- that in supporting anti-communist trends we very often fall into supporting pro-fascist trends, and in supporting pro-fascist trends we actually counteract a basic principle of American foreign policy. This whole problem states what has been American foreign policy in terms of building up allies, not in regard to a policy statement which is well known, but in reality and as to what it should be. Is that policy really adequate to win and retain the allegiance of allies? I'll give you an example. We have a policy which has been repeated time and again on nationalization in Europe, -- that we won't oppose it. We don't like it but we won't oppose it, provided it is arrived at in a democratic manner, provided that American property interests are protected. The problem is to study these official policy statements in terms of their realization. Has this policy actually been adhered to, or have we done the opposite? If we have done the opposite, what is the result of this policy? You can take any other of these dilemmas in existence. This in turn leads to the project that has been indicated later as 5:3, the "Interaction of Foreign Policy with Domestic Policy". The question whether a country that is wholly dedicated to capitalism can actually promote or even stand for the policy of the promotion of collectivistic trends in Europe. We should carve out from the general project 5:1 a few such specific projects, rather than devote our attention and effort to doing very elaborate studies on what American foreign policy has been.

Brodie: If the description of the project is not one to raise reservations, certainly what is stated under research method definitely is. It is easy enough to produce a thoroughly cross-indexed dictionary, but what you do with it when you have it is the question.

Fox: Projects 5:1 and 4:1 have this in common, they cover the universe. As far as there is a distinction between them, it is artificial, namely between what is and what ought to be. If we are going to examine what is, with a view to perfecting our sense of what ought to be, we ought to look at it from an operational end; not what our goals and our values and our major policies have been, but try to develop a series of cases, of examples of decision making, in which we examine what the man thought he was doing, to the extent that what he thought he was doing was related to some larger ends which he thought he had. Then we ought to reconsider the ways in which the efficiency of his decision-making might have been improved by providing him with particular kinds of frameworks. In these large projects we ought to reject the notion of simply constructing the framework itself. We ought to build our data

Fox: by looking at actual cases, attempting restatements, and then by interaction gradually perfecting a position. Similarly, with respect to the study of foreign policy traditions and study of intensity of resistance, we might examine, by looking at actual cases, the extent to which the decision maker is forced to engage in inefficient decision-making because the traditions leave too narrow a range of alternatives open to him. We might examine the problem of how to broaden the range of tactical flexibility.

Speier: It is also possible that an inefficiency in decision making may be due to other factors in addition to the narrow range of alternatives.

Lasswell: I think the projects as outlined are subject to the criticisms which Neumann gave, with which I concur. Neumann suggested that we examine the problem of gaining allies. You may look forward to the problem of demoralizing the enemy, and you may look forward to the problem of maintaining your internal support as you undertake to accomplish many of these specified purposes. As part of the future you might look forward to the problem of consolidating a peace after the next war. If one formulates the relationship to any one of these ways one is then in a position to ask what kinds of method will give us knowledge of the predisposition of our own people with which we must deal, and a knowledge of the ways of changing the situation in which these groups may function which will increase the likelihood that we will get the effects that we want.

Neumann: The problem that Lasswell raised leads at once to a study of the future significance of neutrality, which I consider a very crucial one. There is a general belief that anti-communism in Europe is identical with the willingness of European people to fight in a war with the Soviet Union on the side of the United States. Is this assumption really true? In view of this situation, is it possible for, say, Great Britain to remain neutral? What does it mean? What should be our attitude if Great Britain should declare neutrality in a war? None of these questions has been seriously discussed anywhere. Yet I think that's exactly what we have to visualize -- the various situations that may arise in case of conflict.

Fox: I agree with Lasswell that we ought to try to envision the objectives towards which the particular decisions we are going to make ought to move. It makes no sense simply to pick the decisions we are going to analyze carefully without any sort of any criterion of judgment. We must begin by making some sort of rough and ready statement of what are presumed to be objectives. We simply label this a contingent statement, and then as a result of analysis of particular cases we may be able to state goals, conditions, etc., in a somewhat more refined way. One has to make a rough statement along the lines that Lasswell indicated before one could gather any sort of data on any rational basis at all.

Speier: Is there more or less agreement among us that an inventory of U.S. foreign policy in itself, without orientation toward particular objectives, is not a project to which we would be inclined?

Young: I agree with that statement. Would it not be useful to take specific elements of foreign policy, of dogma, in particular situations in our history, and make rather careful analyses with reference to whether they were actual policy or just dogma, how they were changed, how people were brought around, what could be done? A series of specific case studies of that sort might be extremely useful. If that were done I

Young: would certainly not be interested in an encyclopedia.

Herring: International relations is much too broad a rubric for Project RAND. The problem for us would be to see what point of departure we should clarify so that we could see possible research on international relations as it touched upon the objectives of RAND. These projects as set forth here have no focus. They range all the way from the sort of thing that is already accumulated in our libraries -- the studies of traditions in American foreign policy and the studies of the content of American foreign policy -- to slightly more specific topics. Our job is to attempt to give some orientation to the study of international relations, to determine the relevance of that kind of inquiry to RAND as a research undertaking. There is such a variety of projects listed that if we are really thinking of a research program that will relate in some fashion to action, that will have some internal coherence, we'll have to improve materially on these projects. To illustrate, it might be possible to study our experience with the good neighbor policy to ascertain in what fashion that has worked as a way of gaining allies in Latin America. You could study the good neighbor policy from many standpoints. RAND must have a sufficiently clear orientation so that when you turn to the good neighbor policy there would be certain relevant questions that you would raise. How did we extend our influence, what connection can we see between the success of that good neighbor policy and our total security position? Unless there is a pretty clearly stated viewpoint of RAND's research I don't see how we can draw up a program. I don't feel that these projects have been related very clearly. It's particularly difficult when you turn to the study of international relations.

Speier: The suggestion of such objectives of a study in most valuable. But we have not said anything as to how these studies might be undertaken. How do you study the question of how to gain allies, of how to consolidate the peace after the next war, and how do you study even the effect of a good neighbor policy, which is a fairly well defined project here? I raise this question with regard to the good neighbor policy in view of the fact that the influence of factors other than American policy in determining the success or failure of good neighbor policy are not taken into account in this project, and these factors vary from country to country. The question as to whether the good neighbor policy was successful or not can probably be answered, but the answer is not necessarily the answer to the efficacy of the American good neighbor policy as a policy. It may perhaps be useful if we could, in the case of one or another more specially refined project that has been suggested, go into the question of how to undertake the research, what method of attack to adopt or recommend. Almost any of the objectives suggested might lend themselves to such discussion. I have here the following foci: 1) how to win allies, 2) how to demoralize the enemy, 3) how to maintain internal support for a foreign policy, 4) how to consolidate peace after the next war, 5) an evaluation of the American foreign policy in view of future significance of neutrality.

Young: This heading of international relations covers almost every other area in the whole book. To get at it in a research way we have to move over into other sections. Is there another alternative in terms of personnel which thinks of itself as being directly in the field of international relations? That isn't a logical focus, but as a practical focus there are quite a number of very excellent research men in this country who work on international relations as they see it, and if we try to design projects here in terms of the psychologist, the economist, the population expert, etc., many of them will be left out of the picture. Yet that's a resource

Young: which I assume RAND does not want to neglect. Could we not take a practical focus: what is it that people who say they are in international relations can and want to do that will contribute to the program?

Lasswell: To some extent the implementation of our recommendations to RAND will depend upon developing continuing institutions in our society that will supply knowledge when it's needed at the time it is needed. If we think of a continuing survey of the relevant attitudes around the world, the procedures used to evaluate the predispositions prevailing in any country among any subsidiary group would include the traditions of their elites and other elements with respect to what could be expected of American or official governmental policy as well as from protectorates of the U.S. Plainly, in deciding what information is worth trying to gather in the field by interviewing procedures correlated throughout the world, you would want to bring in your specialized students of comparative diplomatic history and of a general theory of power and social processes, to work out and criticize the schedules of what could be obtained by interviewing. Before the expert can make those pertinent suggestions, in many cases we would need a more systematic analysis than we have at the present time of the structure of attitudes that prevail on the part of the informed diplomats and leaders of each of these countries with respect to the official acts of the United States. This would involve the summarization of material, chiefly from archives and printed studies.

Speier: Would you also include considerations of the following problem: the awareness on the part of policymakers of public attitudes in their own and in other countries that might be determined by such a survey? A good case could be made for the proposition that a number of policy decisions in the field of international relations are made in all countries on the basis of insufficient intelligence, particularly insufficient with regard to prevailing attitudes in the area to be effected. Were you suggesting in your last remark that a survey of attitudes would be useful for this particular purpose too, or should it be enlarged to include an exploration of the awareness of these attitudes?

Lasswell: I would want to have that included. One of the utilities of case studies is that they might present us with the situation at a given time as to the prevailing attitudes of Chinese, Indian, Iranian groups, etc., on what can be expected from the U.S. and what can be expected from the other governments that are participating in a power process. This material can in part be assembled from the kinds of persons that the professional student of the polls is accustomed to make use of, and the man in possession of that summarized information is then in a position to carry on the necessary work with the specialist on field anthropological and social scientific surveys.

Fox: Perhaps we don't necessarily need to keep our focus continuously on decisions made in Washington. It may be that decisions made in other foreign offices would be equally rewarding in terms of getting the cross-sectional pattern that you are talking about, and also in terms of freeing our minds with respect to variations in the organization of intelligence for the purpose of making efficient decisions.

Speier: Project 5:3 is "The Interaction of Foreign with Domestic Policy" and supposed to be undertaken with regard to Russia, the U.S. and England. I regard as gross underestimation the statement of time and manpower required to do it.

Fox: The way in which it's set up suggests an artificiality in assuming that one can discover correlations between domestic policy and foreign policy. Politics is a seamless web. There must be some better way of stating the project in terms of what kind of objectives held by groups smaller than the population of a whole state interfere with or reinforce the attainment of objectives which presumably are held by persons acting in the name of the whole state.

Speier: The study is supposed to be focused on the predictions of foreign relations from internal occurrences, whatever that may mean.

Neumann: I would very strongly advocate that this project be adopted. There are a number of quite important theoretical considerations involved. We have to deal with a theory which maintains domestic policy is determined exclusively by foreign political considerations. To my mind such doctrines are true and truth depends on specific historical situations. It is, for instance, quite important to visualize what significance foreign policy has for domestic developments in satellite or semi-satellite countries, say. It is also quite important to realize to what extent the domestic structure of the United States, not simply ideas held by certain groups but the very structure of the country, makes the realization of a certain policy difficult or almost impossible. Clearly the project cannot be one which analyzes the course of foreign policy in the last fifty, sixty, or one hundred years, or deals with all possible situations. It is a question of selecting a few crucial situations and then discovering to what extent a foreign policy which may be very progressive is thwarted by the structure of the country, or to what extent the opposite happens. I think the project is important. Perhaps it isn't adequately formulated; then we may reformulate it.

Young: The problem seems to me to be an important one but the project is quite inadequately stated. It should be a number of projects on more specific items. This really marks out an area rather than a problem.

Speier: One specification or concretization has already been suggested by Neumann. If the proposition is true that contradictory theories about the relation between foreign and domestic policies hold true in different situations, it would probably be very useful to discover in which situations which theory holds true. If we know that, we would know in what particular circumstances events in the field of domestic policy are or are not likely to effect foreign policy.

Lasswell: One may think of a position of the United States in relation to intermediate powers. One may ask to what extent it is probable that, if the United States follows policies A, the ruling elements in the intermediate states can successfully collaborate with us. Next, to what extent will the elite's attempt to collaborate be unsuccessful unless the United States makes use of its power to change the social structure of that intermediate state?

Speier: If you assume it to be a fundamental task of American foreign policy to stem Communism anywhere without at the same time playing into the hands of Fascism, the focus is pretty well indicated. Consequently the major task is to win allies but in a satisfactory way. If we assume (and I think we have good bases to assume) that either real or even only imagined foreign policy -- very often it is simply what Europeans imagine the American foreign policy to be -- has a very direct bearing on domestic development in Europe, the theoretical problem is to determine

Speier: to what extent foreign policy determines domestic development. The same is true of Asia. One of the most fascinating problems seems to be a shift of American foreign policy from its traditional view of building up China towards the policy of building up Japan, continuing the old traditional imperial policy. Here again is a very crucial problem of the relation between domestic and foreign policy. Probably very few people are aware of the fact that the trend of the American foreign policy is shifting to the right. I think the Marshall Report prepares the way for such a shift, together with the policy of MacArthur in Japan. This has to be seen in conjunction with domestic American policy.

Neumann: It may also have to be seen in relation to the actual power exercised in the respective countries which you want to influence. It seems to be extremely interesting to study the influence of U.S. foreign policy on the internal conditions in Japan versus Poland. In one country we have a very powerful influence beyond the mere announcement of policies, and in the other country we have more or less to confine ourselves to a statement of general principles, which is so for most of eastern Europe, because the power there does not rest with us.

Herring: Is our approval abstract: does it mean having a certain man work on it for six months, or an abstract agreement that we think that the interaction of foreign and domestic policies an important thing to study?

Speier: The project as formulated here is not adequate: (a) because of the underestimation of time and manpower requirements and (b) on account of the undeveloped content of the project. While this is true, the subject of the relation between foreign policy and domestic policies in the three countries, and in other countries, is of pragmatic importance and is susceptible to useful research.

Lasswell: When this project has been restated in a little more precise language, then 5:1b "Foreign Policy Under Two Party Government", will be seen as a part of it.

Fox: I assume that if there are a plurality of parties in a country it is primarily because there are a plurality of different ideas about the content of domestic policy. It is because domestic policy under a variety of circumstances takes priority over foreign policy that there are special problems presented when you have a two party government trying to define a single foreign policy. There are special difficulties in discovering what is the national interest, if, in fact, people have a tendency to act in terms of partial interest. So that in its broadest sense this is simply the study of the problem of the interaction of foreign and domestic policy.

Speier: I would modify it a bit by saying that the existence of a two-party government is one of the circumstances in the general area of internal policy that is very important and has to be taken into account. I do not think the question of the two-party government itself is identical with internal policy as formulated in the other project 5:3.

Lasswell: We might want to consider the question of the conduct of foreign policy by a government with democratic traditions, with traditions of a great deal of criticism, and a great deal of openness of information. The problem is one of such a government conducting foreign policy in a situation in which there is the increasing concentration of power thanks to the consideration of military expediencies.

Lasswell: Can we think of projects that would clairfy the policy possibilities of operating the foreign policy of a state with strongly democratic traditions in a situation in which there is progressive concentration of power?

Herring: If that were recognized as one of the major questions with which Project RAND would concern itself, it would give us some way of evaluating and arranging in some coherent pattern these various proposals. Lasswell has very well expressed what is a major problem in this area. That's the big fact that confronts us in a democratic nation. That gives us a central question around which a number of other research projects can be related. Then we can develop some sense of priority, we could develop some notion of what comes first and what would help us to understand this larger situation.

Lasswell: It would be impossible to discuss the problem of effective use of your power without discussing the problem of the handling of varying degrees of secrecy.

Neumann: Do you think we should carve out a special problem in order to counteract what I would call pseudo-democratic conceptions of secrecy as incompatible with democratic processes?

Lasswell: I would be glad to consider formulating questions of that sort and putting them in terms of degree, without prejudicing in advance the formulation of the problem in an "either-or" fashion, of saying either complete publicity or cutting down publicity.

Neumann: I agree with you.

Lasswell: The problem is that it is productive to say how much of your democratic perspective and how many of your democratic operations you can keep intact, compatible with different levels of secrecy which you can justify on the basis of military expediency.

Neumann: I consider this a crucial problem.

Lasswell: This problem of secrecy is a root problem in a consideration of democracy and power, especially in the external field, and the problem will, on further investigation, break itself down into a number of more and more manageable fields of investigation. This would include such problems as the consequences of varying degrees of disclosure to groups of varying characteristics. A clarification of these questions would be valuable since it is conceivable that many degrees of disclosure are pertinent. Inescapably connected with this is the degree of internal criticism and question asking, both formally and in fact, which would have power consequences pertinent to this problem.

Fox: I wonder if the other side of this question of secrecy isn't the question of understanding. What kind of long-range educational problem has to be carried on in order to provide mass support for the necessary kinds of secrecy? We may need to have more people know more of one kind of thing in order to make it possible to carry out a policy which depends on hardly anybody knowing certain other things.

Speier: Perhaps we deal here with the problem not only of various degrees of secrecy and disclosure, but also of various kinds of disclosure. For example, I can think of a number of illustrations where certain decisions in international policy are not kept

Speier: secret but where the information given about them does not quite state the problem in adequate terms; and intentionally so. I think of the loan to Greece and Turkey. It is not merely a question of the degrees of secrecy as to how far and to whom you give information, but also of degrees of subterfuge and dissimulation in disclosure.

Lasswell: The problem of maintaining as much democracy as possible, in some ideally defined sense, in a situation demanding a high degree of constant preparation for the exercise of ultimate power from the world outside, breaks itself not only into these questions of secrecy and disclosure at the level we have been talking about, but also into the question of maintaining the various degrees of effective protection of the position of private individuals and of cultural and other controlling groups in America. I have in mind the question of what the alternatives are by which with the minimum sacrifice of power, we can maintain effective zones of self-determination, of proptection of the position of pluralistic groups in the society as a whole, and of private persons.

Neumann: Secrecy and democracy are incompatible, and I would very much question whether the popular conception of democracy is workable.

Fox: Secrecy does give an immunity from criticism which makes it more difficult to operate the democractic system.

Speier: It is also true that the decision as to whether secrecy and democracy are compatible depends very much on the political theory which you adopt. The point of view of Locke looks different from that of contemporary writers.

Lasswell: One illuminating aspect of this problem is how you get people changing their demands still thinking themselves in a democratic society. There is the process of redefinition of democracy in terms of degrees of exclusion from certain aspects of the decision making process.

Speier: Project 5:4a is "Pressures Created by Power Vacuums" and perhaps it is appropriate to combine this discussion with that of the following Project 5:46 "Trouble Spots and Internation Tension". I do not know what a "power vacuum" is. I doubt the usefulness of the term.

Fox: A substantial disparity between the legal order and the politically possible order.

Brodie: We talk about Japan having caused a "power vacuum" in the Far East. We talk about the demise -- temporary or permanent -- of Germany, having caused the "power vacuum" in Europe. Our whole tradition and conception of what is necessary in terms of policy abroad has been altered in response to a general complexion of power which has been radically and suddenly altered. In terms of the necessity of prompt adjustment it creates what is usually referred to as a "power vacuum". It seems to me that is a meaningful and useful term.

Speier: Use of the term "power vacuum" conceals a number of useful distinctions. When you use the term "power vacuum" you do not know whether you refer to something which exists in view of the fact that a power has been defeated or the fact that a

Speier: power is small in relation to other powers, or the fact that you deal with a contested area. Whenever you have an area in the world where there are various powers trying to gain more influence you may be led to speak of a "power vacuum". I submit that these are three entirely different cases all covered by the term "power vacuum", and it may be useful in deliberating this subject to consider whether these distinctions are of any use. I did not mean to say that the project should be dismissed.

Neumann: I see now two different things; one is what you would call disputed or contested areas like Germany-Austria, which would involve a study whether such an area can remain under a condominium of the great powers; whether this is possible at all or whether it's an impossible situation. I think it is a very important problem to be studied. The next problem would be this. If a state has exerted power over a series of other states and has organized a condominium under its leadership, if that state is defeated, how is the organization of this condominium to be carried out? These are the two problems, both of which appear to be very important. But I wonder if this is what is meant by the project.

Brodie: We are dealing with a situation now in which a sudden drastic change in terms of who and where are the great powers has caused us to reorient our whole attitude toward fundamental problems of foreign policy. We are all struck with the fact that Germany and Japan are great powers which no longer exist, and we are becoming increasingly aware of what has happened to Great Britain as well. Somehow those few facts are of gigantic importance in relation to the whole field.

Speier: Would you think that it would be impossible to undertake research on the subject as we have used the term "power vacuum", rather than in terms of the specific circumstances such as the loss of power of Great Britain, Germany or Japan? Do you think it is possible to find generalizations which would comprise the entirely different situations in these three cases, not to mention others?

Fox: Isn't it possible that part of those studies would begin with areas in the sense that one would examine what is presumed to be known as the "power vacuum" with the expectation that as the material was brought together one could make generalizations, say, of the following character: The process of polarization in that part of the world which can be said to be the undistributed middle ground of power has gone on to such an extent that it can be thought of as a "power vacuum", in the sense that it is soon going to be distributed some way or other. With respect to some of the rest of it, there is some power which is, or can be, locally developed so that it will be strong enough in its own right to prevent the process from being carried forward to its ultimate conclusion, so that it is not a zone of "power vacuum" but of undistributed middle now and for some time to come.

Neumann: There is a question of the desirability of this process of polarization, which is actually a division of work between two great powers. Is such a state desirable at all? Or is it to the interest of U.S. foreign policy to retain both in Europe and in the Far East so-called dispute areas -- this is a problem in which I am vitally interested and on which I am presently working. But I think the problem put in this way has a direct bearing on American foreign policy. Surely if you accept the trend of polarization as an absolutely inevitable fact that nothing can prevent -- the division of the world into two camps -- there can be no intermediary powers at all. Then the answer is a very simple one: we should grab as much as we can. If you believe that to be very undesirable then an intelligent foreign policy would seek for ways and means

Neumann: of preserving autonomous areas between the great powers.

Fox: The data which I was suggesting could be collected, would be equally useful to everyone's objective. One might well prefer to have more Swedens and Switzerlands in the ideal world which one is trying to create. One might deliberately try to create zones which, because of their own interest, would act in a way which would reduce the size of our problem. That leads me to suggest another kind of a focus to our problem than the conduct of foreign policy of a country with democratic traditions trying to promote democratic values. The focus might be one of several dominant military theories of how to win the next war, with a view to seeing the extent to which following this theory or that theory will enable one to achieve in detail the kind of objective which one wants to achieve. We ought, perhaps, to ask what kind of world can be created if one puts one's whole emphasis on preserving American security on a theory of inter-continental warfare. You might get some results which have bearing on this business of developing the apparent strength of the in-between world.

Speier: One area of problems in the field of international relations or rather international policy in the U.S. might be affected by the relation between the military policy and political policy. In times of war we proceed on the assumption that foreign policymakers will continue to make foreign policy in terms of war. I don't think it is an overstatement to say that during the last war a great deal of foreign policy was relegated to military decisions, so that war was not really considered as an instrument of foreign policy while it lasted. It is usually considered as an instrument of foreign policy when it doesn't exist in this country; but the moment it breaks out this is less true than in the intermediate periods of peace.

Barnard: That apparently differs a great deal between countries. The British Foreign Office was very much more active in the war as the foreign policy outfit than was the case of the United States. The State Department in the U.S. practically abdicates its job to the military during war.

Fox: By accident in certain other countries such as Canada, where the department of External Affairs has traditionally been the office attached to the Prime Minister, they make the domestic policy in many respects because of this special staff relationship.

Lasswell: Possible interrelations of this kind could be explored.

Speier: Project 5:4b is "Trouble-spots and International Tensions". It overlaps to some extent with 5:4a and yet it apparently includes more than merely a question of redistribution of power on a large scale.

Lasswell: Is this any more than a general statement of the same type as the UNESCO recommendation that we study the tensions that are potentially disturbing the peace?

Brodie: This particular project strikes me as suggesting the kind of thing on which a great deal of work is being done anyway. All sorts of various specialists in the field are working in particular areas and pointing out the relevance. They work in precisely these terms. On the assumption that Project RAND would be somewhat more interested in proposing important areas of study which somehow have been neglected, I would say on that kind of criterion this one would fall by the board.

Fox: I assume that we would all agree that it is not the end of American foreign policy to create a situation in which the United States dominates the world. It is an end of U.S. foreign policy to try to create a situation in which nobody can dominate the world, that other things being equal, therefore, it is in our interest to study each local conflict with a view to discovering what are the merits of the disputes and trying to state a solution which commands the support of the local populace, so as to build up the in-between world. I would suggest, therefore, that there is an overall U.S. political interest in systematically surveying trouble-spots with a view to a statement of possible solutions according to the merits, which would bring the support of as large a portion of the world's population as possible on the side of whoever is trying to have a settlement according to the merits.

Neumann: It would appear to me that this is a function that is covered by the State Department in its daily work, that you take up each problem as it occurs and analyze it and see what the attitude of the U.S. should be. If that is the function of the project I don't see how we can do it unless we sit continually as a committee and survey trouble spots as they come up; unless you want to develop a theory of trouble spots and define various types of troubles and their consequences that may possibly arise and attitudes that we should take.

Fox: Some kinds of crises become acute a good many years after discerning students have foreseen that there is a high probability that they will someday become acute, and the man who sits in the State Department on the area desk involved very frequently goes down to the State Department library to hunt for the monograph which gives him some background information. It might make some sense to see where our deficiencies are in this kind of monographic literature which would be focused on the merits.

Herring: Can you imagine if we had someone in Washington called a trouble-shooter, an expert on trouble-spots? I don't see how you can become an expert on trouble. It's just not approached in the study of international relations which you could pursue under that head. An expert on Trieste would certainly be an expert on a trouble spot, but to transfer his expertness to some other part of the world would appear to me most futile.

Speier: It is easy to demolish this whole project by calling attention to the looseness of the term trouble spot. On the other hand, I would not like for any valuable suggestions made in the discussion to be lost on account of the word. Fox meant to suggest that experts in certain geographical areas are in a position to foresee that certain problems of relevance to American foreign policy are bound to arise in three or five years or under certain circumstances, and that in view of the present configuration of political problems this particular area may not loom large in the minds of the policymakers but would be realized by them as an important problem, once it is called to their attention. By way of illustration a case could be made that in any future war Africa (or any other area) will play a very important role. Now that may be in the minds of military strategy makers, but not necessarily in the minds of the policymakers in the State Department.

Young: This kind of knowledge of where trouble spots may be, would probably lie within some of those centers to which Brodie referred. Some years ago I helped edit a volume called Danger Spots in the Modern World, to which the leading experts

Young: contributed, but the word Ethiopia or Abyssinia did not occur, even in the index -- and that was long before we had a little trouble there. I am wondering whether RAND should not be concerned with the existence of centers of study of areas of the major parts of the world. There is no such center today for Africa, which you have just mentioned, nor is there any prospect that I know of that there will be a center for a study of Africa in this country. There has been a little bit of work at this university and that university, but nothing comparable to what we had, for example, on the Far East and Latin America.

Brodie: Young is suggesting quite forcefully, without perhaps intending it, improving our techniques for predicting the location of trouble spots. If he could add to that some suggestions relatively to research method -- I am contradicting myself as of half an hour ago -- then I would say it would become a very important project indeed.

Young: Again that's a study which comes up under another heading, where they are talking about attitude studies overseas. I doubt if that will develop in Africa or certain other parts of the world.

Speier: Maybe attitude studies are not of the greatest urgency in the case of an area study of this kind.

Neumann: The connection between 5:4a and 5:4b should be brought out a little more clearly. If 4:a is being divided up into, say, two projects, one on the processes of polarization and the other on disputed or contested areas, certainly it is a major function of each of the studies to analyze trouble spots, whether it is India or Africa, because in the processes of polarization you have to discuss the role of practically the whole world within that process. You cannot do without it. Consequently, you will have to foresee troubles in India or Africa or wherever trouble may arise, and bring them into proper focus. So actually I think the two projects are identical.

Young: The question arises whether it might be useful to study the use of trouble spots in diplomacy and warfare, whether they're natural or artificial trouble spots. That seems to me to be something tangible and rather important.

Brodie: That is precisely what we are witnessing today, at least in Soviet practice. It is the business of declaring the existence of trouble spots in line with where the advantage of dealing with those particular trouble spots happens to lie. In attempting to determine a political-military relationship, and how far the autonomy of the political decision ought to be preserved, one thing that ought to be recognized through the discussion is that one's answers are in large measure (though by no means exclusively) contingent upon the predictions of the character of the next war, if any. It may turn out, for example, that preserving the autonomy may be a luxury which cannot be afforded. On the other hand, I think it is necessary to retain one's conception of the necessity of doing so to the maximum degree possible. Young had a very fruitful suggestion on the fact that trouble spots are to some degree created artifically. They are an instrument of policy -- the exploitation of existing trouble spots and the creation of trouble spots. The study of this subject is a concrete and useful field of endeavor.

Barnard: Project 5:2, on U.S.-Russian relations, deals with a very specific, vital relationship. It seems to me that if the State Department isn't already studying it, and that is the place where it ought to be done, I don't see how RAND could do it without the closest cooperation with the State Department people and the other people who have the information. I happen to have seen a lot of the top secret State Department documents on Russian affairs, and I know this sort of thing could not be worked out without access to that material; why shouldn't it be done in the State Department, not RAND?

Fox: I agree with Barnard. I would like to point out, however, that the statement under utility of results "Improved planning of U.S. foreign policy in terms of ability to enforce policies short of using force" does suggest something that would be useful to RAND, namely, a delimitation of those kinds of problems in which certain of the grosser means of applying force are particularly useful, in order to get some sense of what you can do and what you cannot do without total mobilization. I take it that in Greece and Turkey, for example, there are many things which one can do. But one of the things one can't do is call out the whole U.S. Air Force. Whatever objectives are currently being accomplished have to be done with some other kinds of resources.

Lasswell: I think Fox has made a strong point. My guess is that what is relevant in that is likely to be provided for by some of the recommendations which will be made in connection with other problems. The full-scale analysis of all the top secret material which is recommended here may be too large or inappropriate an enterprise for the present auspices. The way to make investigations of American-Russian relations within the framework of this enterprise might be a function of several other topics and procedures which are outlined in this Conference.

Brodie: With reference to what Barnard said, I would like to express my full agreement in terms of the information available. The State Department has information which is not available elsewhere, and the information available elsewhere is far inferior in terms of both magnitude and quality. On the other hand, it is also true that, while the people outside don't know enough to reach intelligent conclusions, the fact of the matter is that the State Department policy is largely governed by the attitudes and opinions of one or two men, and those attitudes and opinions reflect their individual temperaments. A project which would tend to make available to scholarly temperaments and of diverse special competence, the kind of information which has been available to the State Department, might result in a kind of detached critique of policy and suggestions for the future which might be of extraordinary value. The business is not preemptive by the fact that the State Department has the information and the outside world doesn't. We have an additional dilemma, which is unnecessary and deplorable in the extreme, that we see in the world today, particularly in the academic field -- a marked divergence of fundamental attitudes concerning the Soviet Union and our relations with the Soviet Union. I think that divergence again is due to lack of information, as well as individual temperament, etc. Something might be accomplished. After all, the Soviet Union is a tangible reality rather than a speculative hypothesis. Some progress might be made toward developing a general consensus among scholars concerned as to what that particular country and regime represent, in terms of foreign policy, philosophy, etc.

Gray: If the State Department would cooperate with RAND on this kind of a study, in

Gray: the nature of the case it would have to make it secret. They could not make it available to scholars. You can't make some of this stuff available without indicating that you have channels of information which you are concealing. You just could not do it.

Neumann: I don't believe that publication of documents would effect the judgment of any scholar regarding Soviet relations. The statements of General Clark or any other such materials are themselves not objective historical data, but are subject to interpretation.

Barnard: I would agree with that, but I think in any case the situation might be better than you have right now.

Neumann: Only if all data are published. Publication is motivated by certain political considerations. It is a very optimistic assumption that you can, by publishing any such documentary volume, detect the political judgment behind it.

Barnard: I am a little bit sensitive about that subject as a result of an experience on the atomic energy panel. I am aware of the misleading character of the subject of economics by leaving out a vital section that connects the whole thing, and there's been a lot of that. The report that you saw published was an expurgated report, of course. It is so easy to mislead the public, and I just can't believe that on the relationship between these two countries, even in much easier times than these, that the State Department could let the information be known.

Fox: This may be an area where the usefulness of an agency with funds is not so much to define useful problems of research as to make it easy for certain kinds of material to become available which, because of a language barrier, are just not available now. We have in this country a trained body of social scientists who don't even know how to begin to define certain problems comparing Russian and American systems, because they can't read Russian. It will be a long time before the language barrier will be overcome, but in the meantime there is something we can do for a stop-gap which is, say, to have Pravda and Izvestiya translated everyday, and build up a file of materials in English. We could put a large amount of effort simply into making things available with respect to Russia which are now generally available to social science scholars in all the other semi-universal languages, and then let the problems be defined.

Brodie: A good deal could be done to broaden our conceptions of basic Russian policy without even calling on the material which is considered confidential or secret. To say that we need to know all in order to know anything is a gross misstatement.

Speier: There are three suggestions that have been made in the discussion. The first, mentioned by Barnard, is that an exhaustive study of U.S.-Russian relations on the basis of all available materials, particularly in the State Department, cannot be undertaken in view of the secret and top-secret classification of many of these materials. The second suggestion, made by Fox, is that regardless of classification there is a linguistic barrier which hampers social scientists in relation to the study of Russian matters, and that it would be of help to the social scientists regardless of what project you undertake if more Russian language material could be

Speier: made available as a matter of routine translation. The third suggestion, made by Neumann and Brodie, I take it, is that despite the fact that much information is classified secret or top secret, there is enough information available, with the help of Russian language experts, which could be usefully explored for purposes of a better understanding within the social sciences of U.S.-Russian relations.

Young: I thoroughly agree with Barnard's position on the misrepresentation resulting from the use of State documents. But why shouldn't we study international relations between Russia and U.S. by picking up specific problems of a social science nature -- for example, the study of how cultural differences affect international relations, the question of political processes, the various techniques for handling tension situations as they vary between the countries, etc. With a little time I could extend that list to twenty or thirty different problems of social science which could be analyzed on the basis of material which is now secret. That would perhaps give us better generalized knowledge rather than be an attempt to uncover specific historical incidents which may or may not have application.

SECOND SESSION

H. Speier (Chairman)

F. Neumann
W.T.R. Fox
H.D. Lasswell
C.I. Barnard
W.F. Ogburn

Neumann: Summary on Project 5:1 "Content of General U.S. Foreign Policy" and Project 5:1b, "U.S. Foreign Policy Traditions":

1. It was the general view that the two projects should be treated as one.

2. It was agreed that the combined project may mean four different things: (a) an analysis of U.S. foreign policy as derived from official statements, (b) an analysis of the real foreign policy, (c) an analysis of how the policy, official and real, is actually understood by others, (d) the study of the intensity of the resistance of the American people to change.

3. It was agreed that (a) a study of the official statements would add little to what is known, (b) a study of the real policy would be too vaguely defined an enterprise.

4. It was therefore suggested to define certain specific problems. The following were discussed and generally accepted as possible research projects: (a) the policy of demobilizing an enemy, (b) the problem of winning and maintaining internal support, (c) the problem of consolidating peace after

Neumann:

the next war, (d) the problem of winning and maintaining an alliance group.

5. The tentative projects mentioned above are held together by the following consideration. It is the stated policy of the U.S. to stem Communism without giving support to Fascist or pro-Fascist forces either inside or outside the United States. Consequently, there arises the need of weakening Communism (demoralizing it in peace and obviously in war), of winning and strengthening internal support, and seeking allies. Yet, while the aim is clear and simple, the methods to be adopted are by no means simple. What is necessary to win and keep allies? Can European countries like Great Britain, although anti-Communist, be counted on to join the U.S. in a war? Will they remain neutral? Can they remain neutral? Has neutrality today a meaning? Finally, what do we do with the world after a next war? To present to the world now our conception of the future world is as important as the winning of allies now.

Project 5:3, "Interaction of Foreign with Domestic Policy" and Project 5:1b, "Foreign Policy Under Two-Party Government":

1. It was generally agreed that the project in its present form was too loosely defined and that it should be reformulated.

2. It was maintained that there are two different theories concerning the relation between domestic and foreign policy. Namely, (a) that foreign policy is always the product of internal antagonisms, (b) that domestic policy is shaped by foreign relations.

3. It was maintained that both doctrines may be true and that their validity depends upon the concrete historical situation; that consequently it is vital to determine what situation corresponds with what doctrine so as to be able to make forecasts.

Fox: A big group would probably agree that in its present form the statement seems to imply that a situation either comes under category (a) or comes under category (b) whereas, in fact, in most situations the policy is the result of a complex pattern of forces, some of which are domestic and some of which are external. Therefore it is a problem of more and less rather than either-or.

Neumann: I would not quite accept Fox's formulation, although I would not, on the other hand, maintain either of the theories to be exclusively true in any situation. But I think that one will be able to find out the predominance of either external or internal factors.

We continue with 4. The importance of the project follows from its close connection with the project mentioned above.

5. If it is accepted that U.S. foreign policy should aim at (a) seeking internal support and (b) seeking allies, it may be found that the two aims are incompatible, that the most adequate method of winning allies may be vitiated by domestic pressures.

Neumann:

6. It is also true that in satellite and semi satellite states the ruling elites or the masses are extremely susceptible to U.S. foreign policy or even to imagined U.S. policy, and that consequently the United States may be able to change the domestic structure of the country so as to bring it into harmony with her foreign policy.

7. Out of this discussion grew the generally accepted proposal to formulate a special project on the conduct of a foreign policy by a government of strong democratic traditions.

8. This project should also discuss the role of secrecy. The problem of secrecy might be studied as follows: (a) the compatibility of secrecy and democracy, (b) the degree of secrecy and disclosure necessary to realize a foreign policy aim and to maintain democracy, (c) the kind and type of disclosure believed necessary, (d) the securing of popular support (educational tasks) to make secrecy acceptable.

On Project 5:4a, "Pressures Created by Power Vacuums", and Project 5:4b, "Trouble Spots and International Tensions."

1. It was agreed that both projects need reformulation.

2. Comments were made on the meaning of the term "power vacuum". The term may refer to the following: (a) the existence of contested, disputed areas like Japan or Germany-Austria, (b) a shift in the locus of power by the defeat of a leading power like Germany or Japan, (c) an area not dominated by a major power, in which a minor power is not capable of maintaining its position. (The term "power vacuum" seems to be a favorite term with reference to undeveloped countries.)

3. The process of polarization may encompass the whole world. Is this process desirable? Should there be between the great powers autonomous or semi-autonomous areas? If this is possible how is it to be done?

4. No full agreement was reached as to whether Project 5:4b was fully covered by 5:4a.

5. Out of the discussion of the two projects there arose a generally accepted suggestion to formulate a special project on the relation between military and civilian factors in foreign policy. This might comprise a study of dominant military theories such as the doctrine of inter continental warfare, the relation between military and political policy in times of war, and the question as to what degree it will be possible to retain civilian values.

Project 5:2, "U.S.--Russian Relations", was discussed with reference to the classification and scarcity of the information, and to the value to research of translation of materials. It was pointed out that the project is so general as to comprise many others under consideration by this and other panels.

Neumann: On the project on the relation between civilian and military factors, isn't it today much more urgent to study the impact of military factors on so-called civilian policy? Today the impact of the military is far greater than ever before. Military considerations have a direct bearing today on the formulation of the political policy. This change, and even perhaps a comparative analysis of various countries, appears to me as important as the opposite problem.

Fox: I think that a very strong case has been made out for organizing the same body of material from two different points of view and deliberately planning to have combined teams of students of political and military problems preparing statements for both the political specialists and the military specialists. I wouldn't wish to say which I regard as the more important or the more urgent. I think I hear discussions sometimes among military people, however, which suggest that according to some military doctrines a very low order of importance is attached to maintaining in the countries of western Europe regimes friendly to us, since some of these military doctrines rest on the assumption that a prospective enemy would inevitably win control over the whole of the Eurasian land mass and that another war would have to be fought with weapons which started on their course from the American continental base. I suggest that before that particular theory or any alternative theory becomes too persuasive in the minds of military policy makers, political conditions which might cause them to reconsider ought to be available for their consideration. It doesn't seem to me that either sort of project is more urgent than the other.

Lasswell: Fox has formulated the project on the relation of military and civilian factors without specific regard to the institutions involved in the formulation of military policy. We should raise some of the special questions which come up when you start out with the postulate that you wish to maintain the supremacy of military or of civilian institutions over all institutions involved in the policy shaping process. The other alternative is to deal more technically with the ways by which military institutions can increase the degree to which they consider non military ends in the formation of policy.

Fox: I agree with the general comment.

Neumann: We ought to analyze the term 'military necessity'. In operations that are both military and political in character, usually the political end is defeated by asserting that 'military necessity' requires it. The changes the term 'military necessity' undergoes in the course of time, the ever greater range of activities that it embraces, are important. For instance, study of military government and military occupation from this point of view would be extremely important in revealing what is being done on behalf of 'military necessity'.

Fox: The single word 'victory' never constitutes a total statement of one's war aim or one's peace aim, and therefore the phrase 'military necessity' is never a complete justification if the allegation on the other side is that a fundamental war aim is thereby seriously jeopardized or completely destroyed. Any analysis of any proposed military strategy or tactic should be evaluated in terms of its consequences for foreign policy objectives.

Neumann: I mean something else. In the competition between military and civilian terms, values, and actions the military always have a much better position because military activity is defined and understood to be an expert activity. Political

Neumann: activity is something every man's common sense is supposed to be adequate for. So whenever a military man justifies his action by 'military necessity' he is thereby almost exempt from criticism. Such criticism is taboo. The action rests on his expertness in defining what military necessity really requires. This is the relation between military and political forces in areas where they actually compete for power -- like in occupied countries, where the military can always involve its expertness and insist on the lack of knowledge on the side of the political elements. This, I think, is very important -- to go behind the meaning of the phrase 'military necessity' to show what it actually means.

Lasswell: Neumann's suggestion fits in with a specification which I offered a minute ago. If it is clear that we are concerned under some circumstances with the way that civilian authorities can maintain their primacy, one of the important problems is to examine this inter-relationship that Neumann has just been spelling out. In a situation where you have civilian primacy, you have the expectation that in case of disputes as to what constitutes a necessity appropriately described by the term 'military', the decision as to whether or not the term 'military necessity' is appropriate is made by the civilian authority. Now there is a distinction between (a) the "should" in the sense of the expected *authority*, and the "fact" in the sense of the expected *control* relationship. The sense of this enterprise, I am sure all of us agree, is that we want to suggest the kind of clarification which will increase the likelihood of (a) that the authoritative expectation of civilian primacy can be restrained, and (b) that the civilian authority will be able to maintain the genuine civilian supremacy in those situations. This means that the civilian authorities must under certain circumstances be clarified as to what constitutes a genuine 'military' consideration, and be informed by their intelligent advisers, interpreters, and planners of the possible critique of what is presented to them in the name of 'military necessity'. I think Neumann has in these formulations put his finger on what we all recognize as the vital communication link between civilian and military agencies in an institutional setup.

Speier: The competition between civilian and military authorities is not only particularly important in the administration of occupied areas, but also in times of war in the determination of grand strategy. The past war, once the records or most of them are open, would provide very good material for studying this competition.

Fox: The point Neumann made and Lasswell discussed is one which also has bearing on the project relating to secrecy and disclosure while maintaining democratic values. We will need to consider what types of secrecy are necessary, but it may perhaps be an equally important part of the analysis to consider what minimum programs of disclosure are essential if civilian primacy - which we are all agreed is a desideratum - is to be preserved.

Speier: On the question of competition between civilian and military authorities as to control over certain areas of activity, for research purposes it is important to note that in certain areas of activity this competition can be studied more easily than in others. There are certain areas, such as procurement and shipment of ammunition, where one would be inclined to assume that civilian authorities might not want to have any particular say. There are other areas, such as psychological warfare, which are almost by definition competitive areas. In any attempt at systematic research into this important problem it might be useful to consider breaking down the area of investigation into various classes of activities with varying degrees of

Speier: competition.

Fox: So far most of our discussion has dealt with the problem of maintaining civilian primacy while a war was actually being fought or in prospect. There is another kind of problem which is perhaps even more important, namely, maintaining the civilian peace strategy in time of peace, the prevention of the adoption of military strategies which jeopardize the peace strategy and make it somewhat more likely that the war might have to be fought under unfavorable circumstances. I have in mind, for example, the adoption of a military program which would indicate to some of our allies that we would not in the early stages of a war make any effective effort to prevent their being overrun.

Lasswell: I am especially interested in emphasizing the opportunity that this project affords for the invention of new administrative solutions, for the general problem as stated. I was very much struck by Speier's formulation of the scale running from severe to negligible competition between military and civilian claims to influence in the decision-making process. But I want also to point out that as one envisages the future there is an opportunity to clarify some of the administrative expediencies that are likely to prove appropriate to the maintenance of civilian primacy at different stages of policy during inter war periods, during the early stages of crises, during a war, and in the postwar period. I have in mind the type of critical evaluation which I am sure would come of past institutional relationships, such as those illustrated by the recent arrangements between the Department of State and the War Department in this country with respect to what goes on in the occupied areas. My impression is that if this project included an analysis of the history of selected comparative cases of how democracies have in fact maintained various degrees of civilian primacy at several stages of these policy-forming processes, we would have a very clarifying body of material which could guide our policy makers in the future in meeting contingencies which we have in view.

Fox: There are dangers to which the military may be exposed if there isn't a sufficient understanding between military and civilian aims. The military have a right to expect that the civilian personnel before whom it has to justify its choice of military policy shall have a sufficiently broad grasp of the military problems so that it can have a sympathetic hearing of solutions which it brings forward. This, therefore, is a project which is of some importance in addition to the maintenance of democratic values. It is also a project which is closely related to the efficiency of operation of the military in the realm of purely military policy.

Speier: The need for mutual understanding exists in the reverse as well. That is, military should be expected to understand the civilian goals too. I think that in the past deficiencies existed on both sides. Also, certain institutions like the War College can be used for the purpose of furthering such mutual understanding, and are to some extent being used for that purpose.

Lasswell: Developing the institutional practices appropriate to the ends in view would include a consideration of the selection and training of civilian and military personnel occupying responsible positions in the community.

Neumann: If the problem is studied, it should not be confined to analysis of democratic solutions. It is vitally important that both the military and civilian leadership in the Soviet Union and in Nazi Germany be scrutinized. As far as Nazi

Neumann: Germany is concerned, we have the excellent study by British Intelligence on German strategy during World War II and the fatal influence of civilian strategy. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we probably know that civilian authorities had - shall we say -- a very fortunate influence. These two historical experiences should be taken into account in analyzing the relationship.

Speier: If one takes into account historical experiences, one would do very well to take account of certain classical discussions of the whole question of the relation between political and military authorities. The old discussions of militarism, and Ludendorff's and pre-Ludendorff writings are full of illuminating detail. There a great deal of historical research has been done on this problem.

In summary, we all feel this is an important subject to which should be attributed a high priority. The subject as drafted seems to stress the influence of non military factors on the formation of military policy; but the influence of military factors on the formation of political policy is equally deserving of research. Fox was entirely agreeable to such an interpretation of the project as a whole. The draft does not put much stress on the exploration of the institutional setup; it might be useful in this research to pay attention to these institutional aspects. The point was raised that the term 'military necessity' needs clarification, particularly in view of the fact that there is always danger that the presumed experts on what constitutes 'military necessity' may be able to use the latter in negotiations with political policy makers in such a way as to win their point. This led to discussion of the competition between civilian and military authorities in various stages of over-all policy making -- in inter war periods, at the early stages of war, etc., as well as in various areas of policy making. It was suggested that it might be useful to distinguish such areas of acitivities with respect to the degree and intensity of competition that prevails. It was further pointed out that it might be extremely useful to explore the possibility of inventing new administrative solutions for solving conflicts arising out of competition between political and military authorities. Furthermore, the discussion mentioned that it is not merely a matter of the authoritative expectations of either civilian or military supremacy, not merely a question of the institutional distribution of control and of authority, but that the problem also involves the training and selection of personnel. In another part of the discussion it was pointed out that in certain areas, such as the occupied areas, much material can be found for studying this competition between military and civilian authorities. The further point was raised that there is need for mutual understanding of the goals, practices and considerations on the part of the military and civilian authorities respectively. And I take it that it was also agreed that there is room for improvement in this regard. Finally, attention was called in the discussion to the usefulness of extending the research to include the study of certain historical instances, particularly the distribution of authority between military and civilian agencies in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, as well as other historical instances discussed in classical writings on the problem.

Neumann: On the project drafted by Lasswell, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy by a Democratic Government", I wonder whether it would be advisable to include in this project a study of secrecy within the government between its various branches.

Fox: I would very much want to have this project understood as including all those

Fox: problems of relationship among the various institutions of the government. The project should explore in detail the relationship among the civilian and among the military institutions, and then crosswise between the military and civilian. Beyond the official group there are many degrees of knowledge throughout the society as a whole. This project should keep the entire group structure of the society in view, official and unofficial, and consider the problems of secrecy and disclosure from the point of view of that structure. One comment can be made about both this project and the one preceding it. When we talk about civilian-military relations we sometimes are talking about the relationship between those in the employ of the government who are in uniform and those who are out of uniform, and sometimes we talk about the relationship between the military and its civilian superiors. This is perhaps only a special case of the necessity for differentiating between the various elements in the whole civilian society, but it is an important case, and it is a distinction which ought to be kept in mind in dealing with both projects.

Speier: The phrase, "degree of disclosure and secrecy" could refer to two different phenomena. You may disclose little or much to all people, and you may disclose everything to few people. For example, if you give certain secret information to Congressional committees off the record this is a degree of secrecy which differs from that which you encounter when only part of the available information is made public to everybody. It might be of some use to consider this distinction. It is nothing but a hunch on my part that both degrees of secrecy are likely to increase.

Lasswell: I had this distinction in mind, but perhaps it ought to be made clearer. There could be a subdivision of the content category, classifying it in terms of (1) various degrees of completeness of disclosure and (2) persons occupying some determinate position in the official and nonofficial structure of the society to whom the disclosure is made.

Barnard: About six weeks ago it was revealed in the newspapers, what was top secret for both the military and the State Department, that all of the uranium in the Belgian Congo was coming to the United States. The Communist Party in Belgium was raising the dickens with the Belgian government on account of it. Now the existence of that arrangement (I'll say nothing more than to mention what was published) was completely concealed from the American public. The activity under whatever arrangement was obviously known to the Communist Party and, therefore, to the Russians. The concealment of the arrangements, in fact, was almost equivalent to a hoax on the whole American public. Now whatever was secret there was not merely a secret of the United States; it must have been a secret of our partners, Canada and Great Britain. The propriety of revealing information in which you are merely one of the parties is an extremely difficult aspect of this thing both from the military and the civilian side, because you have allies and prospective allies and arrangements with them all the time, and most of these important secrets do not beong exclusively to ourselves or to any one department of public affairs.

Fox: Another delicate problem which needs exploring is the consequence of disclosing fractions of the facts relating to a total situation, so that the process of democratic control is impaired because the fraction is necessarily misleading. Hence there might be an excuse for withholding facts which are in themselves not secret only because if not told with certain other facts they would warp opinion.

Barnard: The contest for appropriations and the desire for prestige, in my opinion,

Barnard: constantly leads to giving out fragments of information of a so-called secret character, to stir the public interest, but withholding the full story. One very important aspect of that is the failure to disclose what you don't know that you wished you did know. It is a very important aspect of secrecy in a democratic government, and in any other kind of a government as far as that's concerned.

Lasswell: On this point, one of the interesting problems that arises in the practical conduct of affairs is that of the relation between the person who, with good intentions, accepts the moral values of the community and who feels some hitch in relation to his official responsibility. Many times that problem is solved by judicious, unofficial leaks. I think it might be of some interest to include in an investigation of the facts of secrecy and disclosure the role of such leakage.

Barnard: A study of this kind should also include the practical behavior of people in responsibility, formerly under obligation to make disclosures. While I was Relief Administrator for the State of New Jersey in 1931-33, I divided the 21 counties up into three groups and every two weeks I held in each group a meeting of the county directors of relief. One of the Camden newspapers insisted on being present at what I thought was a perfectly private administrative session, and I indicated that I would not permit the reporter to be present. Some good friend who was wiser than I suggested that I was doing public business with public money, and that if I wanted to live with the newspaper I'd better let the fellow come in. He probably wouldn't come more than once because he'd be bored to death and he wouldn't get any news value out of it. This is precisely what happened, but if it had not happened, what I would have been compelled to do would be to do business in an unofficial way on the side.

Fox: One can ask not only what is the degree of secrecy essential to carrying out the successful policy, but one may ask also what is the degree of disclosure which is essential to the maintenance of civilian control. There may be in any particular situation conflicting considerations which would make one's decision a close one, and therefore one ought to define the situation from both directions in order to establish the overlap, before one makes judgments as to just where to draw the line.

Speier: The panel seems to be inclined to assign a high priority to this project. It is a useful project to do, and would lead to information of great interest to government agencies and social scientists, as well as to the citizen at large.

Lasswell: In summary, the discussion of the project, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy by a Democratic Government" appeared to indicate that the Panel regarded it as having a high priority. It was pointed out that one of the important dimensions of the problem is the degree of secrecy within the government and among the various groupings in society. It was emphasized that it is important to consider how much is to be disclosed, as well as how many shall have access to a specified type of information. There was emphasis upon the problems which arise in connection with military personnel which is subordinate to civilian authority, and those that arise in the case of civilians subordinated to military authority. Among the special problems are those connected with arrangements technically shared with allies. Furthermore, there is a question of the consequences of disclosing fractions of irrelevant information, thereby actually frustrating democratic control through failure to disclose enough of the relevant context to permit rational criticism. There was stress upon the disclosure of lack of knowledge since, in many instances,

Lasswell: it is important to know the scale of knowledge available to the community at any given time. Furthermore, there are techniques of "justifiable" evasion which give rise to problems in connection with persons under formal obligation to make disclosure. There is the problem of the circumstances under which conflicts arise in the consciences of those who regard themselves as dedicated to the collective values and who feel that information should be made available through leakage. Then there is a basic question, the degree of disclosure which is necessary to the maintenance of civilian control. These were among the various ramifications of the project.

Barnard: An article was published in *Science* by a man who had nothing whatever to do with the Manhattan Project which told exactly what you did with thorium. The Philadelphia Bulletin carried a syndicated article based on this article in *Science*, spreading to the whole world what was going on. General Groves' people didn't do anything about it, so that when our representatives on the scientific committee in United Nations were discussing the subject, every time they'd come to thorium they'd talk about "X" as what you got from thorium, and the Russians said, "But that doesn't mean anything, we are not talking about anything as long as we are talking about just 'X'". It just kidded the life out of them. Every man there knew the story by that time. Finally Groves agreed to declassify it. The next morning they went into meeting and told the story, and then the Russian representative said, "Well, I think from now on I'll call it 'X'." That's a case of letting the momentum of a thing that might well have been justified in the past carry right through to a perfectly absurd situation.

Fox: That's a wonderful phrase of yours - "the momentum of secrecy."

Speier: Is there any problem in telling people things which they would in the normal course discover anyway, in order to feel them out?

Lasswell: That's a very good point. I watched with a great deal of interest that technique used by experts in Washington and elsewhere. It's the pride of the practicing newspaper man. He must avoid, if he can, getting on such an intimate relationship with the sources of information that his hand is stopped.

Barnard: This technique is a great device for increasing popularity with Congress. On two occasions I have had it reported to me just what was said, and there was nothing secret about it at all. Of course one did not want a Secretary of State to be making official statements, which was fair enough. "Off-the-records" protected him from that. Really, there was nothing to it. It was a device to make the Congressmen feel as though they were in on something.

Lasswell: Creating the impression of disclosure is an interesting technique. It should be extremely interesting to clarify the problem in an institutional context, partly for the sake of giving people a notion of some of those subtle practices.

Speier: On "Trouble Spots in International Relations", originally 5:4b, Young in our last meeting suggested that instead of studying trouble spots in international relations it may be particularly useful to study the use that is being made of trouble spots in international relations. I have suggested as a new title, "Controversial Issues in International Relations." The description is as follows: "Controversial

Speier: issues in international relations may be genuine or fabricated. The events to which these issues refer may be instigated or not by the power interested in the issue. They may be raised at a convenient time, chosen by a power or dictated by the events. They may be raised in an attempt to solve them or to enlarge the area of unresolved conflicts with other powers. They may be minimized by various means, diplomatic and otherwise. Genuine or fabricated issues may be raised for various reasons for example, in order to 1) create a pretext for non-diplomatic action, 2) precipitate a showdown, 3) test the response of the home population, the adversary, neutrals -- the so-called trial balloon, 4) gain advantage in trouble areas, including friendship of the population in the trouble area, 5) focus a conflict that is diffused, 6) divert attention from other issues, 7) deceive the adversary about the interests in other issues, 8) enlist support, sympathy, etc., by dramatization of the issue." Under Research Method is "A series of case studies on the basis of a theory of conflict behavior in international relations." A mere description of a series of case studies would not really be sufficient; I do not believe it can be done without any reference to a specific theory of conflict. However, that may not be so. Under Utility of Results is "Better appraisal of danger points and of treatment of controversial issues by other powers."

Lasswell: On the difference between a trouble spot that is manipulated and one that is "real", there is a problem of establishing a scale of discrimination in concrete situations.

Speier: By way of illustration, a spontaneously arising difficulty, say through the action of a minority of a given area, may be described as a real trouble if it involves the previously described interests of other powers. If the same trouble occurs through the promotion of one of the major powers interested in the issue or in the area, by providing finances or weapons, etc. to the minority, then I would speak of fabricated trouble. The distinction is particularly difficult to make whenever (which is probably the most realistic assumption) you have something that happens anyhow and is then enlarged upon by the interested power. An attempt must be made to distinguish the types theoretically, so as to have conceptual yardsticks for analyzing given situations. The research would be difficult to undertake in any case in terms suggested here. If you would renounce this distinction, then you might just as well start with trouble spots and not bother with whether they are real or fabricated.

Ogburn: There is a certain danger in being too sophisticated about trouble spots; the trouble spots may be quite real even though fabricated. I, too, would view trouble spots somewhat this way, and this would give, in my opinion, simple priority to this topic. The relations of one nation to another are a continuing proposition over time in which adjustments are made; war is simply one method by which certain objectives may be obtained. It is true that wars are cataclysmic and of such a dramatic nature that it seems as though everything is soaked in war and nothing lies in between. But if you view the problem as one of continuous settlement of affairs, then trouble spots may take on a significance more or less comparable to war itself. If you wish to avoid war, then the more successfully you can adjust and settle matters by trouble spot techniques, the better off you are. I'm very much impressed with the fact that international plans and international organizations, particularly the latter, do not seem to be geared to meet phenomena of change. They seem to me to be geared to maintain the status quo a good deal, and to affect minor

Ogburn: adjustments; whereas what is needed in international relations is some sort of practice of settling big issues without having to resort to war. For instance, I sometimes thought that political differences ought to be settled between two parties in such a way that the weaker party will find the settlement just, since at a certain period in the future he may become stronger. To illustrate again, suppose we have a settlement between Russian and American interests, and suppose that the United States is in a stronger position with the atomic bomb. Are we justified in crowding Russia as far as we possibly can? Or should we try to obtain a settlement which will appear just to the Russians at some time, say 20 or 25 years hence, when they surely will be much stronger economically and militarily than they are at the present time? If we do not make such a settlement, then we could reasonably guess that the Russians will try to seek a readjustment when they do become stronger. Then the question is will that readjustment lead to war? It seems to me that the probabilities are that it would, unless we had developed through some form of either diplomatic procedure or international relations some trouble spot technique. In other words, you could prevent considerable adjustment of trouble spots without having to go to war. I think the real dynamic changes that produce these adjustments are essentially those of technology and invention; the shift in powers that is now taking place and has taken place throughout history has been precipitated in general by technological developments. The question is, does this come under the trouble spot technique? In short, trouble spots to me have come to be a real phenomenen, and are not necessarily a sophisticated method of manipulating public opinion on petty issues.

Speier: Some of your comments will be of great usefulness in relation to the subject of international organizations. It seems to me essential that the study be undertaken against the background of the concept of a real trouble spot. Otherwise the whole thing dissolves into an investigation of manipulations.

Neumann: I'm still very skeptical of its possibility of execution, simply because the trouble spot of the controversy is, as Ogburn pointed out, only a part of a whole mass of relationships that exist between nations. To isolate, for instance, the alleged slaying of Germans in Poland prior to the march of the Germans into Poland from the whole mass of international relationships would be an almost impossible undertaking, or to isolate similarly the Sudeten-German question. From the whole position of Germany in that situation it appears merely as an incident in a whole policy. Similarly with, say, the question of Iranian oil today. Do we blow up the request of the Russians to secure oil concessions in Iran to great proportions in order to have a weapon in a more crucial issue? That is almost impossible to say unless you introduce into the analysis of the use of trouble spots almost all factors at hand.

Fox: I'm very dubious of the possibility of making a classification of trouble spots according to the degree of subjective sincerity of the great power leader who happens to interest himself in somebody else's trouble, and that seems to be the distinction involved in saying that this one is real and that one is fabricated. Let me suggest another way of classifying disputes which might get around that difficulty. Disputes may be examined for the extent to which they are capable of being redefined in terms of some over-all bi polar conflict. Some disputes are reasonably intense locally, but are not defined in such terms that it is easy for the whole complex of world powers to arrange themselves on one side or the other. We are particularly interested in those which easily define themselves so that one knows who is on what

Fox: side. Let me suggest secondly that we ask ourselves what are some of the ways in which the issues in trouble spots can be defined so that they are neutral as between the two powers. At this point we seek out opportunity to bring in some of the supranational institutions.

Neumann: Take an actual instance -- the German assets in Austria -- is it a vital issue or is it not? Is it a minor issue or is it a major problem? Is it blown up out of proportion? How can one possibly isolate a question in a trouble spot? The impasse does not resolve itself to analysis of trouble spots -- this is a relatively simple matter. I think experts would agree in a very short time on the objective significance of a trouble spot as divorced from all other considerations. But they will never agree on the significance of a trouble spot in conjunction with the sum total of all relations.

Fox: I doubt very much if there is any real difference of opinion between Neumann and myself as to the capacity of a trouble spot to be isolated from a total complex of issues. I do believe, however, that the project as outlined suggests the usefulness of estimating the degree to which any given dispute offers to some other power an opportunity for exploiting the dispute to win an advantage over the United States. It might help our government to get its order of priority straightened out with a view to which dispute it wants to go to work and see settled.

Speier: To summarize, it seemed to be a widespread feeling in the Panel that the project is of doubtful value if not definitely useless. The question was raised how real and fabricated or manipulated disputes could be readily distinguished. It was pointed out that the term "trouble spot" may conceal a general problem of maladjustment or the need for readjustment in the distribution of international power, a need brought about primarily by changes in technology and in inventions which call for adjustments. It was also pointed out that it would seem extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, to isolate trouble spots from larger political contexts in which they have meaning. This, it was emphatically said, constituted a virtual impossibility of undertaking a project as proposed.

Speier: Coming back once more to the distinction between real and fabricated issues, the comment was made that this distinction seemed to be predicated upon the possibility of ascertaining the subjective sincerity of the person defining the trouble spot. As an alternative for making the distinction between real and manipulated disputes, it was suggested to use as a yardstick the question whether disputes permit a redefinition in terms of bi polar conflicts to which they can be related.

The general feeling on the project on the Interaction of Foreign and Domestic Policy was that it was very important.

Fox: How completely is this project taken care of by another one in Panel 6 consisting of a series of studies of those domestic policies traditionally presumed to be determined without reference to foreign policy, although they had many foreign policy ramifications?

Speier: The other project dealt merely with domestic economic affairs and their influence on foreign relations. This project includes noneconomic domestic arrangements that may have an influence on foreign affairs, such as the bi partisan setup of foreign policy.

Neumann: The other project is confined to very narrow problems of domestic economic policies; this one has a very different aim. It is to be a theoretical analysis of basic questions, whether, for instance, we can undertake a policy for aiding Socialist States. What will be the likely repercussions on the United States and vice versa? This, of course, has to be exemplified with a large number of concrete historical instances.

Barnard: I guess the project as it now stands is useful. I'm thinking now of Viner's demonstration (to which I haven't seen any exception taken by anybody who is competent in the field) that it is impossible to carry on international trade between a totalitarian and a non totalitarian free enterprise state under agreement neither to subsidize nor to create barriers, because there is no way of telling whether the totalitarian state is subsidizing or not in this particular problem. That's a particular instance, I take it, of the type of thing to be studied.

Neumann: This is one of the aspects, I think a very minor aspect, of the whole problem, although I honestly confess that I have not yet been able to see the real problem in the question of trading between a free enterprise economy and a controlled economy. Since we have historical experiences of considerable and increased trading, I still fail to see the theoretical problem although I read Viner's pamphlet. I see there practical difficulties which can be overcome, but the theoretical objection is still something which I don't quite grasp.

Lasswell: The references which have been made to the other analysis underline the structure of categories in the formulation and execution of the present problem. In the other analysis one was interested in comparing the relative contribution which trade could make to the total production process. One had certain definable economic criteria; if you have primarily political criteria, it's entirely possible that the question of economic gains is lost. The problem that confronts us is that of clarifying the degree to which various power objectives can be pursued given the weighting which is attached in American society to power and other values. This analysis would include the institutional structure which is involved in the shaping and sharing of each of these values, whether you are talking in terms of power or wealth or respect, etc. I gather that it is Neumann's intention in formulating this project for us to emphasize the basic question of how far you can accomplish power and other value objectives in a society which has such and such a commitment to a certain rank order of these values and a certain definite institutional pattern.

Barnard: I want to add the problem of how you can attain certain power objectives in the whole society while certain parts of it seek to maximize certain non power values.

Speier: In short, the present project is related to another project discussed in Panel 6 on the influence of certain economic issues on foreign policy. It was generally felt that the project under consideration here is both more inclusive and in a sense more basic, inasmuch as it raises the question of the relation between foreign and domestic policy not merely with regard to political issues, but also with regard to the value assigned to economic, political and other activities and institutions in a society as they bear upon the foreign policy of the country.

The description of Project 5:4, on International Political Organization, reads,

Speier: "Studies of the utility, feasibility and stability of the possible forms of international organization among sovereign states."

Fox: I'm inclined to cast one negative vote on this project, not on the ground that it is without utility, but on the ground that one can predict with a high degree of certainty that it is one that will be performed over and over again by people working in various universities around the country.

Lasswell: Do you think there is an area connected with this problem of international organization which could be particularly adapted to RAND? Another possibility along this line is the consolidation of the peace at the end of a future crisis or war. One of the problems in case of a victorious or partially victorious outcome would be the setting up of a continuing international order in which there would be a good deal of respect paid to the lesser members. Among the major problems there would be devising the measures of military control, etc., which would be appropriate for that type of setup.

Speier: By way of summary, Fox's first comment expressed adequately the feelings of the Panel that there are a number of possibilities of research related to the subject, which in itself does not seem worth pursuing.

On U.S.-USSR Relations, during the last session it was pointed out that the project was difficult to approach because many subjects under discussion by this and other Panels seem to fall under the general heading.

Neumann: I believe it to be useless to engage in an over-all project unless the other specific projects are carried out. However, we should not let it stand at that. There are a number of requirements for research on U.S. - Russian relations that are not met at the present time. There is first the continuing study of certain areas that comprise the Soviet Union as such. There is a very great need for expanding the work that the University of Seattle does in translating newspaper articles from the Soviet press. They confine it to Far Eastern affairs; it would be very important to expand this service to all foreign relations of the Soviet Union and to domestic affairs as well. Even those who are able to read Russian have difficulty in getting the material. The second point would be that the service of translating Russian materials should be extended and considerably speeded up. This is indispensable for a more fruitful study of Soviet-American relations.

Barnard: It does not seem to me that discussion of specific international relations is a proper thing to be done by RAND. That almost necessarily has to be confined to the State Department with whatever aid it wants to get outside the Department. It gets a good deal of course.

Speier: There are universities and other agencies that might very well have a legitimate field of activity. If RAND could do something to encourage such activities, to break down the linguistic barriers, I think that would in itself be quite a useful thing. It seems to be the general opinion here.

COMMITTEE II
POLITICAL STUDIES

H.D. Lasswell (Chairman)

B. Berelson
F.R. Collbohm
W.T.R. Fox
H. Goldhamer
H.M. Gray
P. Herring
A. Kaplan
E. Kris
F. Neumann
H. Speier
J. Viner

Lasswell: The political studies have all been talked about within the broad framework laid down by Weaver in his opening speech. He pointed out that our national goals include the prevention of war and the winning of wars we cannot prevent, and further, that the maintenance of democracy and of civil authority is one of our value objectives. Total policy, of course, includes all the means we use to maximize all our own goal values with the least possible sacrifice; this includes a rising standard of living, etc. The recommendations presented by the panels are made with a view to contingencies likely to confront the United States. The aim is to clarify the policies appropriate to the achievement of our goals under such circumstances. In general, we have not viewed the task of analyzing comparable situations in the past, and the problem of perfecting institutions by which a continuing survey and analysis can be carried on. To a certain extent, plans and techniques we pointed out can be pre-tested on a small scale before being applied on a larger scale. From one point of view, such pre-tests are essential to the appraisal of the current disposition of representative people and groups to respond to possible changes in the situation. In a word, we have regarded our political studies as part of the general intelligence function. We broadly conceive that as a process by which the informational and analytical basis of decisions can be improved.

The following were recognized as relevant problem groupings for political analysis. (1) The demoralization of an enemy or potential enemy. That includes the changing of the enemy or the potential enemy in ways compatible with the common system of voluntary security. (2) Gaining and maintaining a supporting diplomatic group. (3) The problem of neutrality in future wars, its possibility and its usefulness. (4) The problem of consolidating peace after a next war. (5) The problem of maintaining enough support at home within the framework of democracy to permit the carrying out of foreign policies recommended as desirable means to security and peace.

On Projects 4:3 and 4:3a, "Democratization of Dictatorships by Peacefare" and "Reactions of Ruling Groups to Internal Pressure," it was pointed out that any attempt to evaluate the effect of our actions on the state of democracy and dictatorship would take it for granted that we have a continuing survey and interpretation, and that this would make special reference to any signs of change in the degree of

centralization and decentralization in those dictatorships. We would search for signs of pluralization in the sense of a growing range of initiative among subsidiary groups and individual persons. In conjunction with this continuing evaluation of the dictatorships, we would need to appraise the effect of the entire range of means which are open to us in relation to those changes. That includes an examination of what difference our diplomatic activities make -- of whether a firm or soft or any other type of diplomatic action can be shown to have any sort of relationship to the changes specified. That is a question, then, of constant evaluation of the impact on the state of democratization or dictatorship of the several diplomatic measures. In the same way there would be consideration of measures usually called economic, such as trade, investment, barter arrangements of all sorts. Again the evaluation would be in terms of any demonstrable effect they seem to be having on the degree of centralization, polarization, etc. The third main part of the problem would be the handling of the stream of information. The problem here is to maintain a critical and continuing evaluation of the impact of elite-mass and direct and indirect streams of communication. The fourth aspect is the movement of armed forces -- maneuvers, weapon demonstrations, and the like, and evaluation of their effect. On the side of implementing this research program, the comment was frequently made that one of the most tangible things to do is to have a non-self-serving evaluation of the effects of psychological warfare in the past war. It was frequently emphasized that no investigation of this sort could be properly conducted apart from a comprehensive grasp of psychological and sociological principles.

Project 4:2c on "Determinant of the Revolutionary Situation" is also primarily directed to potential enemies and allies. The most rewarding line of study, in the opinion of several persons, was not an investigation of the entire revolutionary situation, but rather a specific evaluation of the possibilities of a *coup d'etat* in the Soviet Union and in various other communities -- the evaluation, under different technological and related circumstances, of the changes of seizure of power by a small group. There are, of course, many relevant hypotheses which have been formulated and which would be evaluated.

Project 4:2a on "The Role of European Social Democracy" may be taken as representative of some of the projects which are primarily directed toward the task of evaluating the significance of institutions in the intermediate area between the United States and Russia. The study of certain other topics led chiefly to the discussion of what the United States would be able to do abroad within the framework of democracy or within the framework of its own social structure.

In connection with Projects 5:1 and 5:1b, "Content of General U.S. Foreign Policy" and "U.S. Foreign Policy Traditions," and Project 4:1, "U.S. Goals and Values," there was a set of comments about the importance of evaluating the extent to which the United States could become a center of ideological attraction beyond its own frontiers. It was pointed out that that in no small degree was a question of the extent to which statements of America carry conviction inside the United States so that it would be possible to make use of those formulations abroad. The emphasis here was on the struggle for the control of expectations, of the picture people have about how things are likely to turn out in the world, who is likely to come out on top, and what institutions are likely to come

Lasswell:

out on top, and what institutions are likely to come out ahead.

The last group of topics was focused on the ways by which democratic processes could be maintained inside the United States. Project 5:3 on "The Conduct of Foreign Policy by Democratic Government" was generally regarded as one of the more promising lines. Here the problem of degrees of secrecy and disclosure was pertinent; and there was outlined a problem of adjusting military means to non-military ends. This involved an examination of the relationship between civilian and military institutions in accomplishing the tasks of evaluation.

On Project 4:4, "Politics of Military Occupation," it was pointed out that this would only be useful if it were seen in relation to a future problem at the end of war.

Fox: The discussion of Project 4:1 on "U.S. Goals and Values" quickly disclosed that there were two sorts of things being talked about. The first we might call "U.S. Information Policy," a formulation of the present and prospective position of the U.S. in world affairs, so as to combat intellectual skepticism of leaders of the in-between world regarding U.S. ability to check the spread of Soviet institutions. Persons rigorously trained in orthodox Marxist theory are to be used in developing some counter formulations which would appeal to the socialist leaders and socialist intelligentsia of the in-between world, and the sophisticated students of general democratic theory in the formulation of alternative positive statements. These specialists in theoretical analysis would have to pool their accounts with specialists in the formation of information policy, in order that the American merchandising problem be solved in the most satisfactory possible manner. This project would be expected to sharpen the instruments of U.S. foreign policy for maintaining and expanding American influence in countries with important non-Communist left political groups, which includes most of the countries of the in-between world.

The second project related to the range of "U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives," an examination of case materials in foreign policy and especially in the making of critical decisions, in order to develop the full spectrum of American policy objectives, demonstrating thereby the degree of complexity and consistency of these objectives with each other. The method is a detailed investigation by students of international relations with training in diplomatic history, political science and international economic relations. By clarifying present objectives, it will give assistance in ordering priorities with respect to future objectives in foreign policy.

Speier: I understood Fox to say that for an effective presentation of American foreign policy to left wing groups outside the United States it would be helpful to have the advice of persons trained in the theory of Marxism. I can clearly see that this will be helpful in presenting U.S. policy in terms which are more easily understood by big groups abroad. But the assumption that you have to talk in terms of the theory of Marxism in order to get more easily accepted what you have to offer would be entirely correct only if your aim were to talk just to theorists. But it isn't; you talk to people who have digested bits of the theory, whose conceptual framework is not entirely consistent as it would be in the case of the ideal theoretician

Speier: of Marxism. You talk to people who have a great number of attitudes which cannot be understood merely by a clear understanding of the theory of Marxism. If that is correct, then you would very definitely need the advice not only of theoreticians of Marxism but also of people who know the predispositions of the audience which you want to reach. I would like to warn against an undue narrowing of the description of the research methods to be used in this project.

Neumann: The difficulty that Speier mentioned derives from the fact that Fox's formulation comprises two different problems which I've brought together to one. The one problem that we discussed is how to understand and work out future development trends in the United States, regardless of their presentation to the outside world. To deny the validity of the Marxist theory applied to the United States is to work out an alternative picture of the future development of the United States. The second problem is that of presenting that picture to the people of the in-between world. Fox has combined two aspects into one, and made it appear as if we should talk to Europeans using Marxist terminology, which, of course, nobody whatever wanted to do, and which would not be valid at all, as Speier mentioned. Now I don't quite see in what way Fox's second problem differs from projects the chairman already mentioned -- the analysis of foreign policy objectives of the United States, the demoralizing of potential enemies, the policy of seeking of alliance groups.

Fox: Speier and Neumann's comment gives a needed clarification of intention. With respect to the second problem, I had in mind that those charged with the actual conduct of day-to-day foreign relations do not frequently deal with some of these grand problems such as enlarging the alliance group which would support the United States in a new war, or demoralizing the opposition group in case of a new war. I was rather thinking of a variety of non-power objectives (I hesitate to use the phrase because of its ambiguity) which enter in all the time. We all know that what the State Department deals with most of the time doesn't bear a great deal of relation, superficially at least, to these grand power objectives. Therefore I would not say Lasswell's discussion completely foreclosed a special project of selective examination of certain kinds of positions. In the broadest sense both the projects were amply covered by some of his more general statements.

Viner: Did one of the panels of this Committee discuss something like the adaptation of democratic political institutions and procedures to the present day needs of political and military policy?

Lasswell: Some of the topics which were discussed do include such a study.

Viner: At one of the panels in Committee III we were told that there was a gap in all the economics panels (and by implication, in the whole scheme of things here) of just that topic. There was general agreement in that panel that that was a very vital point. I'm glad to be able to report that it isn't a total gap.

Lasswell: Project 4:2 on "Political Peacefare" is reduced to only a recommendation of research in the history of psychological warfare. Project 4:2a, "The Role of European Social Democracy," should not be confined to social democracy but should be extended to cover Christian Democracy as well.

Speier: Would that take care of the general research area which I find exceedingly

Speier: intriguing and important -- the relations of the United States Government to the Vatican as a center of Catholic sentiment and opinion in the world?

Lasswell: The re-write includes any transnational organization of this type.

Fox: On Project 4:2b, "The Effect of Nationalization on Policy," the comment was made that this effect is important when seen in relation to the changing political conditions in the in-between countries. Project 4:2c on "The Determinants of the Revolutionary Situation" was redefined and narrowed to the *coup d'etat*.

Viner: Project 4:2b is closely allied with topics that came up in one of the other panels on the effects of the differences in social economic organization of international relations on foreign policy.

Lasswell: It was our view that this is the type of project that would require just that type of teamwork and division of labor.

Project 4:2d on "Changes in Foreign Policy by Political Eventualities" was not reshaped into a formal specific project, since the view was that this is a dimension of all future-oriented investigations. Project 4:3 on "Democratization of Dictatorships by Peacefare" we previously referred to; it remains a project which was emphasized in the discussions. Project 4:3a on "Reactions of Ruling Groups to Internal Pressure" was combined for discussion purposes with 4:3. Project 4:3b on "The Reactions of Ruling Groups to Changes in National Power" was dismissed as covered by the variety of other projects. Project 4:4 on "The Politics of Military Operation" was regarded as having low priority. Project 4:5 on "The Logical Analysis of Political Concepts" was regarded as having low priority unless the unusual facilities of RAND in developing teams of mathematicians, statisticians, etc. seem to provide unusual opportunity for the cooperation among specialists of this kind in the propositional analysis of the entire psychological and social process. In short, a general interest in this type of postulational work was expressed but without detailed recommendations as to action. Project 4:6 on "The Political Implications of Population and Industrial Redistribution" was regarded as one of the type that plainly involved close work among teams of specialists.

Viner: What does 'redistribution' mean there, within that country or transfer of population, or what?

Lasswell: It was discussed from both points of view. It was felt that both dimensions of the problem were at least worthy of investigation.

Viner: Are there still big areas where international transfers of population are liable to occur and are important in the present setting?

Lasswell: There are still a good many displaced persons, etc.

Fox: The title as it now stands is a synthetic unity of a number of somewhat smaller projects; it really is not a single project.

Lasswell: Yes, the title is so very comprehensive that it seems to cover dimensions of a good many investigations. The general feeling was that in whatever

Lasswell: programs are developed for the study of population changes, and especially of those where there is any element of coerciveness in the arrangement of the population, it would be particularly appropriate to have teams of social scientists who would make sure that the political consequences would be taken into account.

Collbohm: What social science knowledge is applicable to the formation of a complete United States policy? Or what would have a bearing on the formation of the policy that we should have in the future? For example, present foreign policy rests primarily on political and military factors, and secondarily on economic factors; does it also take into account knowledge that might be applicable in the field of anthropology or any of the other social sciences? If it is not now based upon all these factors, can such factors be set forth so as to be brought to the attention of policy makers?

Lasswell: One question might be, what is the stream of knowledge that ought to be brought to the notice of policy makers? How could you improve the intelligence function in this large sense to provide people with what's needed for a rational evaluation of all the major possibilities in view of our total objectives? Another large dimension of the problem is an examination of the relative weight which has in pratice been given in the past to a variety of these considerations, and an explanation of the relative weight which has been given them.

Lasswell: Project 5:3b is on "Conduct of Foreign Policy by a Democratic Government." The description of the project is "What is the degree of disclosure and secrecy which is compatible with successful foreign policy under circumstances of the kind likely to confront the U.S.? How can we distinguish content to be withheld or disclosed, and how can the expedient degree of secrecy be made acceptable without sacrificing democracy?" This calls for an analysis of the relation of democratic doctrines and degrees of secrecy.

Viner: There is another problem which seems to me to have at least as high priority as that of secrecy. The question is whether democratic procedures slow up the formation of policy and action thereupon.

Lasswell: This question of speed was brought out in the discussion of the standards of effective action in the field of foreign policy.

Viner: Is there a project there, a survey of the delaying aspects of our procedures, including possibly constitutional provisions that would delay action at a time when speed is essential? The point of view is that one of our major problems results from the fact that our democratic procedures are time - consuming. Hence the opinion that there is an urgent necessity of surveying our procedures in advance so we don't get caught by a time schedule in an emergency; this is a much faster moving world.

Fox: In Panel 13 that specific problem was discussed rather extensively.

Lasswell: Project 5:c is on "Adjustment of Military Means to Non-military Ends." To indicate a little bit of what was involved: Non-military factors affecting the formation of military policy and the choice between alternative policies, and desirability of maintaining democratic values in both the civilian and military sectors of life in pursuing a military policy requiring a progressively greater concentration of power.

Neumann: In Panel 4 the most important project is "U.S. Goals and Values" as reformulated by Fox, subject to the correction that I have given his reformulation; afterwards, the project on "Social Democracy and Christian Democracy in Europe." An answer to the questions of these political and national and transnational organizations promises an effective implementation of U.S. foreign policy. Finally, in Panel 4, a study of "Revolutionary Situations" as reformulated by Lasswell appears to me extraordinarily promising. The most important project is "Conduct of Foreign Relations by a Democratic Government," since this involves the greatest problems of the theory and practice of democracy, which so far have been seriously avoided in all discussions of democratic foreign policy. Also important is the group of projects on demoralizing the enemy, provided that this investigation is formulated in terms of studying weak spots in the social, political and economic structure of the Soviet Union, and only from an examination of these weak spots arriving at an information policy. The attainment of military ends by non-military means is perhaps equally important with the converse formulated in Project 5:c.

Kris: In Panel 4 my preference would be 4:3, on "Democratization of Dictatorships by Peacefare." This includes also an emphasis on the importance of all research which bears on the means for demoralizing the enemy.

Herring: In some stage in the not too distant future it would be very desirable to have this whole matter considered from the standpoint of what the disciplines are prepared to contribute in terms of their own research methods and their own development. Not until we come to grips with that aspect of the problem of research can we advance very far in thinking of priorities in terms of a program for action.

Kaplan: From Panel 4 the project on "U.S. Goals and Values" seems of particular importance, especially in the second of the two projects into which it has been recast -- the analysis of foreign policy objectives. A trend analysis leading to a general prospective of future developments is one of the very important matters required to perform successfully an advisory function. From Panel 5 the line of investigation of the "Adjustment of Military Means of Non-military Ends" seems at the present stage to be especially promising.

Speier: In Panel 5 I would list as my highest priorities the projects on the "Adjustment of Military Means to Non-military Ends," on the "Conduct of Foreign Policy by a Democratic Government," and on the "Interaction of Foreign Policy with Domestic Policy."

Berelson: With reference to Panel 4, I would like to express a preference for the first project, particularly as reformulated with reference to the "Formulation and Presentation of American Goals and Values." The others which I would assign high priority within Panel 4 are the reformulated Projects 4:3 and 3a, with reference to both the identification and the exploitation of tensions within another country. I am wondering whether the fourth of our original five categories -- consolidating the peace after a war -- has been given as much attention as the others.

Fox: If I had to assign them, the highest priorities in Panel 4 would go to the project relating to "U.S. Information Policy" and the one relating to "Transnational Movements." I'm not sure they are not the same project. In any case they have this in common. Instead of the more orthodox analysis in terms of resources

Fox: and territory, in both cases we would be engaged in identifying non-territorial groups and the attitudes of the leaders and masses in such groups, with a view to getting a somewhat more sophisticated conception of the line up in the in-between world than you get in terms of states and the powers of states. I attach a little more importance than I think the panel did to considering now what the United States would be able to do with victory if it got itself into war under certain specified conditions. The project on the "Adjustment of Military Means to Non-military Ends" has the highest priority, if only because it is theoretically possible to subsume practically everything else discussed under that. It perhaps describes the whole of RAND's possible functions in the social science field.

Goldhamer: In Panel 4 the project that seems to me of special significance is 4:3a on "Reactions of Ruling Groups to Internal Pressures." But the reason why I would consider that especially significant is not the one indicated here under utility of results. In interpreting the actions of various governments there is a tendency to identify action as representing the conception that the governing group has of its national interests. I suspect that in many instances misinterpretations of the intentions of the governments of foreign countries are made by attributing to the government a policy which in fact simply stems from the fact that certain special pressure groups are momentarily able to secure acceptance of their own immediate policy. A study of this sort would aid in differentiating those actions of governments which might more truly be said to reflect long term policy from actions which simply mislead in that respect and are largely due to the policy of rather special groups within the nation. In Panel 5 I am rather partial to 5:4a and 4b on "Pressures Created by Power Vacuums" and "Trouble Spots." I would emphasize that, not only because of the obvious fact that wherever you have such a situation trouble ensues, but also because of certain considerations that arose in Panel 3 on Political Psychology. A number of situations in which friction occurs between governments are often depreciated in significance by saying that they involve altogether secondary issues. ("Everybody knows this particular issue isn't really striking; it's simply an instance of one country jockeying with the other. It's mere show and testing of strength, and consequently isn't to be taken too seriously.") The relation to the problems that arise in political psychology is this. In speaking about political decision making we tend to emphasize a great deal of study of decision making as such. I suspect that there has been relatively little discussion of the specific decision to wage war, how that comes about and under what circumstances. If one wanted to make a very crude distinction one could perhaps say that the motives for war or the calculations for war are of two types. One consists of rational calculations which rest on expectations of gain (I would include here such gains as in national pride, not simply territory or power). The inhibitions to war on a rational basis might be very grave, based on the capacity to calculate that even though in some sense you may be a victor you will nonetheless suffer a net loss. But that situation is not likely to eventuate. In that case, it seems to place the major burden on the non-rational processes in decision making and the incapacity to maintain relations under the pressure of constant international bargaining and testing and exercising pressure. Final breakdown may result from feeling that you can't go on any longer. You simply say, "To hell with it all! Let's take a chance if the situation isn't so bad!" and you act in that sense nonrationally. From that standpoint the projects on "Power Vacuums" and "Trouble Spots" are especially significant. Often they do not seem significant in terms of substantive issues. But they are terribly significant in terms of the pressure they put on the decision makers to ultimately lose their capacity to maintain rational discussion among themselves.

Gray: The conference is concerned with two types of problems: studies that might hold out some hope for prevention of war, and those that might better prepare a country in the event that a war did come. From the point of view of prevention of war, the type of study suggested by the general heading "Goals and Objectives," studies concerned with improving our understanding of Social Democratic and other middle of the way movements, and the study of trouble spot situations, all suggest some means for lessening of present tensions. In the other category of studies, those calculated to strengthen the country in the event war did come, I think priority should be assigned to those concerned with the clear understanding and demoralization of the enemy.

Lasswell: Most of the men who have commented around the table this afternoon have in various ways indicated that they wanted their remarks to be looked upon rather as vague and tentative signals of some of the project fields which strike them now as being somewhat promising; no one wants his remarks taken in any very strict fashion.

Collbohm: Many of the projects that have been discussed -- particularly those relating to circumstances in foreign countries in the in-between world -- can hardly be thoroughly analyzed until we get a pretty solid picture of what our foreign policy is or should be. We need some framework in which to work. For example, we might make a careful study of some country in the Balkans which is really of no interest to our foreign policy, because it is something that is too far out of our power area.

Lasswell: Most of the persons here would agree that it is important for any investigation to entertain some tentative assumptions about our objectives. There must be at some point either an authoritative or articulated policy, or one which a given set of scientists and engineers assume for purposes of an analysis.

My impression is that the needs of policy require selected projects in each one of the major project areas since each one is of very crucial importance. And the maximum advantages from any one of these lines of investigation can only be gleaned if one has a series of concurrent investigations going forward in each one of these major areas.

ECONOMIC STUDIES

PANEL VI
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS RELATIONS

L. Ridenour (Chairman)

B. Brodie	E. Shaw
W.T.R. Fox	H. Speier
F. Lorimer	J. Viner
F. Neumann	A. Wallis

Ridenour: Project 6:1, "Economics of the Marshall Plan", aims to determine and appraise the postulates on which the Marshall Plan for economic reconstruction rests, so that the aid requested by other countries can be viewed in proper perspective.

Shaw: The economist would have something to say in a number of respects about this particular method of extending aid to Europe. It is peculiar in that it is not moving through commercial channels; it is concocted pretty much on the spur of the moment; the specifications of the need will be laid down in the first instance by the recipients; it is peculiar in a number of other ways. The economist can certainly examine historically such questions as the dangers implicit in "on the spur of the moment" assistance plans that apparently won't fit into an overall economic plan, and which are devised with a single emergency in view. It would be worthwhile looking back on these various programs to see what the mistakes were that we fell into by precipitative action.

Ridenour: You feel that even though such a study as the one proposed here might come too late or come at the wrong place to be useful in connection with the Marshall Plan, nevertheless as an evaluation of what was actually done it would serve as a guide to the future.

Shaw: I am willing to take that position for the sake of argument.

Viner: I would want to generalize it. Consider the general question of our relations with countries in distress and procedures for dealing with them. We should not confine ourselves strictly to economic analysis, because clearly the political considerations are of great importance. However, a study of the techniques, problems and consequences of financial aid with the Marshall Plan and of the fact that a large part of the world economy apparently can't stand on its own feet and needs aid from us, should be conducted in terms of the conditions of our granting aid as well as the economic consequences of our action. I don't know any field of investigation that has more urgency and I am sure that its significance will continue until a study could be completed.

Speier: It has been pointed out that the postulates of the Marshall Plan procedure are both economic and political in nature. The importance of the public relations question should not be minimized. For example, what was the effect of announcing the plan and later permitting it to be contradicted or fortified by other members of

Speier: the cabinet?

Fox: At least three different kinds of projects have been suggested; RAND can study economically efficient ways of aiding an area, politically efficient ways of getting a program into action, and what sorts of foreign policy objectives can be attained by the use of this kind of technique. For the RAND group the latter type of project is of particular interest because other weapons presumably can be used for achieving other objectives in foreign policy. If we fit the whole thing together we see the relationships of the economic tools to the coercive tools in the implementation of given objectives in American foreign policy.

Lorimer: Isn't this project as presented either too early or too late; that is, too late to make a significant contribution to the actual determination of operations under the Marshall Plan and too early to give an adequate historical appraisal of it? Aren't there some rather basic economic problems which bear on this; for instance the question of the conditions of a viable economy in western Europe? It is impossible for western Europe to achieve an economic stability apart from close relationship with eastern Europe. It seems to be a basic economic problem of resources, trade relations, etc.

Viner: The problem of under what conditions there can be a viable western Europe is a very important one and one in which research might very well be fruitful. The viability of western Europe, the conditions necessary for western Europe to be self-supporting, is certainly something about which the American people have reason to worry. It is a problem that has a right to stand on its own two feet and is of significance whatever the objectives of RAND may be. It also opens the whole question of area studies.

Neumann: The objective of the Marshall Plan is primarily political rather than economic. It is not simply to create a viable economy in Europe but also to create a politically stable Europe. Therefore, the major question of the Marshall Plan appears to be "Can we succeed in creating a viable economy in Europe and with it a desired political system?"

Viner: The political aspects of this topic are of course important, but a separate group may study the political aspects knowing that the inter-relations are important. It involves different techniques, different sorts of data, etc. There is a legitimate economic study here and there certainly is a legitimate political study. I am not sure what you would gain by informing the economist that there are political implications here, and informing the politicians there are economic factors involved. What further gain is there in taking the two together? If a research project were to be outlined here, there would be an elaboration in terms of economic and political factors, the projects would partially go off in independent directions and then come together again at the end. In other words, there are enough political aspects of the Marshall Plan to contribute a legitimate project for the political panel. The economics of it also seems to be a perfectly legitimate project.

Shaw: There is no reason why another facet should not be added -- the Marshall Plan is interesting also for what it may do in this country. There may be a basis for choosing between alternative plans of aid because of their domestic repercussions or choosing timing, form or direction of aid on the basis of domestic considerations.

Shaw: One can see some popular worry about this in Hoover's statement, for example, that he intended to explore the ability of the United States to support a series of programs like this.

Brodie: There seems also to have been some play upon the politically dramatic value of the idea in order to win support, as with piecemeal doling out of loans.

Ridenour: Fox has divided this project into four parts. The first concerns the question of the efficient use of economic means in achieving foreign policy objectives -- is the Marshall Plan the best possible arrangement that could have been proposed for achieving what we wish in our foreign policy on the basis of economic aid? The second part of the problem concerns the political context of extending economic aid -- the political aspects of our current economic assistance to foreign governments for the purpose of reaching political ends. The third part asks which of the many possible political ends can be achieved at all by political means. The fourth part is that of the economic viability of western Europe.

Fox: Now that the project has been broadened this far I am wondering why it couldn't be broadened just a little bit further in order to include project 7:1 (Economic Peacefare). This would include both coercive means and, let us say, incentives or blandishments. Sometimes you can't clearly distinguish whether a particular transaction is coercive or is a concession but by atmosphere and tone they may be quite different.

Viner: There will be many important occasions in which they are separate and autonomous, with no connection between them. I think purely conciliatory or friendly diplomacy that tries to come to a mutual understanding to get its own way is often carried on in important areas where there is no question of coercion involved.

Lorimer: The purpose of 7:1 is to make an inventory with some assessment of different means of international economic aid which carry political implications -- just to make a catalogue of the possible instruments that can be used in different situations, what is the work of each weapon, what are the deficiencies and drawbacks, etc.

Ridenour: Can we recognize then that these various items in 7:1 would provide, say, leading chapters or individual studies in a series, and still hold out the possibility of considering patterns of combinations of them?

Viner: They could very well tie up with area studies -- a type or a combination that might be an appropriate one for northwestern Europe might not be appropriate for southeastern Asia.

Speier: Surely it would not be the purpose, would it, to arrive at a catalogue of the various instruments and then assign degrees of efficacy to the various instruments? You don't want to say that a certain instrument (e.g., coercion or blockade) is more effective then loans are, because that would make very little sense unless you take into account the circumstances under which you apply these instruments.

Viner: It would make sense to me if I knew how to find out which would be more effective. What would be the pattern of research here? Suppose this project were agreed upon as being important, how would you start on it? You might start thinking of what are the possible methods -- speculating about it, getting some conceptual

Viner: or analytical pattern; the only other way I know is to go into historical research to study the use of such instruments in the past and see how they worked under various circumstances.

Brodie: In that connection I want to ask whether our tendency to lump various projects together into one logical whole, which tends to get to the level of the textbooks covering the field, is really advisable. It may leave you where you were before.

Viner: The logical whole is not intended to designate a specific research project, but to coordinate research projects so that they fit into a pattern. For instance, to what extent have tariff threats or tariff concessions been used effectively as means of gaining political ends? That is a possible query, and if it could be answered at all it would have to be answered by historical study. I don't see any other way.

Fox: I think that to give the study focus one should make a preliminary statement of what he believes to be the objectives of foreign policy and then to consider these various techniques in terms of their efficiency towards achieving those presumed objectives. You may want to refine your objectives after you have gone through the list of instruments or after you have thought about the objectives some more, but I don't think it is particularly efficient to ask simply what you can do with tariffs. One can make some statement about the kind of foreign policy which the United States is now working toward; one can make some observations about what that means in terms of a certain area, and then proceed to consider what is the utility of the alternative economic instruments in achieving these general ends in that particular area.

Shaw: There may be some other items that fit in, for example economic analysis not of our own foreign policy technique, but also of colonialism as it is developing since the war. It may not be particularly interesting to us, but colonialism as one aspect of foreign policy is important for the Dutch, for example, and the British.

Ridenour: We turn next to Project 6:1a, International Trade Regulation.

Viner: I think there is room for a research project in this sense: How can you devise a mutually satisfactory pattern of relationship between a state regulated economy and free market economies? That is an important question, now and certainly for some time. I would like to see some minds get to work on it. How to draft a code of the proper relationships between the monopolist acting as a monopolist and the small buyer and seller trying to keep himself from monopolistic exploitation? That's an internal problem of some importance. I don't know how to find an answer. I have not only failed, but as far as I can think at the moment, I reached the limits of any technique I know for getting more light on it. Therefore, I say the way of handling it would be to announce the question and try to find somebody who thinks he knows how to find an answer.

Lorimer: Is there a question just a little less ambiguous than how to get a code formulated? How can a free trade, free market, individual enterprise system best adapt itself to dealings with state controlled economies?

Viner: I think the answer's pretty easy there. Become a state controlled monopoly. However, if you have other reasons for objecting to that solution, the real problem for us may be how we can retain as much of the free market system as possible while

Viner: preventing our economy, or individuals in our economy, from being subjected to unreasonable pressures by external monopolies. Another thing that would stand investigation is how important it is to us that we should protect them -- that is, how important to us are the external monopolies. If the Rand project were to embark on this I urge them to get in contact with the State Department and start where they have left off rather than do all they've done over again.

Ridenour: What should be put under research method?

Viner: Bright ideas -- I would say this is that sort of problem. If you state the problem very clearly you have already made a big advance, and then it is a challenge. It ought to be assigned to somebody because it's been a sticker. There are many people who are anxious to find an answer. They want to say, for instance that the United States and Russia (even though Russia grew larger in area) can get along perfectly well. There will be no hitch on the economic side, even though we have a free market. I can show you a lot of literature saying that. They don't say how -- what they say does not make sense in one way or another. There is real interest in it. I think it may be important that an answer be found. The State Department's answer is shutting their eyes to the problem. Russia is absorbing more and more of eastern Europe, which is not important to us but is important to western Europe, if western Europe is to live. This ties in again with the viability of western Europe. But there is literature already and any research ought to start where that ends. It ends in failure.

Fox: I would like to ask whether this project is correctly described in having simply two categories, free market individual enterprise system and state controlled economy? All over Europe there are varying degrees of state control. The problem may be one of adjusting to various degrees, rather than of spelling out the theoretical relations between a theoretically completely free economy and a theoretically completely controlled economy.

Viner: The problem is the same problem analytically where there's monopoly. How does a free market economy deal with monopoly -- with external monopoly? That's the economic problem. The political problem may be different, but our problem with English bulk purchasing is substantially the same as it would be with the Russian monopoly buying wheat. But where there is complete state control of foreign trade it makes a difference.

Fox: It also introduces the possibility that it is a political consideration.

Viner: As soon as the government gets into trade it can and it inevitably will be affected by political considerations. It can't stop itself from letting political considerations affect its commercial economy.

Lorimer: Does this problem represent a difference of kind or of degree from our relatively long history with cartels and various type of monopoly abroad?

Viner: If the cartels get to be state sponsored -- state participation ---of course one merges into the other, but then the cartel could be a problem of what you do with a combination of state monopolies, because the cartel is a combination of international monopolies. The 20th Century Fund has got some good people on the international cartel problem. The volumes are already in the press. They have not exhausted the subject.

Viner: But there again Washington has an interdepartmental group working on that and has got all sorts of material.

Ridenour: Is it felt that what's already going on in the State Department, combined with the difficulty of solving the problem as stated here, is such that there is no virtue in making such a recommendation?

Viner: I would recommend that you try to find somebody who is bright enough to find an answer to the problem. I would say that is just the kind of challenge you ought not to ignore. The only procedure I know is for inviting college professors to invite their bright graduate students to take that as a thesis topic. One of them may find the answer.

Lorimer: Viner said the problem was to find a mutually satisfactory code. That seems to me to be more ideal but more ambitious than a project directed toward the problem of trade between state controlled economies and free enterprise systems which wish to preserve themselves. Unless a person of ability is willing to tackle and work on it, there is no use setting it up as a project. There's a closely related problem that might conceivably merge into the other problem, and that is how should trade between state controlled economies be effected?

Viner: I'd certainly urge that the topic be left at least rattling around in any list of proposals with the chance that somebody catches fire on it.

Ridenour: Let us turn to 6:1b U.S. Tariff Policy.

Viner: Here there is distinct room for research. It has not been done and it is significant. Something like this would be a historical study of the political effects of the United States tariff structure on our relations with the outside world. The point I have in mind is that ever since the late 1880's there's been a constant threat, a constant tendency for some form of European union intended especially to cope with our high tariff and our giant ways, etc. This has not been investigated by American historians, as far as I know, or by others. At present such movements as there are for European economic unions still have some of that element. They feel that they need a bigger unit to deal with us, and I think it is a relatively important phase of the history of our relationships with Europe. I find no mention of it in American history at all. There is a big available literature of continuous contemporary documents. Some of those proposals were serious documents between countries -- circular letters as long ago as the 1880's. It would also be significant for us in the European customs union. That was usually the form which the proposal took. Part of the project might include a study as to why it never came to anything. A substantial body of European ill-will is due to our tariff policy. One particular case has been studied. There is a case study of European reaction to the Jones Tariff retaliation, (I think it was the 14th McComber Tariff Act). That study wasn't extended either forward or back into history. I don't know whether it is worthwhile here or pertinent, but a study might be done on the influence of American tariff policy on Canadian-American relations. The single most important factor determining the tone of Canadian-American relations has been tariff policy. I don't know that our Far Eastern relations have been importantly affected lately. Our tariff policy has figured somewhat in our Latin American relations.

Fox: It's frequently said that the Smoot-Hawley tariff delivered the final blow to

Fox: the last civilian government in Japan.

Viner: That's right. That would include recent Japan. When historians come to discuss Japanese-American relations they are going to say that Japan had a great deal of provocation in terms of unreasonable economic coercion. That hasn't been studied either, although there is some Japanese literature charging us with it, and rightly. I wouldn't be at all indisposed to say that when the depression came, the combined blows to the Japanese economy of the tariffs of the British Empire and the United States were a very important factor in leading Japan to abandon what semblance of liberal attitudes it had in foreign policy, adopting instead a greater Asia co-prosperity scheme, etc.

Ridenour: Should this be studied in the first instance as a unit or broken down into relations between pairs of countries?

Viner: Offhand, the ideal arrangement would be to have different men study these different parts but in contact with each other, so that they would be aiding each other rather than doing the same part of the basic analysis -- for instance a part would be the legistlative record in the United States.

Wallis: Shouldn't it include not only tariff policy but also currency policy such as currency depreciation?

Shaw: There are certainly some interesting episodes of monetary policy bearing on international political relations. The London Conference of June '33, is an outstanding illustration.

Viner: Also, the old Bi-Metallic conference was at a high pitch of international tension.

Shaw: Our relationships with the so-called Gold Bloc are colored now and will be colored indefinitely by the sudden reversal of our policy at the London Conference in '33. That helped shift the balance of power internally in both a political and economic sense in the countries of Western Europe. I should think that would be a fascinating study.

Viner: That should not be hard to do. The history of that period has been written up from many angles. This would be writing it up from another angle, and therefore I think on the whole you wouldn't have to plough back very far to reach a record of this sort. A relatively short essay would make the point.

Wallis: A study such as the one done on competitive currency depreciation of New Zealand and Denmark, is a similar study of a pair of countries. Perhaps we shouldn't confine ourselves to the direct political implications. The Denmark-New Zealand thing didn't have direct political consequences of any importance, but the Argentine got into that competition and then Canada half-heartedly followed. In Canada it became a critical issue as to whether they should have followed in depreciating or done something else.

Shaw: Of course we see here the point that it is impossible to draw up a code for international trading when each country reserves the right to permit its national

Shaw: income and its exchange rates to fluctuate over a wide range.

Viner: The Breton Woods attempt at a code could be a good pattern. You may not think it does it, but it's fairly elaborate. Perhaps it's too daring -- too much of a code to start with.

Wallis: I suggest that the code is less involved in this problem than the one that goes before. As phrased, this project deals with the effect of the U.S. tariff structure on the economies of other countries in so far as tensions predisposing to war may be created. But this is quite another question from a code.

Viner: No, it isn't. Again I feel it was an attempt to develop a code to deal with peace problems here, just as Breton Woods is an attempt to deal with the problem Shaw raised. In other words, these are recognized problems and the world is struggling for a code to deal with limitations on what individual countries can do if what other individual countries are liable to do on their own is likely to creat tension.

Fox: I suspect that the drafter of this proposal had in mind that purely domestic considerations would sometimes injure the American foreign policy position in some important way. The purpose of this was to organize material so that the people charged with making foreign military policy could go to Congress and say, "Look here, there is a national interest in not allowing this special interest to triumph." I mention this because the tariff is only one of the many kinds of policies which are presumed to be totally domestic but whose foreign policy ramifications ought to be considered -- for example, immigration policy, currency policy, silver legislation, etc. We might set up a series of studies in which we examine the foreign policy consequences of legislation in fields which according to the American tradition are thought to be purely domestic

Brodie: One of those things might be business cycle control.

Ridenour: We might list all the fields of this sort we can think of.

Fox: Shipping, air transportation, and access to raw materials in other countries are likely to be important.

Ridenour: Does this come under the head of domestic policy?

Fox: The pursuit of access to raw materials, various types of subsidies, the struggle as to who is going to dig for the oil in the near East, and the role of American pressure groups as to what our foreign policy shall be in the near east.

Viner: Economics with strategic interest, I think, illustrates the part we want. I don't know how to formulate that into a project, but it seems to me that oil is only one case where the Government proceeded toward a certain policy on which they weren't clear in their own mind as to whether the primary interest was economic or strategic. There must be other such cases as well.

Ridenour: Let's consider next the question: "Will international friction be mitigated by reducing the extreme disparity between advanced industrial nations and those less fully industrialized?"

Coale: We might analyze it in a logical way by asking in what way there could be friction. One hypothesis might be that less advanced industrial nations are themselves aggressive, and I think that could be dismissed by a fairly rapid examination of the last few wars. Then you might ask in what other ways there could be a source of friction.

Viner: Supposing it increased friction - you might still want, for other reasons, to promote industrialization of some backward region, so I don't believe the question as it is phrased has the proper policy orientation. I would suggest that in this whole field of the backward countries we follow the word "undeveloped" as the keyword, rather than the word "industrialized". In other words, will international friction be mitigated by reducing the extreme disparity between the development of advanced industrial nations and those less fully developed? This begs the question, "Shall you try to raise the level of the backward countries by industrializing them or by other forms of their economic development?" That is an important issue and needs more analysis, although it is already receiving a lot. Very often people say industrialization and mean development. They are two different problems. Should China have heavy industry and make its own locomotives, or should China be given a lot of capital for irrigation and roads and a railroad system to support small scale processing industries?

Ridenour: This is a good correction of the first question. We can go to the second: "How can the rivalry of the more developed nations for control of and access to the less developed countries be reduced or controlled?

Viner: This is a question of the processes of economic imperialism, the use of some sorts of coercions. This has been a problem since the 1870's. I don't know whether it's your present day problem or not. The relations between industrial -- developed and undeveloped countries might be mitigated by making the undeveloped countries more developed. A big area with a lot of manpower and a lot of natural resources but no systematic exploitation of it may be a vacuum area. Its lack of development may make it weak in a military sense, so it isn't autonomous and able to keep the enemy out. There is rivalry as to who gets political control over it. Military weakness results from backwardness. Economic backwardness may itself be a factor in creating a friction breeding pattern. If India were powerful because of development or for other reasons, we wouldn't regard India as a dangerous spot in a sense that there may be rivalry between the English and the Russians or between us and the Russians as to who gets into India.

Speier: The rivalary of the more developed countries is not so interesting as the respective effectiveness of the different methods they apply. I am not primarily interested in how to reduce or control the rivalry, I am principally interested to find out, putting it bluntly, whether dealing with China, the Soviet Union or the United States is more effective.

Fox: Germany, France, England and the United States all claimed (1870 - 1914) that there was a certain pattern of rivalry in various areas of the world.

Viner: Germany's aggressive policy might have been due to her being kept out of certain areas -- by the "closed door", for instance.

Speier: It may be useful for introducing a little more specificity into the project, to distinguish between the economic and political results of the rivalry. It also calls for an appraisal of the pursuit of American interests. As a matter of fact an

Speier: appraisal of any study of the kind would have to be made, otherwise you would just get an economic result or only a political result without getting the total problem.

Lorimer: As one of the non-economists, I am a little disappointed that there aren't any specific economic research problems here. I would suppose that the economists with their techniques would have some contributions to make to some of these problems. I wonder if there might not be some economic aspects to these problems that might be studied by methods of economic analysis although they are not primarily economic problems. To make my point specific, Viner's first statement in objecting to the term industrialization as the whole story in connection with the backward areas suggests a critical problem in the development of China as probably the most critical power vacuum area in the world, because of its size and because of the U.S. - Soviet rivalry. One aspect of that economic problem is the population growth. One thing which the population students are pretty well agreed upon is that with any political stabilization and any economic advance China would enter upon an era of rapid population growth, because initial economic advance always operates much more rapidly on the infant mortality and child mortality rate than it does on fertility. A reduction in fertility comes along later with the impact of economic advance. It would seem that there couldn't be much industrialization, much shift of labor force into industrial production, unless there was a very rapid increase in agricultural productivity. I understand that the Chinese communist strategy concentrates on agricultural reform and rather tends to pass over the private enterprise, a few industries in Kalgan that have come into their hands. There is the question of the possibilities -- the relative importance of agricultural versus industrial production; there is also the appropriateness of small-scale enterprise; the possibilities of something being done in China analogous to Japan's transformation of hand industries to standardization, electrification etc. In other words, I wonder if there could be an economic study of the possibility of economic advance in China, the lines appropriate, and the relative stages of economic advance. Even if that might not be a contribution to the whole foreign policy concept of relations to China, I think it is capable of some rather fruitful study. There is a good deal of rather hasty jumping to an all-out industrialization without an understanding of what are really the interactions of possible economic forces in that situation. There might be a piece of economic research along these lines.

Viner: The field is for American economists a peculiarly novel one. The Americans did a little work on it in the days of American conscious imperialism in the 1890' and 1900's. There was some American literature on that, but I don't know of any field of economic investigation within RAND's range of interest which is being pushed as much as this problem of the development of backward areas. There is a good deal of work going on in England and in France with respect to their own colonial empires. There is work going on in England by economists who are working for other countries or with other countries in mind. And in this country, of course, I have always worked on the problem, and there could very well be more work in this field. It will be a long time before one can say the field is overworked. One thing I'd like to see, if only for curiosity, is a comparative study of the plans that backward countries have themselves drawn up. There are a whole array of such plans; Chinese plans that have become seriously modified in the light of more sober appraisal of the possibilities; the Bombay plan in India; pre-Russian expansion plans for the industrialization or the development of the Balkans; a literature on Brazil

Viner: and Latin America; the Puerto Rico problem; there's the Carribbean commission. It is an important field and as long as there are areas with tremendous population, substantial natural resources, and low standards of income or of living, there is a problem of large-scale planning in some sense of that term. The analysis of how it would affect American policy is itself something for exploration and a systematic statement. I think that UN and I.T.O. are involved. There is a history of these ideas being pressed on us, and of the State Department being reluctant to get involved in them but being pulled into them more and more, and finally getting to like their own phraseology and beginning to believe it, so that the ideal charter has a lot of nice words about development. This field of study is not being covered, and in terms of the availability of economists in the world, the proportion of American economists working on it is much too small. Substantially more of American economists ought to get to work on that. There is a good deal of work in this country being done on the doctor's thesis level by foreign students. The work has been going on only a relatively few years. The problem is a major one and it needs thorough exploration. It would be a serious mistake to start out with the assumption that a problem that would be suitable for the Chinese would be suitable for the Balkans. You had better look to see if there is any difference in areas of population, or traditions or social structure, or rate of population growth which might be a significant factor in determining what the appropriate policy is.

Fox: Despite the assumption that this sort of thing might indicate theaters of the next war, you would still give it a high priority, wouldn't you, whether it was for peace or war?

Viner: Sometime in the fairly near future we move on to Latin America and the Far East, and unlike Europe it won't be merely a reconstruction to something like a former pattern. If we have a big program of aid for the Far East or Latin America, this issue as to the type of development that the U.S. will support becomes a genuine issue of policy in the U.S.

Fox: We have in the U.S. a large reservoir of people with extensive foreign experience in almost all of these undeveloped areas as a result of the way in which the war was fought. Every graduate school and every social science department is filled with young men who have this area experience. It would be rather easy, therefore, with a reasonable amount of subsidy to encourage these partially trained students to do doctoral dissertations along patterns which fit together. It would make a good deal of sense to think of some systematic way of gathering information on the areas of the undeveloped world, particularly since we know that a great political and economic change is going to take place there within this decade whether we will it or not. RAND may very properly interest itself in such a subsidy program looking toward a systematic collection of information.

Viner: I would like to generalize as to a method which RAND might use. Subsidization of doctoral research would apply to many of the problems that will come up. It is a routine way of carrying on research projects in the physical sciences -- having people do them as their doctors' thesis. A lot of the best work in American economics has been done in doctors' theses, even though there's a pattern of depreciating them as not being important. Also at that level you get a willingness to expend energy which isn't present later on. RAND ought seriously to consider as to whether the most effective and most economical and fastest way in which it can get some of this work

Viner: done is by trying to get it assigned with help to candidates for the doctorate as thesis subjects.

Shaw: Industrialization does quite different things. The industrialization of Russia on the one hand and industrialization of Canada and New Zealand on the other, tending to break their ties with Great Britain, are quite different. We might well count on the historian to give us a number of clues as to the political direction in which industrialization tends to drive a nation. It obviously can be in several directions. We've been implying it was only in one direction.

Viner: I don't know any economist who would be interested enough in the question of power politics to have studied the effect on the power pattern of the spread of technology and the spread of industrialization. It would be something concerning which you could rewrite the last sixty years of history.

Ridenour: We will turn to Project 6:3 (Belligerency Index).

Shaw: It might be put in terms of a policy index rather than a belligerency index. Are there ways in which we can diagnose an imminent change in foreign policy? I think it is one of the uses to which we might put a more thorough economic knowledge of Russia than we have. If there is an enormous wheat crop, what does that mean in Russian policy toward Italy? If we can get notice three or four months in advance about growing conditions in Russia, that may be useful in planning counter-moves. There is no reason why that usefulness should be limited to forecasting the outbreak of war.

Neumann: It would be interesting to write a short essay on why such an index cannot possibly be compiled. I don't believe that even if you have all the data you want you can ever construct an index that would tell you anything about the immediate prospect of war or peace.

Lorimer: An index might be useful. We're otherwise bound to rely on a lot of piecemeal information we find to forecast the direction of policy.

Ridenour: Neumann feels there is little value in attempting this. Some other people in the panel feel there may be value in attempting this, and they have some notions how it might be tackled. Project 6:4 (International Tensions Between Socialism and Capitalism) is next.

Viner: These tensions here might not all be economic. Certainly the other project does not go beyond economic aspects.

Neumann: Shouldn't a distinction be made of types of socialist countries? Socialism like Russia's is not the same as socialism like New Zealand's. Also there is the implication that peaceful coexistence excludes frictional factors. This should not be taken for granted.

Fox: The way the project is formulated does not lead to the question "Suppose countries with differing economic organizations have to work together to achieve certain non-economic objectives. What are the special problems that are created?"

Viner: Insofar as we have taken care of this problem under the previous one, that disposes of it. Insofar as it is political, it belongs in the international politics panel.

Ridenour: We now come to 6:4a (Economic Prospectus for Russia).

Lorimer: A critical and honest attempt to estimate trends in Russian productivity would be a very valuable thing, a real contribution, but a person would have to utilize a great deal of material in the Russian language, a great deal of wartime intelligence that was picked up in various ways and still hasn't been released. A tremendous amount of adjusting and revising of the data would be necessary. The final result would not be very satisfactory, it has a great deal of bearing on foreign policy.

Shaw: Precisely that sort of study appeared in the last issue of the Journal of Political Economy, by George (?) of the Department of Commerce who judges various estimates of the Russian national income simply by cross comparisons for consistency between different types of Russian data. He ends up far short of the stage we can reach in estimating the American national income, but it is far advanced relative to a state of complete ignorance. There's no question about the fertility of the study; it is just a question of the ability -- are we capable of judging that?

Viner: It is a question of technical skill.

Lorimer: The economic analysis of such data as are available, more systematic collection, etc. is needed, but in addition there would be needed clues here and there to changes, etc. One need not really come out with a complete prospectus for estimating the income.

Neumann: I don't quite understand the skepticism with regard to this project. I think on the whole we reached fairly accurate conclusions during the war on this type of problem. I don't quite understand why it shouldn't be possible to reach estimates that are fair, and that is quite important. Information, I think, is easier to pick up now than ever before.

Fox: This study might be given a careful focus for policy purposes by asking for an estimate of how much economic power is available for political purposes. An economy which produces just enough for survival has nothing available for coercive purposes, but in an economy which has an excess it makes a difference. It may make a good deal of difference that Russia is so organized that a somewhat larger fraction of its total productivity is available for political competition. The study might try to gather data with respect to all of these things with a view to estimating the maximum margin which is available for political competition.

Ridenour: This is a novel proposal then, in the sense that everybody seems to understand what is meant by it and does not particularly want to make any change in it.

Turn to 6:4b (Economic Objectives and Consequences of Russian Policy).

Lorimer: This project might be dropped. I can't see any utility and I can't see

Lorimer: any answer.

Viner: A research project that might be appropriate is what would be the significance of further expansion for the Russian economic foundation of its military power.

Neumann: That is a different question. We can study techniques of penetration and from the results estimate whether the motives have been economic or political; this is quite an important index for future Russian tensions. There are two of these studies being made at Columbia.

Ridenour: What is suggested is that we may get guidance as to the importance of economic concessions as a means of pacification, discovery of Russia's critical shortages and of the trend of its economic planning. I gather that the content of this proposal is mainly that of determining how economic factors have influenced Russian expansion on the one hand, and on the other (possibly as a separate matter) what are the likely economic effects of future expansion.

Fox: This study as now phrased would be worthwhile if there were a parallel study of strategic incentives, area by area, since the decision with respect to any given area would be made as a result of a combined judgment. A distorted picture might result from a systematic collection of data about the economic motives for expansion without asking what other incentives there might be.

Neumann: The study should really be focused on the problem of psychological peacefare against the Soviet Union.

Ridenour: Project 6:4c is Operational Analysis of Foreign Trade of Russia.

Fox: Official information that goes around is that one of the striking things about Russian policy is the high degree of independence between her internal activity and her imports and exports.

Viner: We know that Russia is a relatively self-sufficient country by ordinary standards, but it doesn't follow that if changes occur in the constituent elements of her exports and imports you might not learn something about her internal trends. If this were to be done, not only exports or imports, but also a survey of the relationship between Russian and American engineering concerns would be useful, analysis of the Russians coming here, or the Americans hired to go there, the purchase of services, etc.

Lorimer: Another thing that would be useful would be the number of Russian ships that are in our ports at different times and if that is ever abnormally large --

Brodie: This isn't a research project, but this is a continuing job for the intelligence agencies of the government.

Viner: The specification might be a research project to examine whether there were clues during the inter-war or some other period which were ignored but which might have been used. If you could demonstrate that German export and import statistics could have shown this, that or the other thing, you would have a strong case for having a continuing intelligence project.

Lorimer: It would however take on some added meaning if carried out in relation to 6:4a (Economic Prospectus for Russia).

Ridenour: What we are discussing is the technique of doing this job; we are pretty well agreed as to its usefulness.

PANEL VII
INTERNAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

J. Viner (Chairman)

A. Alchian	F. Lorimer
M. Andron	W.F. Ogburn
C.I. Barnard	E. Shaw
B. Brodie	J. Viner
A.J. Coale	A. Wallis
C.J. Hitch	

Viner: Let us begin with project 6:2 which we have appropriated from panel 6. The description is: "evaluation of the premise that war is the result of economic motivations." The attempt is to specify what the particular forces are and determine whether they are precipitating, facilitating or generating causes. It is part of the general study on war and motivations.

Lorimer: In adopting certain economic policies in order to make them effective you may be led to take more and more political steps which eventually do condition a country for war. It's conceivable that the economic system adopted in Russia, without any intention of creating war, might eventually get them into conflict, or that now being adopted in England, without any such intention, might lead in that direction. For further example, a tendency to self-sufficiency may deprive other countries or make it necessary for them to gain political control over economic resources which previously they got by exchange.

Alchian: I'd like to point out one difficulty in this particular project. Everyone assumed economic factors had something to do with causing war of one form or another. Practically no one said how would you go about finding out how if they did. What is the method to be used in carrying out this study?

Viner: Mr. Ogburn, I know you have ideas on these things. How should the question be investigated of how one finds out what causes war?

Ogburn: The first thing you would do would be to have a frame of reference that would come from examination of the materials having to do with recent wars. Then you would develop from that a series of hypotheses, two of which you examined in your lecture in the Harris Foundation series, on Glory and Economic Conditions of War. Take up each one of those in turn and see how the data bore on them. This examination would call for considerable inquiry in regard to social psychology and social psychological situations, otherwise one wouldn't understand the complexity of the relations.

Viner: Do you think it would be worthwhile as a project, even if only for the clarification of others working in the field, as to the difficulty of the task they em-

Viner: barked upon when they tried to find out what causes war?

Ogburn: It seems to me a little big for a research project. Most of us think of research projects as specific areas broken down so that a considerable amount of data can be made available. This one seems to be a problem in analysis. It would be considered a research project in a scholarly sense, but not particularly in a scientific sense. But it certainly would be a worthwhile thing to do. However, it would be one of these projects that couldn't be settled by evidence like a detailed specific problem could. It would be a question of emphasis, you see, and there would be room for considerable disagreement on the analysis according to where you put the emphasis.

Viner: Any specific research involving investigation of details must have consciously or sub-consciously some notion as to this general framework. It must start from something of that sort. I would think it would be better if it started in a sophisticated way. If an able group had investigated what are the presuppositions which underlie these detailed studies and whether they are self-consistent, plausible, etc. The RAND project might very well include a project of that sort.

Coale: Do you think it might be possible to set up a project that was strictly analytical on this general topic?

Alchian: How would such a study be carried out? What data would you look for?

Viner: The first step would be to really write a history of war in an attempt to answer what I would say are now the significant questions. Nobody has done it. A lot of these stereotypes that we hear can at least get a rough check from a fairly simple type of historical investigation. It won't be decisive for the future, but show what bearing experience has, for instance, on the argument that war comes out of poverty or internal distress. Among the things that could be studied are (a) have the countries that have been the most aggressive in their foreign policy been those most subject to distress or backwardness or internal frictions and (b) have they been most vigorous in their foreign policy when things were going badly at home economically or going well? I know when I look around in historical material I find many of these stereotypes to be completely the reverse or nearly so of what the surface historical facts seem to show. It's a job for a historian, but a historian who's interested in some question that he wants answered by his historical investigation. There isn't any such history now, as far as I know.

Alchian: Can you suggest anybody who might be qualified to do that sort of work whom RAND might farm this out to?

Viner: Well, Gordon Craig of Princeton is interested in that and is a very competent historian in a technical sense. An Englishman has written somewhat on these things, E.L. Woodward, Professor of History at Oxford, who is in the country now. He has looked around a little from that point of view. It might be a job that a historian could do by knowing how to farm it out to other historians who know different countries, different periods. It needn't be an elaborate study. Its chief service at first would be to show that a lot of the easy generalizations that are current really ought to be highly suspect.

Ogburn: I believe we'd get a better job done on this if either it were done by one person, turning it over to another to revalue, or else by a group, making the fundamental analysis and the others revising. You should have several people in it, otherwise it won't turn out to be a good project.

Viner: I strongly agree with that. I think it will be true for many projects.

Shaw: We might make a very elementary beginning in the form of a general essay simply stating the lines of the problem, some of the fetishes and myths, and the relevant disciplines.

Viner: I would prefer to say stereotypes, which need investigation to see whether they are fetishes or myths. They may be true. But what are some of the most common propositions from which people tend to start? There are a number. You could get your collection almost out of this Conference book, particularly in the economic field. And how do we know that they're true? I think on the whole that the question of the causation of war is really an unexplored field. From the standpoint of an economist, it certainly is. Economists have not been interested in that, and have not done systematic work. And yet they speak of it with just as much assurance as they do about topics in which they've done a great deal of work, because we have certain patterns of assumption as to what the facts are. Even the negative purpose is important - the clearing away of propositions which get in the way of fresh analysis because we think they will bring the true answers; this may warn us that more elaborate work is needed.

Ogburn: If you took the recent war as evidence on the basis of which you would examine these questions, I don't believe that you'd be very happy with the results. There is an attitude among historians that you can't write about history until it's a hundred years old. Probably the first world war could be discussed now and analyzed from the point of view of causes.

Viner: Let's take this proposition, that the promotion of prosperity is an important barrier to war. Now, where you're not raising an issue directly of motivation, I say that proposition can at least get a rough check. If you find that there never was a country that started a war except when it was near the top of the boom, that would at least suggest some doubt about that proposition. I think one German scholar has already shown that German foreign policy throughout Prussian and later on, German rule, throughout the 19th century and then the 20th, waxed strong and aggressive when there was internal prosperity and became conciliatory or quiet whenever there was depression or internal distress. That is capable, I believe, of a fairly objective test. I don't think it's a fairly difficult kind of investigation for an economic historian. And yet just think, if it came out that way, how much current assumptions about how you prevent war would be weakened.

Lorimer: One might do somewhat the same thing in terms of both the leadership and the followers. When a nation goes to war that is a complex procedure in which its foreign office or its cabinet precipitates a crisis. That is the emergence of warlike motivation, aggressive motivation. Now there may be a research approach in the breakdown of what segments of the population provide the aggressive leadership and out of what forces in the population come those who follow warlike operations. That is one attempt apart from this essay which might have some value in clearing the air.

Viner: One type of investigation in that field would be, for instance, a study of the role of organized business in a number of countries. That would be a task for the historian or the economic historian. Or a study could be made of the role of organized labor, of the role of farm and agrarian populations, their attitudes, etc. The easiest sort of study would be their overt attitudes, what were they pressing for as organizations, etc. My guess is that that is largely an unplowed field. I know the Habeler study, but I don't think there are many like that.

Ogburn: It would not be a difficult undertaking to take up separate propositions as you are doing and give them a good working over. A good many of those could be handled rather quickly, as a matter of fact. The question of population pressure and war could be handled very quickly. The notion that population pressure causes war is amenable to data. I don't believe that would give you, however, the picture of the causes of war or their inter-relations. I think that would be an approach to it, but I don't believe that would be the safest asset you need to understand the causes of war.

Viner: Wouldn't you need a great range of such studies in order to get a snythesis on a solid foundation? Wouldn't they be materials?

Ogburn: Of course.

Barnard: One aspect of this problem would be an inventory of predisposing economic conditions leading to war. The most important of those are scarcities of strategic materials. Probably the greatest single pre-disposing condition of international conflict today is uranium. Oil is almost always in the front line of strategic interest; the important thing here is not history but prospects. If it's true, for instance, that we're going to run out of our major iron resources within the next 25 years and have to go to Brazil and Northern Canada for it, we immediately get into conditions involving political arrangements which are directly susceptible of breaking out into war, exciting the population. The other side of it would be the question of the relation of economic surpluses to the effort to find international outlets. The whole history of Colonialism is involved in that. It seems to me that is a field that could be pretty definitely explored from the standpoint of the prospects and not so much of the history.

Viner: That would bring you pretty closely in contact with the Trade Policy Project. However, that is not objectionable.

Barnard: Yes. It would be the differential conditions that would be important there.

Viner: Yes. It's the fact that Colonial status means tariff boundaries or restriction of access to raw materials.

Brodie: Such work as that of Robbins and Staley and your own, etc., provides a platform from which we can leap off into further study, assuming that work is already fairly substantial.

Viner: Some of it is, I think, fairly substantial, especially over a narrow field like Staley's work; the rest I think are really suggestions based on scattered evidence. I

Viner: don't think systematic work has been done in that field except by Staehle on one narrow topic. Except for Staehle I don't know anyone that really tried to gather the available evidence and scrutinize it systematically and in a narrow field. For instance, suppose you tried to correlate the business cycle with the aggressiveness of foreign policy. Except that one German scholar, who probably would take the rest of his life to get up to 1890, I don't know anybody who's ever attempted it at all. So that there is a field that hasn't been covered. It isn't merely a question of gathering together data. There would have to be primary research, if it's to be done at all. English and American economists for the past 150 years have lived under a sense of security and have not been interested in strategic or military problems, and have left the field practically untouched. If I were hunting attempts in this field, I would look in the German literature under the Nazi regime to see whether some of the Nazi economists have been discussing these questions. They certainly had power and aggression in mind as a focus for economic study as we and the English never did.

So far we've been discussing questions of study in the field of economic conditions leading to international friction or to war. We haven't said anything about internal unity and disunity.

Shaw: We know so little about the allocation of great batches of income to functional batches of the population that this opens up a big field for economic knowledge. As economists, we have an awful lot to do about such sources of friction as income distribution. If we look at the allocation of the national income to wages and salaries before, during and after the war, we notice some rather remarkable changes in percentages. We're not sure in any scientific way as to what it is in a free or in a planned economic mechanism that precipitates the big changes in income distribution and presumably, the frictions that may arise out of them. There is some basic work in national income theory of a very specific sort that economists can do to contribute to the overall problem. But that doesn't mean that the sociologists or political scientists don't have something to contribute.

Viner: The possible impact of a disgruntled white-collar class on the German pattern is an illustration of what you may have in mind.

Wallis: Have you been taking for granted that internal unity and disunity is due to inequalities in income distribution or some directly economic factor?

Shaw: That's certainly a hypothesis worth working on.

Viner: It might be due to a cessation of a pre-existing inequality.

Shaw: It may simply be that the upsetting of a status quo creates new frictions. But until we have some notion as to what the economic mechanism is by which the status quo changes, or the economic mechanism of the status quo itself, we're not in a position to contribute very much as economists.

Viner: Project 7:3 is a special topic under 7:1 if we re-interpret it as we have been. I suggest that we retitle this to "Economic Conditions Leading to International Friction or Harmony". What would be worthwhile projects under that general and broad heading?

Ogburn: I would like to throw into this project a study of possibilities of foreign investment in countries which have socialism. The American opposition, say, to Russian control of the Balkan countries, might very well be related to the possibility of investment in those countries. If Russia dominates a particular country, the freedom of American capital to seek investment there might be questioned, and you'd probably get a source of considerable friction. That would come in, say, with regard to China. It's hard to unravel the security or power problem from the economic problem.

Viner: You're thinking of it from the point of view of free access to such territories. I thought when you started, you might be thinking about the point of view that the surplus capital countries might be unwilling to invest in such areas.

Ogburn: When you talk about peacefare and the sort of things that have to do with promoting peace, one of the methodological difficulties is to prevent your hopes from running away with you. Most of us want peace very much, and there's a great tendency for peacefare discussions to get into realms of idealism and get away from realism. I think any project along this line would have to watch out for that. For instance, in economics we think of free trade as developing a set of inter-relations which bind countries together. It's a very attractive picture leading to an inter-relationship which ties people together and thus works for a condition of peace rather than war. That is very true historically and very true as a general pattern. But if you look a little more realistically into the nature of governments at the present time and into the nature of international trade through bargaining relationships you see that any schemes of free trade will run into a certain number of difficulties. It's a point that has to be watched for, that's all.

Viner: Would you suggest that as a project? The obstacles to peacefare?

Ogburn: Yes.

Viner: Perhaps more serious is the utopian thinking that comes from the feeling that there is a remedy easily available.

Lorimer: We have yet very little that suggests itself as a specific research program. I would think that the problem of the internal stability of the United States is probably the most important issue. That certainly is one that is going to be worked on by a lot of people other than Project RAND. Also important is study of the situation in specific foreign countries. An internal analysis of the economy of Russia could be very important; we do not have an authoritative treatment of it. A certain amount of foreign policy is based on what may be wishful thinking that Russian productivity won't move very well, and it may be a dangerous fallacy. It's a specific project that RAND might well undertake. It relates both to peace relations and to possible war relations. Secondly, it would be worthwhile to make an analysis of economic factors in China in the attempt to determine how investments made in China would contribute to internal economic stability. What possible action would contribute toward any stability and friendliness in an economically weak nation?

Shaw: There are other various suggestions that could be fitted to those. For example, 7:2 suggests a very specific one - what is the economic problem posed to the United States by the overall state economic plans of countries that are drifting farther and farther away from free enterprise? What is the cost in terms of our international

Shaw: investment, what is the cost in terms of reorienting our output, seeking for different markets -- there is a whole variety of area studies that open up.

Viner: Project 7:2 can be attacked from the general point of view of the problems that arise out of the differences in economic systems. I'd say that that project ought to be given a good deal of attention. It's not only on the economic side either - in fact, maybe more on the other side.

We move now to project 7:6 on stockpiling. We're all agreed, I'm sure, that stockpiling has become a very important aspect under preparedness for war. The question arises whether we should propose stockpiling for internal stabilization as a RAND project.

Shaw: As far as I know, there is no careful and general review of the stockpiling program. It's obvious that stockpiling programs can be devised which can contribute toward internal economic stability and simultaneously act as an irritant internationally. It's conceivable that there are stockpiling programs which will directly increase our war potential, and simultaneously take away from our war potential by encouraging the continuance of uneconomic capital equipment. So far as I know, no careful study has been made that will put together all the possible objectives of stockpiling, consider their possible inconsistencies, and come up with a recommendation which might cause the Secretaries of Defense, Agriculture, and State all to see their stockpiling problems in a single perspective.

Viner: I agree. There's a basic conflict between military stockpiling and economic stabilization stockpiling, and it would work well for neither purpose if the two weren't kept apart. But that's another story. The question is, shall we also say that we propose a study of stockpiling as a stabilizing device?

Hitch: We want to study stockpiling as one problem with several different purposes.

Brodie: It's essentially one proposal. I doubt whether the proposal to stockpile simply for the purpose of economic stabilization is a live issue today or is even likely to be one.

Viner: My question is really whether the RAND Project is enough concerned with that one scheme for stabilization to make that one of its projects.

Ogburn: It could be put this way - stockpiling which includes materials used in peacetime industries has an effect upon the economic system in peacetime. What is this effect?

Viner: Project 7:7 is on Atomic Energy.

Brodie: I've become increasingly impressed over the last few weeks that there is information that is being withheld and which should be withheld, which practically governs the results which could be found under this project. I'm not saying the project shouldn't be retained under RAND, but it should be made clear what the limits of the possible results are. Under the premise that this fissionable material might ultimately come to have nearly zero cost and have almost limitless availability, the most that could be done would be to draw up an outline of expected maximum results.

Brodie: Certainly this required kind of information is not going to be made available to anybody under project RAND. There's no question about that. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff aren't being given this information. The most that could be done under this project, within the next year or two, is extremely limited. Incidentally, something is being done at Chicago.

Coale: I haven't any idea how well it's being done, but an analytical project is being carried on where various assumptions about the cost of atomic energy are made and effects are explored. Certainly we ought to withhold judgment about what the project should recommend until the results of the Chicago study have been published. It will be published by the end of the year, I think. The Cowles Commission at the University of Chicago has been working on it for about a year.

Viner: We recommend that the RAND Project get an advance copy if it can, and that it consider in the light of that a research program in that field.

Brodie: The information concerning actual availability of or production of fissionable materials in such quantities as would make it an important source of power, is absolutely top secret. My guess is that a lot of assumptions which have been made are far afield from the facts. I'm not saying we should drop this; I'm saying if its significance recommended it, it's to be recommended with a warning, a caution that not much is to be expected in terms of the amount of knowledge which is available to Project RAND or anybody else.

Wallis: I've followed very slightly the Cowles Commission study, and it seems to me from what they've reported so far informally around the University that Barnard's comment is rather heavily underscored, that it's very much premature at this time to make any such study.

Barnard: May I suggest a new project. One of the things we need advice about is the economic factors in removing disunity in the civilian population from the standpoint of either preparedness or the making of war. The morale section hasn't covered the thing that I'm going to talk about now. For about 15 years I've been convinced that, willy-nilly, thru the love of technology and the love of bigness and the open spaces and so forth, this country was working away from the free enterprise system, not indeologically, but actually. We want everything bigger and we want all the benefits of mass production and the fellows who are yelling for individualism are the very fellows that, in spite of themselves, are doing just the reverse, so that you've got now a hundred corporations doing half the business in the country. You still have about 3 million concerns that are shooting ideas, but the fact remains that you are getting more and more concentrated and more monopoly and more regulated competition. I've had no confirmation of that point of view as the fundamental underlying trend in internal economics in the country until I saw something written by Margaret Mead a few months ago in the New York Academy of Science. She draws attention to the fact that in this country everybody believes in planning. That's the motif of the American business world, planning bigger and better and larger and wider and more comprehensive, etc., whereas the British, who are now formally engaged in a socialistic enterprise, don't believe that you can plan, that all you can do is adapt. I think she's quite right. The whole trend of American practice and its concrete thinking is more and more in the direction of the totalitarian kind of regime - the regulation of unions, the regulation of corporations, and all that sort of thing. Some of it's

Barnard: pretty subtle, but it's a constant trend, with Republicans and Democrats doing the same thing. You reach a certain point in that, and you run a very grave danger of revolution in this country. That is, the hillbillies in Vermont and Kentucky, etc., are going to fly apart on this thing; not the people in New York City so much, who are drilled in large scale management, but the people outside. If I were commanding the Air Force, I would want to get some advice as to the inherent trend of American economic development.

Ogburn: I have an idea that possibly there should be a study of new technological developments. A number of the topics which we have discussed today would relate to this topic. I can see, for instance, in the problem which Barnard proposed, that technology and the development of communication and transportation inventions would be quite related to it, particularly to the agricultural angle. Technology has a way of disrupting industry. For instance, the new developments in regard to coal, particularly the making of gasoline from gas and also from coal, might have several repercussions on the economic system. Since technology plays such a significant role in wartime, it would not seem to be amiss to make a survey of the outstanding inventions and technological developments that are in the offing, to see what there may be in them with reference to this general subject of internal conditions. I have found in the past that these technological examinations are oftentimes surprisingly truthful, and we miss them sometimes because they tend to be a little new and a little hard to forecast. But I believe that RAND would do well to take a look at some of the outstanding technological developments at the present time in reference to this problem.

Shaw: Within the RAND files there are proposals something like this, with a supplement that a study be made of various restrictions on the use that is made of new technological developments, patent restrictions, for example, and other types of monopolistic restrictions. It's not only the invention of new technological devices but their exploitation that RAND considers to fall within its scope.

Coale: A group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is making a study of the institutional barriers to the introduction of new techniques.

Brodie: Technological prospects and their bearing on social and economic conditions constitute an extremely important problem. It ought to be covered from the RAND point of view. Relevant to that would be some kind of systematic appaisal of comparative status of the nations in terms of technological competence. All we have at present is a lot of brand new guesses. This is something that the National War College, for example, is worrying about all the time and has no data whatsoever to work with.

Barnard: I told the Senate Committee that I thought this 5 years of keeping scientific secrets was the most dangerous delusion in the country. From what I have seen in Russia (I was there in '39) I have very grave doubts as to their technological competence, unless they can get enough Germans in there to do the trick, which I don't think they are likely to do. But I don't know what it will be two or three generations from now. Carl Frederick who has just returned from six months with Lucius Clay, said that in two or three generations it's going to be at a much lower level than it is now. We have complete information of the effect of totalitarianism in Germany, on both scientific and technological progress, and in both fields they were sliding downhill very rapidly indeed. And so he said he was highly convinced, from what we know about

Barnard: what's going on in Russia plus our general experience, that their technology will go down below what it is now. The same thing happened with Mussolini. For about three months you've got the finest line of efficiency and staff that you could imagine. Then you reach the stage where everybody is doing his damndest to keep from having any responsibility and getting out on a limb. Then your whole organization becomes completely flat - that's what happened in Germany and is already happening in Russia, in my opinion.

Andron: We might include among the research proposals a project incorporating Barnard's suggestion in connection with the effects of totalitarianism on the level of technology. It could be done historically or from the point of view of an economist.

Viner: The technology suggestion might itself be a range of projects. One such project might very well be the influence of the form of social organization or government on the rate of technological progress.

PANEL VIII
ECONOMICS OF PREPAREDNESS AND WAR

A. Wallis (Chairman)

A.J. Coale
H.M. Gray
C.J. Hitch
F. Lorimer
W.F. Ogburn
E. Shaw
J. Viner

Wallis: Coale has a list of categories which he would like to propose and which will replace many of the sheets.

Coale: Some of the projects listed on the sheets fall directly into the subject of vulnerability; others are fairly closely related to it. It is a more general approach and brings in some alternatives that are not included in the papers as printed. The general problem would be the reduction of vulnerability as a form of preparation for the possibility of another war. The reduction of vulnerability might be looked at in two different ways: first, protecting military strength from the effect of enemy attack, and second, minimizing casualities and destruction of property. These two overlap, for analytical purposes, they can be treated separately.

Under the preserving of war strength, one of the primary considerations, and the one which is of particular interest to this economics panel, is to make sure that the proper materials for war are ready for use when needed, in spite of enemy attack. This indicates the relationship between plans for mobilization and plans for protection against attack. Getting them on time is a matter of protection. When it comes to protection of war industries, there are at least three general methods. One of them is relocation, which is a broader way of saying decentralization. Another is physical protection, the most extreme of which would be underground construction, and there is also protection against radiation, blast and heat by appropriate construction above ground. The third is stock-piling of the end product. I have made a pilot study of the aluminum industry as an example, and I find that certain segments of the industry might properly be stockpiled, others might use relocation, and in other cases physical protection would be required.

The second aspect of reducing vulnerability is minimizing casualties and property destruction. The atomic bomb is a concern for the large urban centers. There are a number of solutions for this problem. One is preparation for emergency evacuation of the large portion of population in cities. A second is a more or less permanent dispersion of the population, so that there will not be large aggregations. A third is the construction of deep underground shelters in the cities, which would have to be sufficiently large to house a significant portion of the population. A fourth is the construction of firebreaks and other methods of protective physical construction to minimize one of the factors which was most destructive in the atomic bomb attack on Japan. A fifth would be disaster control and relief, provision of hospitals and

Coale: fire-fighting equipment, and mobile squads which would enter the cities after a bombing attack.

There are two general observations that should be made about the study of vulnerability. The first is that you must consider the probable nature and scale of the attack to which we might be subjected to in another war. The problems of vulnerability would be quite different depending on what type of weapon and how many were available to the enemy. For example, would we anticipate the use of atomic bombs, and if so, how many? Might we anticipate the use of super-bombs which have been mentioned seriously by the physicists, bombs which are reported to be possible and to have a destructive force of approximately one thousand times as great as the present atomic bomb? We must consider the possibility of using atomic bombs in novel ways, such as exploding them under water as we have done at Bikini, which raises a large spray of radioactive water. One should not overlook the possibility of biological warfare, or the use of what might be called ordinary bombs, high explosive and incendiary bombs. You must consider the nature and scale of probable attack. Secondly, you must consider the relation between vulnerability reduction and the general planning for war, including especially the fact of mobilization. We won't have any time between the declaration of war and an attack on us.

There are three topics which I might propose as substitutes for some of the ones which are here. (a) An appropriate way for studying vulnerability is, first, to study the industries which might be expected to contribute importantly to war materials in another war. Studying these industries one by one, looking for their intrinsic vulnerability, i.e., the location of the plants, their destructibility; the accessibility of their input materials (whether they might be cut off from their raw materials by atomic bombing attack); the probability that their key personnel live when they are not in the plant, and the protection that is afforded by the plant to the personnel; etc. I propose that each industry be studied to discover all of these facts, and then be studied from the point of view of which of the alternative remedies to vulnerability are most suitable in terms of effectiveness, the alternative remedies, rapidity of mobilization, feasibility, their real cost, and acceptability to the general public. It took me several months to study quite a simple industry and I didn't do it completely. You would need a large staff, access to the WPB records, and a very sophistocated level of researchers. (b) A second topic would be a study of the timing and over-all costs of such a program in terms of a contra-cyclical program. (c) The third general topic is a study of urban areas in line with the second concept of vulnerability, that is, protection of property and minimization of casualty. A study of cities to determine their intrinsic vulnerability would mean that you would have an expert from the Strategic Bombing Survey, perhaps, or someone from the National Fire Protection Association (which I understand has maps showing every individual building in the country, its type of construction, etc.). A study of these cities would determine what damage might be expected from a given scale of attack. This is a very complicated problem, too. One city might be studied in detail from aerial photographs and these fire-protection maps. To get a complete picture, most of the major cities in this country would have to be studied in that way. Having done that, you would be in a position to suggest the suitability of various methods of reducing the probable loss of life and damage in these urban areas, to suggest the feasibility of dispersion, of shelters, of constructing fire-breaks, of protecting hospitals and providing for disaster controls.

Gray: Coale's general approach narrows the subject considerably. It was originally posed to embrace the whole question of the organization and management of war economy, which is a much broader subject than the question of vulnerability and protection.

Coale: I am proposing this as a substitute for only some of the topics here.

Ogburn: Coale's conceptual arrangement has symmetry and coverage with regard to the breakdown, and that appeals to us all. The plan he has set forth is one that we might think of as being made irrespective of the type of society in which you live. It would be a more feasible program for action if we lived in a totalitarian society. The data which would be uncovered by the study would be useful data, but the question still comes up in my mind whether the data which would come from such analyses would be put to use or put away in the file.

We have made some studies along this line at the University of Chicago; there was some measurement of the cost of dismantling cities. There is also a study based on certain assumptions as to what the cost would be. All these studies seem to me to have a sort of mechanical beauty, but it seems to miss out on what I would call social-psychological grounds. I have been impressed by these studies on the effect of technology on society, and the resistances which are put up in the society to the adoption of these proposals. Very characteristic are what we call plans in general, especially city planning. There have been many of them laid out, but they are not really enough from the point of view of practicability. This remark is concerned with trying to find a way of getting up some programs which will be feasible or practical in a democracy. This is not so much against the proposals Coale makes, but it is more in the nature of a supplementary type of study. I would indicate an approach which might have a certain amount of practicability, although I realize that from this viewpoint the problem is extremely difficult. I am a firm believer in planning to make first a study of what the trends are. In this matter of decentralization, the task, if you look at it from the practical point of view, is to find out what the facts are with regard to the trends in the location of industry or the dispersal of population. I would recommend a series of studies on the trends in these particular variables. This type of study is an illustration of the sort of approach which I am advocating.

One of the most fruitful things that could be done along this line would be a study of resistances to any programs that concern themselves with minimizing vulnerability. These studies, I feel sure, will be very fruitful in any particular planning which we may have. For instance, I suspect that you would find one of the most marked resistances to dispersal of industry from businesses and elected officials of cities. But that you can list a lot of resisting forces to these plans does not mean that they should be given up. There would be other groups that would be in favor of them. To proceed on a topic of this kind without considering social inertias, resistances, is not getting at the real practical problem of getting something done.

Another study along these lines is the question of the time factor and the magnitude of the problem; there are various approaches of this sort. I have worked up a memorandum of this sort in which I list about fifty projects and I figured it would take about three years to even get the thing planned out for study. Execution would have to be thought of in terms of something like twenty or twenty-five years. That would be a question of the rate at which these various adjustments would be made. I

Ogburn: have admiration for Coale's study and plan. My point is that I don't believe that is going to begin to go far enough. These other practical ways of doing it are quite as essential to carrying out the program as a schematic or conceptual arrangement.

Viner: A study of growing governmental policies, which are perhaps more easily changed than attitudes among the people, might be useful. It may very well be that our freight structure is so geared as to have a very important influence on the location of industry, of ports, of centers of industrialization, and the pattern it may be forming may be a bad or a good one.

Ogburn: Transportation is the key point and there's no need of talking about dispersion unless you have a study on transportation.

Viner: The point is that the way in which transportation effects the location of industry depends on the kind of structure of freight rates we have, which is dependent on the operation of government administration. The tariff also ought to be studied from this point of view. Is the tariff developing those industries which add to invulnerability, or is it working the other way? Is it promoting the exhaustion of scarce mineral resources, is it leading to the development of luxury industries in this country instead of having them come from abroad? The latter ought to be studied from a broader view than vulnerability to a special form of attack. It should cover the strength of the economy for military purposes. I think investigation would show that some parts of the tariff in all probability do have strategic value, but some parts of the tariff are probably, from a strategic calculation, a complete nuisance.

Lorimer: The problem breaks down essentially into two main divisions, the analysis of objectives and the decrease in vulnerability, i.e., the analysis of what changes could be made to reduce the appalling vulnerability of the US to atomic attack in a world in which there has not yet been established any political control of that menace. The second step, which seems to embrace projects 1a, 1b, 1c, and which embraces Ogburn's and Viner's remarks, is in terms of implementation of objectives. Those are not independent, because one has to understand the possibility of implementation before he can find objectives that will be attempted; but I think there is some distinction. The problem Coale directed himself to is the problem of how, if it were sociologically and operationally possible, the vulnerability of the US, with regard to its military potential or its civilian property and life, could be appreciably reduced. Unless that can be done, we aren't particularly concerned with the implementation analysis. If you got at the first objective of maintaining the military power, then the military vulnerability might be decreased 50% with a 5% relocation of physical structure. If that is the case, it may be that it would be desirable to support action along that line in Congress. Maybe there needs to be set up a research program on the reduction of vulnerability and the scale of the cost.

Wallis: Coale has suggested in effect a study of what would be the aims of an invulnerability program. We should do such things as make a study of existing trends that we might ride in achieving these things, make a study of the social problems that would be generated by every alternative measure, and choose among those the ones that might have the greatest chance of accomplishment, even though they might not necessarily be the ones that would give the greatest invulnerability. In general,

Wallis: at every stage of his program, no question can be asked or considered intelligently without every one of these others being considered simultaneously.

Coale: I proposed a study of the present industries to see how many plants they were in and where they were located and how destructible they were. You should then study the suitability of remedies; there are two criteria you might use for suitability. One is effectiveness: by how much would they reduce vulnerability; and second, feasibility: you shouldn't consider a solution, no matter how effective, if it's completely unfeasible.

Viner: Again, as an addition and as a check, I would suggest some thinking about what I call catastrophe economics on an economy which has been hard hit. What does it need, what has it got? What are the nerve centers? How can you reconstruct them? How do you get some degree of life back into an economy in a hurry?

Shaw: Viner's suggestion of a catastrophe study is very interesting because it is an indirect way of getting at the gains to be achieved by working on vulnerability. It is quite conceivable that by setting up a variety of catastrophe models one could discover that there are lots of apparently vulnerable points that we really don't care about, that there is enough elasticity of substitution of resources to carry us over a short period difficulty. I am very much struck by that sort of program. On Project 8:2, is it agreed that economic weapons of a fighting war are unlikely to be important?

Hitch: Either obvious or unimportant or both.

Viner: In a major war, it will be unimportant.

Hitch: Project 8:3, on the economic foundations of military power, has to do with supplies of raw materials and with the relation of the economic organization to the political organization. It is an effort to particularize just one aspect of the entire subject. If we are going to maximize our economic foundations of military power, we must look into the various limitations that there are on the real per capita income during peacetime.

Coale: In this study as well as in others, the general proposition that the time for mobilization is more likely to be limited in the future than it has been in the past, should be borne in mind. The whole question of what speeds up and what slows down mobilization should be included.

Ogburn: There is a question interesting to me - to what extent private capitalism, as the term is used, is modified during the war economy.

Shaw: It's not at all clear yet to economists how far we can go by any given technique in diverting resources away from the uses of the civilian to the uses of the military. Would it be interesting for economists to make a historical study of a succession of white, blue and yellow papers that emerge from governments during the war estimating the availability of resources and see what errors were made in judging the proportion of the national income the countries shunted off from civilian uses? In time one would eventually have to take account of the method used to allocate the resources. I imagine that there were gross errors, even toward the end of the war,

Shaw: in estimating the availability of anticipated output for wartime uses. A study of the reason for those errors and their nature would be useful.

Ogburn: A plea which I make rather earnestly is that RAND study much more fully this whole question of the economic transformation necessary to become a war economy.

Shaw: If we are thinking about war in the next ten or twenty years it seems to me this study of the feasibility, the means, and the time required for diverting resources is much more significant than any studies of the sort so far outlined in 8:3, such as means of increasing the per capita national output.

Wallis: On the conversion of the economy, why is it that the plans drawn up in the last war were not used? Were they unusable or was the failure in not getting them properly to the authorities' attention?

Viner: I'd say that's a historian's job. You can find out by looking at the files of the New York Times. Major political issues were involved, and they didn't want to face the issues at that time.

Ogburn: The political transformations are equally significant. They are rather difficult, and we did not make so much political transformation in the last war, but if we were pressed very tightly and had to fight very desperately, it is quite conceivable that the political transformation we would have to make would be considerable. There ought to be inquiry a little bit beyond the economic transformations which we are discussing, concerning various social and political institutions which would have to be transformed.

Coale: Lincoln Gordon, who was in WPB, is going to write a history of WPB, how it worked, why it failed, and where it failed. He has sections on the lessons to be drawn from this for a future war. He is quite competent and he knows about studies made by other people as well.

Ogburn: There is a very real question as to whether a first rate war can be fought democratically. The Army simply is not run democratically. I don't know whether the country can be.

Viner: There are two questions: how you do the transformation when the emergency comes, and how you prepare so you can do the transformation quickly. In the US it is a question of constitutional provisions.

Gray: There is a tremendous psychological problem there, too. People don't believe there is going to be a war. They are not prepared psychologically to accept the transformation of government or anything else.

Viner: To indicate to them that there is enough of an emergency to make it justifiable is itself a major act.

Ogburn: What is included here in the thing we are talking about now is worth all the rest of the book put together. I don't think any of the other problems begin to touch this set of problems we are talking about in this panel. You have invited expressions of values and priorities; my priority would be that the program we are

Ogburn: discussing in Panel 8 would weigh as much as all the rest of the book put together.

Viner: On Project 8:8, Effect of Profit Limitation on War Production, in this war the problem was not one of profit limitation. It was one of provision for reimbursement for loss.

Shaw: There were a number of episodes in which restriction of production at least was threatened, if profit levels considerably in excess of the 1936-39 standard were not permitted.

Gray: It might be well for RAND to undertake a comprehensive critique of the experiences in the recent war in connection with just these matters of mobilization and new plant construction, allocation of resources and the financial arrangements, and collate that experience in a comprehensive way as an object lesson for the future. This would be relevant to Projects 8:7, 8, and 9, as well as 8:1d. There's an enormous mass of material there; much of it hasn't been made available at all. Our experience with the War Production Board constitutes some of the best economic material ever compiled in this country on the operations of our economy in a state of crisis. It might be well to attack that in a big way.

Wallis: How about including 10:5, on "Efficient Mobilization of Manpower", analyzing factors which delayed transfer of manpower from non-essential to critical uses in World War II?

Viner: Time limitation would probably be the most important single factor in all that, the rate at which these things are done.

Hitch: I am strongly in favor of this being done, but I am not sure this is the time to do it, unless we're concerned about the dangers of war within the next year or two, because a tremendous amount of source material is just coming out now. I think we ought to wait until we have it.

Wallis: Last night on a similar topic it was suggested that RAND attempt to encourage by subsidies doctoral dissertations on related topics in the immediate future, with the idea of having the really big study a little later.

Ogburn: In World War I we had a phenomenon called the dilution of labor - we took the green labor and mixed it in with skilled labor. If you get the idea of interchangeable parts and work that out with regard to labor, with regard to mangement and with regard to the various technological processes, you have possibilities there of considerable significance in making a transition to a wartime economy.

Hitch: Barnard once said that if you were to assemble in one big telephone company the corresponding executives in other equally large telephone companies, it would take six months or a year before the organization could begin to function. There is a question of the feasibility of interchangeability of parts, because there is a matter of teamwork and personalities, etc.

Wallis: Might something be done along the lines Ogburn suggested without making it absolutely perfect and still get a big gain?

Viner: On 7:5, War Finance Consequences for Postwar Problems, that's one field in which we are sure to have a lot of independent work done. It's a routine, standard sort of thing to study and I don't see any emergency need for it; it will be studied as elaborately as necessary - it would not be basic research; it may be a rapid survey of the findings of materials that others are digging up. Should the RAND Project go into the consequences of the next war?

Shaw: Way down the list of criteria in the next major war will be "Which of these various mobilization devices will have the least unfortunate post war consequences?" From that standpoint RAND could say that study of preparations for the next war falls within its competence.

Coale: On 7:6, "Evaluation of Present Stockpiling Program", stockpiling might be an important part of vulnerability reduction. If we are talking about an analytical review of the present program of stockpiling, the intention of the present stockpiling program is to make available during war resources which are not found within our own boundaries. An equally critical problem in a war with a non-maritime power would be preservation of resources which are found within our boundaries. Stockpiling might be an appropriate solution for that, as well as for things which are found outside. We ought not to concentrate on formal stockpiling, but also study our economy in terms of the stockpiling that is built up in the ordinary course of business enterprize. The larger the scale of attack you anticipate, in terms of atomic bombs or other super weapons, the more you will have to depend on stockpiles. If you get to the point where you suspect it's technically feasible for another country to deliver several thousand atomic bombs, the feasibility of mobilizing and getting production from an economy organized in depth from raw material to end product is very close to zero. A war of that sort would probably have to be fought from a stock-pile of finished weapons. You have to pay very close attention to probabilities of what kind and how many weapons the enemy is going to use, because it would have a great effect on what kind of plant you would have.

Viner: The problem is not only one of military stockpiling. You have to stockpile to carry your civilian economy through the catastrophe, not merely from the point of view of enabling them to serve the military forces, but to live through the catastrophe.

Lorimer: There might be some advantage in throwing the stockpiling program under the general rubric of vulnerability studies, partly in order to eliminate the popular conception that the only answer to vulnerability is distribution of industry. It seems to point to what might be a very significant line of original research.

Ogburn: Stockpiling has a great effect upon the economic system. If you view it in the sense in which Viner does, you have to categorize a very large number of materials under vulnerability, and that's questionable.

Lorimer: I would think that the study of stockpiling belongs under vulnerability. But you are suggesting that there still might need to be a specific study in which the larger economic aspects of stockpiling are studied. That seems to be quite right.

Viner: If the current descriptions of what the next war will be like are at all true, then stockpiling is going to become a major part of the operation of society. It will have to live on fat or reserves for a while, for all its current purposes, not merely

Viner: for attack but for defense. You'll want stockpiles for keeping civilian life going as far as you can. It's a new technique and therefore ought to have a lot of independent study in terms of all its interrelations.

Ogburn: We must signalize this point of stockpiling pretty heavily on our recommendation sheet.

Viner: I agree. The attention given to stockpiling accentuates the point of preparing for war in peacetime.

Shaw: Do you think there would be a possibility of combining the two aspects of the stockpiling problem? Is there any reason to suppose that a stockpiling program would be of use for counteracting the cyclical fluctuations of demand in imports and simultaneously serving military purposes?

Viner: There is a great danger there. If the two kinds of stockpiles exist they should not be physically segregated, but the accounting should be segregated. If in time of a boom you start disposing of a military stockpile because it will help restore more reasonable level of prices, etc., you are violating your military principle. If you get a bill through Congress where you are appealing to two groups for support -- for example, get the Army to support it because of its use for military purposes, and the farmers because they are going to make some profit out of it -- you might have a set of cross-purposes. The military stockpile ought to be accumulated in terms of a military timetable or schedule. Now it might happen to correspond to the needs of economic stabilization. The two ought to be studied together if for no other reason than that if it is going to be put through as a political measure in this country both will play a large part. But from the military point of view it would be important to see that the scheme is not bad for the military just because it's been made better for stabilization purposes. You can adapt one to the other. The military forces will never oppose a bigger stockpile. No economic stockpiling with a military stockpiling will do all you want for stabilization. I am afraid of confusion between the two objectives, since that meets neither satisfactorily.

Shaw: It would be a useful result for RAND to reach, if it could, the conclusion that the criteria for military stockpiling and civilian stockpiling must be handled quite separately. Or if it could say that they differ in these respects: they must be handled by different accounting methods; they must not be handled by different administrations; whenever there is a question as to which shall be in the ascendent, the answer shall be the military, so far as over-all size is concerned; whenever there is a question as to choice between the items to be stockpiled, economic considerations may enter in and they should be looked at, but the military should decide. A result like that coming from RAND would be extremely helpful.

Coale: You might endanger its political acceptance if you pose it as a countercyclical device. Congress might be more sympathetic to something that is entirely for military purposes than to one that is recommended for social or economic reasons.

Ogburn: I am struck with the fact that many of these suggestions would have to be executed in a milieu of social attitudes and opinions. The psychological and sociological studies which are listed in Committee I could very well concern themselves with what considerations are necessary to get the public and Congress sold on a

Ogburn: stockpiling program. It is not enough to have these things laid out in an engineering or economic manner, because they all have to take place in the sociological and psychological setting. The RAND directorate ought to have some sort of project in Committee I on this type of psychological-sociological problem.

Lorimer: The possible effect of stockpiling on international relations must be thought about, because it indicates preparedness for war.

Gray: One matter we haven't discussed is that our allies would have certain resources and manpower. In any general study of economic strength for purposes of war, some consideration ought to be given to the resources and capacities of such allies.

Coale: To take a specific ally, if you assume that England is going to be an ally of yours, you would have to consider what the survival value of England was. In other words, you might consider England as a part of our territory, in terms of military planning - not just a base which we use, but a base which already has its own resources. It is a very good suggestion.

Wallis: What would have happened in the last war if we had had a very extensive program preceding it based on the assumption that the war would involve heavy gas attacks on cities? We oughtn't to go all out on some one limb without at least keeping in mind where we'd be if somebody sawed that one off.

Viner: I can hardly think of any type of warfare in which stockpiling would not be a help. But I do think that in studying stockpiling you ought to consider what are the criteria of minimum stockpiling according to what type of warfare you are assuming.

Wallis: Some of the other measures could be such that after the first thousand A bombs landed you'd be much better off for those measures. But if the first thousand A bombs didn't come, your measures would be so much less effective than if you had had a different preparatory program, that you might be seriously handicapped.

Coale: There are two comments I'd make about that. One is that I think a very good reason for making these strong preparations for an A bomb attack are that it might make the outbreak of war somewhat less likely. Secondly, the weapon has such supposed potentialities that in any real struggle the chances of the war ending without its being used is pretty small.

Lorimer: As a further project, a knowledge of the distribution of skills in the population might be very useful.

Viner: Wouldn't there be a good project there in the form of drafting questions to be put in the next census; in other words, coordinating the 1950 census with this problem of military preparedness. The census should know these objectives and try to see to what extent the next census can be made to serve the interests of preparedness and security.

Gray: That's a good suggestion.

Lorimer: Social Security has the numbers employed by different industries; it has no classification of the skills. When the need arises for so many persons with "x"

Lorimer: qualifications, you would have an idea of whether they already existed or whether they would have to be specially trained. It is possibly worth some thought and investigation.

Ogburn: The Census should not be neglected in the study of this problem. Under Mr. Houser and Mr. Capt, the Census has become a very efficient organization. They have done many excellent jobs during the war. They have the best personnel they have ever had. If they had the funds they could help in many ways, not only in this problem, but on the location of industry, and knowledge of various other kinds.

Lorimer: If this were to be carried out operationally, I was thinking of it as a Census Bureau job. But it might be done using the technique of sample study that the Census has been developing, in order to get a picture of the distribution of skills in different groupings. The only thing that RAND might contribute would be research on the possibilities and value of such a procedure.

Viner: That would be a great contribution if it could be done.

Ogburn: The various ideas which have been set forth tonight fall into a sort of order. The first point to be noted is that modern wars are total wars, and comprise two types of activities. One involves the military, the second involves the social institutions. The integration of the social institutions in the war effort makes it peculiarly a province for the advice of social scientists. This new type of warfare is distinct on another plane - it has introduced the civilians into warfare. This is the result pretty much of the invention of the airplane and of certain highpowered explosives. This has led to the question of reducing the vulnerability of the instruments of warfare, be they economic or weapons, so that the war may be carried on, and of civilians who are likely to be congregated in dense areas.

The total war in which nearly all social institutions have to be mobilized may be studied in the following manner. First you need to get two concepts: one is the concept of the war state, namely the social order that is involved in warfare; second you need to contrast that with the concept of the social order in peace. Very much is to be gained by getting these two concepts highly clarified. The problem of war may be viewed as one transforming the social order from a peace time to a wartime social order. This may in turn be broken down into three sub-classifications.

One would be the transformation of the economic order. We would like to see that problem in its totality and in a large setting. One might characterize it as to the changes that would be made in the capitalistic system, although you might very well use other sets of terms to do that. In any case it should be approached in a comprehensive manner - seeing the economic order as a whole, and in terms of what great classifications would have to be made to make it an efficient instrument in wartime.

The second sub-head under this classification of the institutions is the political institutions. The changes that have to be made in the political institutions should similarly be seen in their entirety, and that could be symbolized by some such question as "What are the changes in the democratic order that are necessary?" The conception here is complicated by the fact that we were never intensely in either the first or the second World War, compared to the way France and Germany were, and we decried the transformations that were made in the political order in those countries because of

Ogburn: ideological considerations. That probably hinders us from an adequate examination and appreciation of their efficiency. The political institutions of another country might be examined in a pure research spirit without committing ourselves to it.

The third sub-head in this transformation of the social institutions turns on those that are not primarily economic or political. These have to do with, say, the press, the church, the schools, the family, etc.

On another plane in this pattern, the transformation of the social order into a wartime state must be made rather quickly in the event of war. That would seem to me to imply that the beginnings of this transformation and the plan of it must be undertaken in what we would call peacetime. The different types of social institutions must be examined in detail from the point of view of the time which it has taken to make these necessary transformations.

Any sort of adoption or transformation cannot be seen in purely engineering terms. It cannot be envisioned, at least in the US, as if it could be done by a dictator. It has to be done by the will of the people, and that consists of prejudices, ideologies, resistances, etc. Any practical approach to a consideration of what can actually be done has to be measured against these social-psychological factors, which I have sometimes classified as resistances or inertias.

Some kind of an organization is needed for the defense of the civilian population and for this transformation of the social order. In earlier wars we have set up in the government two bureaus in the Cabinet, one headed by the Secretary of War and the other by the Secretary of the Navy, and we have thought of them as peculiarly responsible for preparation, attack, and defense. If you visualize this new revolution in warfare which has brought it to the civilians, and if you see this concept of total war in which the social institutions are involved, you can see that even a new Department of Defense is not really an adequate organization of leadership to handle this problem. There ought to be a consideration of the governmental structure to which you intrust the leadership of this type of adaptation.

Shaw: Ogburn's statements should serve both as preface and as concluding chapter to what follows. We have split the problems and fields of study that have been assigned to us into four principal groups under which further study may be organized.

The economic foundations of military power (8:3 is an illustration of that group). We agreed that in view of the possibilities of war in the immediate 5 - 15-year future we probably might concern ourselves less with the long-range trend in our national productivity and work more with the resources already available in the form of raw materials, working population, etc. We tentatively minimized the problem of economic foundations of military power.

We also minimized the problem of what may be called the economics of attack, under which are included 8:2 and 8:4. We did suggest in the case of 8:4 ("Vulnerability of Russian Industries") and explicit analysis of certain target problems, particularly with a view to policing or at least stimulating the work already being done somewhere in the Government. We looked on RAND's role here as supplementary rather than as initiatory.

Shaw:

Under the economics of vulnerability we included 7:6, 8:1a, 8:b, 8:c and 8:6. It was stressed that in analyzing vulnerability we should first of all have as clear a picture as possible of the form scale of the attack we must expect, and, within which the attack may come. When we have a fairly clear notion as to what the military dimensions of the attack may be, then we can proceed intelligently with certain very specific studies, a number of which have been suggested.

Illustrations of these specific studies included: (a) an analysis of the vulnerability of individual industries in two senses -- vulnerability from the standpoint of the military, and also from the standpoint of the maintenance of civilian living. Care was taken to point out that in the modern total war it is extremely difficult to separate those two facets of the problem. It is difficult to say where the military necessities of looking into vulnerability end, and where the civilian necessities begin. (b) It was suggested that studies be made of the vulnerability of single cities. (c) Other specific studies which were suggested had to do with the various devices for maximizing invulnerability. It was pointed out that mere geographical dispersion was only one of the devices, and probably one of the clumsiest. Other devices suggested include stockpiling, etc. (d) It was suggested that in our study of vulnerability we should study a catastrophe economy -- in the extreme case, possibly a catastrophe economy which would result if no action was taken to secure invulnerability - and by working backward visualize at least the minimum steps that should be taken toward reducing vulnerability. (e) There was also a specific suggestion that World War II historical studies should be undertaken to see what measures were successful in reducing vulnerability. (f) Another useful historical study is one of population movements in periods other than wartime. Explicitly, the suggestion was made that the population movements in vacation periods be studied to see how quickly populations could be moved. The greater the speed, the less the need of taking precautionary measures to reduce vulnerability.

It was stressed that in analyzing these devices one should have due attention for the resistances that would develop to each one of them. One should understand their economic, political, social, and psychological costs. What ideally any study should strive to do is to make a marginal balance between the gains in invulnerability to be achieved from any one instrument, and the increments of resistances to the use of that instrument.

Under the economics of mobilization (illustrated by projects 7:5, 7:6, 8:1b, 8:5, 8:7, 8:8, 8:9, and 10:5), we stressed the fact that in the next war the United States will be immediately on the front line, that the war will come very quickly, that speed will be of the essence in mobilization. If speed is essential, so is planning, and if planning is to be done successfully, the responsibility for it must be clearly set. The question was raised as to whether an administrative agency with explicit responsibility for mobilization, possibly also for taking measures in line with invulnerability, should be established. A number of very specific proposals were made in this connection. (a) Some of the most important ones had to do with stockpiling. It was pointed out that RAND could make some very valuable suggestions regarding the use of stockpiling for combined purposes. RAND might be able to say that civilian and military purposes in stockpiling were or were not compatible. RAND could also make suggestions as to how stockpiling should cover not only domestic resources

Shaw: but also the resources of potential allies. The thesis running through the discussion of stockpiling was that the next war will come so quickly and be so damaging that in effect we may have to fight it on our working capital. Our fixed capital equipment will be relatively unimportant. The working capital will consist not only of supplies that are obviously military in character, but also of civilian supplies. We might have to fight with stockpiles of weapons, we would have to fight from stockpiles for the maintenance of our allies and for the maintenance of our own civilian population. We might have to defend ourselves, as well as attack, out of stockpiles. Under this basic assumption the subject of stockpiling becomes one of the major problems put before RAND, especially by this panel. (b) It was suggested that manpower is one of the resources which, in a sense, can be split into working and fixed capital categories. In order to make use of the existing talents of the population, of our working capital equipment in manpower, we should see if there is some possibility of utilizing the next census to give us a clear indication of where the talents are, what the stock of talents is, and where the deficiencies in talents lie - which obviously involves a forcast of what the necessities for manpower will be in the next war.

In connection with this study of mobilization we passed much more quickly over certain subsidiary topics, such as the financial aspects of mobilization and aspects as the post-war consequences of different methods of mobilization, although we indicated that the post-war consequences might be a minor criterion in selecting the mobilization techniques. It was decided that RAND probably should not invade the field of studying the postwar consequences of war-time finance, since that field is being exploited so intensively. Stress was made in the discussion of mobilization not only on the economic aspects, but on the political aspects.

It seemed to be a logical corollary of the assumptions that war will come very quickly and will be a total war that we cannot rely upon free markets to handle the mobilization, and there is some doubt as to whether we can rely upon democratic political institutions for the mobilization. There is some question as to whether we can rely on the ordinary incentives that may have been sufficient in past wars for mobilization. What may be required is essentially a social revolution. Mobilization will amount to transforming the entire political and social system into an instrument for warfare.

There is an integrating influence through these four problems. We have indicated all the way along that there is another dimension of integration, namely, that between the disciplines. We have indicated a third dimension of integration -- the need for a central governmental agency with a sense of responsibility for these various aspects of the economic and sociological and political sciences of warfare.

COMMITTEE III
ECONOMIC STUDIES

J. Viner (Chairman)

C.I. Barnard	F. Neumann
A.J. Coale	W.F. Ogburn
C. Dollard	L. Ridenour
W.T.R. Fox	E. Shaw
C.J. Hitch	F. Lorimer

Viner: On the study of the possibilities of the range of use of economic instruments for diplomatic purposes, the crucial or controversial projects ought to be selected. For instance, the use of American financial aid to win friends or to restore political health to a community on the assumption that that will lead to better cooperation with us raises problems to be studied. The next question is, "What efficient ways are there of using economic means for obtaining foreign policy objectives?" It would have been very well if six months ago a good group had had a notion that the Marshall Plan was going to be launched and had been able to do hard thinking and a survey of whatever they could see in terms of then available data so that there would now be available to policy making people the recent opinions of a group.

Lorimer: Do you feel that this is a project in which some useful results could be attained by social science procedures?

Viner: Many of the things that have been discussed are worthwhile doing merely in the sense that somebody who had been thinking a long time on these problems could get an essay into shape. The question as to whether there is room for large-scale research in the field of the techniques and the possibilities of the use of economic instruments of conciliatory or coercive diplomacy is a question requiring and deserving a good deal of study. It would be a pioneer field of investigation. And just on general principles, I would regard a practice as important as that has become as a topic deserving of systematic thought and investigation by some branch of the social sciences.

Hitch: There has been a good deal of experience now with most of these techniques. There is some historical experience to be analysed. A great deal could be learned from it.

Viner: There is not much to be learned from an existing literature because I am sure that there is no existing literature. I think I'm right in saying that the available bibliography would consist altogether of source material and not systematic analysis. This is a new field. If RAND were to move into it and do a good job, aside from its contribution to the purposes of RAND this would be a pioneer achievement in the field of international relations.

Project 6:1a was originally titled "International Trade Regulations." The conclusion of the panel discussion was a rephrasing from the standpoint of survival of a

Viner: free enterprise system in its dealing with a state-controlled economy. That is susceptible of useful investigation.

Project 6:1b, "U.S. Tariff Policy" in the original, was rephrased to study the effects of policies which are usually regarded as domestic but which affect our foreign relations.

Neumann: This project ties in very closely with the political project (5:3) of interaction of domestic and foreign political factors. These two should be considered together.

Fox: The implication is that we are interested in projects either to strengthen our side or weaken the other. There is a third kind of consideration which might be just as valuable. It might be in our interest simply to have somebody else strong against everybody.

Viner: In planning a program the nature and tone and psychology of dealing with a potential enemy would be so different from that of dealing with a potential ally that these would break up into separate projects. This is, in a sense, a *logical* arrangement; in practice it might be very difficult to know whether you are coercing or appeasing. Nevertheless in listing projects it might be useful to think of them separately. On 6:1c, the chief suggestion made was that not too much stress be put on the word 'industrialization' except as describing one form of economic development.

Lorimer: 6:1d was combined with 7:3 and 6:2 into a general study of economic causes of war. This is a general study designed to test certain of the hypotheses about economic conditions leading to war.

Viner: My own feeling about (b) of 6:4 is that it would deserve at least the essay type of research in which somebody whose general judgment and background knowledge was held in high regard could be persuaded to give it serious thought. Whether there is room here for a systematic and substantial research task and what the nature of the data would be beyond a study of opinion and analysis of opinion of qualified persons, I don't know. My guess is that the economic aspect would not be the dominant aspect as a source of friction. My feeling about many of these projects is that the optimum procedure for the next stage would be to give somewhat more thought to their phrasing and to the idea underlying the project. Then, use the essay approach first. I'd say this deserves that much at least. I don't know whether a large scale research project should be established on this. What sorts of materials would be worked with? My advice would be against embarking on the research itself soon. I'd have exploration of the idea by essay first. In (a) there is already material for a project. What do particular countries do now? What are the features by which monopoly trading systems make their contacts with foreign countries? Even that has not been done sytematically. These are relatively new phenomena, and something can be done in the way of collecting and analyzing existing data that I believe has not yet been done. I think there is undoubtedly room here for a moderate scale research project.

Barnard: I'd like to make a comment on Note 1 on (b). All through this conference there has been an acceptance of a specific demarcation between socialism on one side and free enterprise and democracy on the other as if they were pure types. This note was qualified with respect to the socialistic structure but it should also be qualified

Barnard: with respect to free enterprise capitalism. One of the important things to do is to study the conflict between the idealology of the free market, individualism and wide-open competition, and actual practice as it's developing in America.

Viner: There are two things here: the distinction between free market and monopoly and the distinction between private enterprise and government. Both things have to be studied. Of course the socialistic state tends to be monopolistic government, but the monopoly element is important. The monopoly may be private, and some of the problems are the same whether it's government monopoly or private monopoly but some are different. The fact that it's a government that you are trading with creates certain operative patterns and institutions which make things different. It also creates a different psychology. It's important to distinguish the different degrees of free market and to distinguish between private and government operations. I suspect that frictions can develop from government operations even when the government is not a monopoly. The increased importance of the government in trading creates a problem deserving of investigation and study. Fox has already worked on the problems created for international relations by government acting as a trader, irrespective of whether the government is a monopoly or not.

We next consider 6:4b "Economic Objectives and Consequences of Russian Policy." Panel 6 regarded the major content of this project as being a consideration of the economic effects of past and probable future Russian expansion, including a study of Russian economic motives in generating a desire for expansion. Let's, for the sake of the record, suggest for consideration a study of Russian techniques of territorial expansion through economic penetration, etc., also possibly the use of economic coercions. In other words, a study of the Russian techniques of appeasement, partnership, persuasion, and coercion, would be appropriate if there is available some reasonably reliable data. I don't know how much is available.

Fox: Is this a special case of the kinds of tensions which are generated between socialist and non-socialist systems?

Viner: The answer might develop as a result of the study. Whether Russia is operating strikingly differently from what she'd do if she were a capitalist state in these matters is not obvious to me except insofar as she wins approval or gets a fifth column.

Lorimer: I'm a little troubled by the number of suggestions that are of the essay type. I'm not disparaging the value of careful theoretical work in formulating general theory; I think we have not enough of this in our society. But I am somewhat troubled about the extent to which that is an appropriate type of activity for the RAND Project. This has come up all through these projects. It depends primarily on the intellectual caliber, background, and scholarly qualities of an individual or a small group that works as a team. It is a little difficult for me to see how RAND can do much of that kind of promotion, although maybe it can.

Viner: I alone am responsible for any suggestions that something ought to be done on the essay style. It ought not to carry any more weight than my suggestion. I thought of the essay as a survey of the problem and of what's known of it, to see whether a large scale research project was justified. What I have chiefly in mind is not what can be done with the essay but how cautious the RAND Project should be before it launches a big research program. It better have a preliminary bird's-eye view of the

Viner: particular problem before it goes deep into a large-scale project. In any case I think the chief value for the RAND Project of these essays is to find out where not to conduct research, rather than to count that essay as itself an important piece of research.

Ridenour: I would join with Lorimer in the view that the essay of the individual scholar upon such questions may be rather empty of value, simply because he is an individual scholar. It has a point of view which is only represented in what he writes down. The approach to a problem from people with varying backgrounds in many disciplines may yield something of great value.

Viner: The notion that there is something peculiarly defective in the single mind, and that that defect is cured by bringing a lot of poorer minds together, and that that becomes real research, seems to me to have no validity.

Barnard: For the record there should be included here my suggestion of Project 13:7, a study of the "Trend of Economic Factors Affecting Unity and Disunity."

Viner: The second classification is "Effectively using and defending yourself against coercion (a) to forestall war, (b) to weaken an enemy, and (c) to win a favorable alliance or to break or weaken hostile groups." That was called cold war; it relates cold war, economic warfare, and peacefare. Project 7:2 was not framed properly and should be dropped.

Fox: The lack of projects about use of coercion in peacetime is more apparent than real. Many of the items in our first group could also have that direction or be given that direction.

Viner: Probably a good many of these projects would have to be carried out so that you simultaneously take care of both objectives. There is a distinction there which you ought to consider for purposes of acceptance or rejection or amendment, and which may have some value in guiding organization of research. Research as to the procedures for planning preparedness is different from research about techniques and problems of executing the preparedness program for a war which is not imminent.

Coale: We should refer to the summary of Panel 8 to cover the projects listed here under "Preparedness for War."

Viner: In terms of adaptation of democratic government procedures to war or to crisis conditions, there was a research project connected with the importance and difficulty of maintaining secrecy and speed in a democracy. I take it that we would be agreed that this question of secrecy is also one of the legitimate difficulties of the democratic procedure to be added to the one that was stressed here. The support of both committees, then, is given to this field of research. It highly deserves consideration. The very last topic is "Government of a Defeated Foe." Suppose that the United States does get into a war, or suppose the United States uses its cold war techniques effectively so that there results a collapse of government in a potential enemy country. What then do we do? Now that's a nice question.

Dollard: May I ask how you go about doing research on what you would do if an unnamed country collapsed?

Viner: The question of how you organize an occupation currency, the question of how you organize an occupation police force, the question of what you do to organize local government when you've disposed of the existing local government -- there's a big field there of research in terms of experience.

Dollard: Wouldn't it make any difference what country it was?

Viner: You and I know what country we're thinking of. In this particular place, there is no secret about that. I am surprised if there would be any difficulty about this as being both a field that might repay study, given certain contingencies, and a field that is appropriate for the RAND Project.

Fox: There is a project analyzing occupation experience which did not receive a very high rating from the panel when we first looked at it. It was discussed this afternoon in terms of whether Russia was the country which the United States ever could occupy and whether there is any military objective which we could attain by actually going on to Moscow and taking over.

Neumann: Although I do not want to make a plea for the project, I would like to say that research in this field is not very difficult, provided that the research is not directed to all the alternative solutions. The plans that had been drafted for occupation two years prior to defeat of Germany and Japan are now declassified and available to the general public, and the pattern for such study has already been set, so that if the project should receive a high priority I cannot see any reason why it cannot be carried out.

Ridenour: Would there be any interest in investigating techniques appropriate to our collapse?

Viner: I would suppose that the Germans, for instance, did some thinking on what they would do when they got here, and when they undermined the French government and had to deal with a government that was in their hands. I would share the opinion of Panel 5 that applied to Russia the thing sounds rather absurd, but applied to some of the satellite countries I should think it would merit careful study.

Turn to the fourth group, "Method of Warfare." Project 7:6 (Stockpiling) was one of the proposals that got the most extensive discussion in Panel 7. A good deal of discussion went to extension of the project on the ground that stockpiling would be very important.

Shaw: I'd like to try to rescue something out of project 7:2. The research method has a suggestion in it that can be developed into something. We had very little to say about ways of diagnosing the increasing or decreasing strength of our potential political allies, or of our actual political allies. One step that might be taken in diagnosing their strength or changes in it is to diagnose what's going to happen to their willingness to join us as allies, or to their ability to help us as allies, as a result of changes in their method of doing things economically. What, one may ask, will be the result of the nationalization of the British steel industry to Britain's position as an ally of ours? What may possibly be the result (I can say off hand it will probably be very small) of nationalization of the Australian banking system? Should our foreign policy be concerned with it enough to watch the results? In general, it seems to me,

Shaw: we haven't done very much about putting a thermometer in the mouths of the countries who are supposedly going to go along with us, and that this is the one project which seems to bring that point out into the open.

Hitch: That might be a very good project for someone. I don't know whether RAND is the right group to make a continuing analysis of developments in the potential allied countries, their strength and weakness.

Ogburn: I'm quite enthusiastic about the project. It is a step in the necessary integration in any group of states that are engaged in a struggle, and some research on it is highly necessary before policy is undertaken. Otherwise policy might be carried out in a very narrow-minded fashion and be very detrimental.

Shaw: This is a project having to do with means of appreciating and understanding economic developments among the allies, and where it appears advisable, assisting the allies economically well in advance of the outbreak of hostilities.

Lorimer: There was strong resistance to the concept of a belligerency index, but a careful analysis of details of the economy and economic developments, particularly in a country with state control, might be a very practical project. That's quite different from this construction of an index, which wouldn't use mathematics at all, but numerology. It might be quite appropriate for RAND to make a careful analysis of different elements to see to what extent other countries are engaged in war preparation. That might provide some useful information on the question of the potential threat of war. It might be one of the ways of avoiding being caught off guard.

Viner: There was discussion of this point in a Panel and general agreement that what might be very worth while doing was to study the outlines or the plan of a system of gathering the appropriate information, but that the operation of that plan belonged properly to the regular intelligence service of the military forces. An independent study of what sorts of materials an intelligence service should try to get, and how it should use them would be a sensible and important enterprise.

Hitch: It should not be restricted to the economic intelligence.

Viner: These committees have been called economic, and in general, they have fairly well confined themselves to economic considerations, or economic objectives. That was based on a division of labor and not on the notion that any of these really important problems were not pervasive and didn't involve almost every possible technique and mixture of objectives. RAND is going to have a major problem in that it will have to exercise the responsibility to see that the actual research designs and their execution are not carried out in too narrow a frame-work. They shouldn't be carried out in the excessive specialization which is good for certain purposes, but certainly not good on any policy matter where you have to use every tool available and every kind of information that's relevant. It's clear that even though the record may have the word "economic" on many of the projects where it was appropriate, most or all of us would have agreed that we could have reframed it completely with just as much emphasis on the political, sociological, or psychological. This specialization in our discussion did not represent a deliberate specialization in our thinking.